Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction'', 'Locke on Human Understanding' and 'Individuals in Aristotle'

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12 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition

10528	Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Our concern in giving a definition is not to say how things are by to say how we wish to speak
	From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310)
	A reaction: This sounds like an acceptable piece of wisdom which arises out of analytical and linguistic philosophy. It puts a damper on the Socratic dream of using definition of reveal the nature of reality.

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle

10529	If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Neo-Fregeans have thought that Hume's Principle, and the like, might be definitive of number and therefore not subject to the usual epistemological worries over its truth.
	From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310)
	A reaction: This seems to be the underlying dream of logicism - that arithmetic is actually brought into existence by definitions, rather than by truths derived from elsewhere. But we must be able to count physical objects, as well as just counting numbers.

10530	Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: The fundamental difficulty facing the neo-Fregean is to either adopt the predicative reading of Hume's Principle, defining numbers, but inadequate, or the impredicative reading, which is adequate, but not really a definition.
	From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.312)
	A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but the general drift is the difficulty of building a system which has been brought into existence just by definition.

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism

7720	Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
	Full Idea: A problem for resemblance nominalism is that in saying that two particulars 'resemble' one another, it is necessary to specify in what respect they do so (e.g. colour, shape, size), and this threatens to reintroduce what appears to be talk of universals.
	From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
	A reaction: We see resemblance between faces instantly, long before we can specify the 'respects' of the resemblance. This supports the Humean hard-wired view of resemblance, rather than some appeal to Platonic universals.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined

7712	On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
	Full Idea: Later philosophers emphasised different strands of Aristotle's concept of substances: Leibniz (in his theory of monads) emphasised their unity; Spinoza emphasised their ontological independence; Locke emphasised their role in relation to qualities.
	From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.4)
	A reaction: Note that this Aristotelian idea had not been jettisoned in the late seventeenth century, unlike other Aristotelianisms. I think it is only with the success of atomism in chemistry that the idea of substance is forced to recede.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus

16157	Insurance on the original ship would hardly be paid out if the plank version was wrecked! [Frede,M]
	Full Idea: No insurance company, presented with a policy written for 'Theoris' [the original ship] would pay for damages suffered if the ship contructed from the old planks had been shipwrecked.
	From: Michael Frede (Individuals in Aristotle [1978])
	A reaction: A very nicely dramatic way of presenting what is taken to be the usual reading of the basic case - that the original identity tracks the continuity of the original structure, not the matter.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception

7710	Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
	Full Idea: According to one school of thought, perception is simply a mode of belief-acquisition,and there is no reason to suppose that any element of sensation is literally involved in perception.
	From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.3)
	A reaction: Blindsight would be an obvious supporting case for this view. I think this point is crucial in understanding what is wrong with Jackson's 'knowledge argument' (involving Mary, see Idea 7377). Sensation gives knowledge, so it can't be knowledge.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception

7711	Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
	Full Idea: Only a causal theory of perception will respect the facts of physiology and physics ...meaning a theory which maintains that for a subject to perceive a physical object the subject should enjoy some appropriate perceptual experience caused by the object.
	From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.3)
	A reaction: If I hallucinate an object, then presumably I am not allowed to say that I 'perceive' it, but that seems to make the causal theory an idle tautology. If we are in virtual reality then there aren't any objects.

16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self

7714	Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
	Full Idea: There is the question of the identity of a person over or across time ('diachronic' personal identity), and there is also the question of what makes for personal identity at a time ('synchronic' personal identity).
	From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.5)
	A reaction: This seems to me to be the first and most important distinction in the philosophy of personal identity, and they regularly get run together. Locke, for example, has an account of synchronic identity, which is often ignored. It applies to objects too.

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought

7715	Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
	Full Idea: 'Mentalese' would be neither conventional nor a means of public communication so that even to call it a language is seriously misleading.
	From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
	A reaction: It is, however, supposed to contain symbolic representations which are then used as tokens for computation, so it seems close to a language, if (for example) symbolic logic or mathematics were accepted as languages. But who understands it?

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence

10527	An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: If an abstraction principle is going to be acceptable, then it should not 'inflate', i.e. it should not result in there being more abstracts than there are objects. By this mark Hume's Principle will be acceptable, but Frege's Law V will not.
	From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.307)
	A reaction: I take this to be motivated by my own intuition that abstract concepts had better be rooted in the world, or they are not worth the paper they are written on. The underlying idea this sort of abstraction is that it is 'shared' between objects.

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental

7722	If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
	Full Idea: If meaning is a private mental picture, what does 'the cat is NOT on the mat' mean, and how does it differ from 'the dog is not on the mat?'.
	From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
	A reaction: Not insurmountable. We picture an empty mat, combined with a cat (or whatever) located somewhere else. A mental 'picture' of something shouldn't be contrued as a single image in a neat black frame.