Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism', 'Dialektik' and 'Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad'

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8 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads

12695	Epicurean atomists say body is sensible, to distinguish it from space. [Garber]
	Full Idea: The Epicurean atomists also defined body in terms of the property of being sensible, in order to distinguish it from empty space, which is not sensible.
	From: Daniel Garber (Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad [2009], 1)
	A reaction: This is a very illuminating bit of background, for those of us who have the knee-jerk reaction that monadology is barking mad.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism

12295	3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Three-dimensionalist think a thing is somehow 'stretched out' through its location at a given time though not through the period during which it exists, and it is present in its entirety at a moment when it exists though not at a position of its location.
	From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.1)
	A reaction: This definition is designed to set up Fine's defence of the 3-D view, by showing that various dubious asymmetries show up if you do not respect the distinctions offered by the 3-D view.

12298	Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: In order to have genuine motion, rather than mere variation in position, it is necessary that the object should be 'entirely present' at each moment of the change. Thus without entire presence, or existence, genuine motion will not be possible.
	From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.6)
	A reaction: See Idea 4786 for a rival view of motion. Of course, who says we have to have Kit Fine's 'genuine' motion, if some sort of ersatz motion still gets you to work in the morning?

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism

12296	4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Four-dimensionalists have thought that a material thing is as equally 'stretched out' in time as it is in space, and that there is no special way in which it is entirely present at a moment rather than at a position.
	From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.1)
	A reaction: Compare his definition of 3-D in Idea 12295. The 4-D is contrary to our normal way of thinking. Since I don't think the future exists, I presume that if I am a 4-D object then I have to say that I don't yet exist, and I disapprove of such talk.

18882	You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons]
	Full Idea: Fine says it is acceptable to ask when a wedding was and where it was, and it is acceptable to ask or state where the bride was (at a certain time), but not when she was.
	From: report of Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.18) by Peter Simons - Modes of Extension: comment on Fine p.18
	A reaction: This is aimed at three-dimensionalists who seem to think that a bride is a prolonged event, just as a wedding is. Fine is, interestingly, invoking ordinary language. When did the wedding start and end? When was the bride's birth and death?

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts

12297	Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Even if one is a three-dimensionalist, one might affirm the existence of temporal parts, on the grounds that everything merely endures for an instant.
	From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.2)
	A reaction: This seems an important point, as belief in temporal parts is normally equated with four-dimensionalism (see Idea 12296). The idea is that a thing might be 'entirely present' at each instant, only to be replaced by a simulacrum.

19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique

20959	Concepts are only analytic once the predicate is absorbed into the subject [Schleiermacher]
	Full Idea: The difference between analytic and synthetic judgements is an unimportant fluid one. 'Ice melts' is analytic if it is already taken up into the concept of ice, and synthetic if not yet taken up. It is just a different state of the formation of concepts.
	From: Friedrich Schleiermacher (Dialektik [1833], p.563), quoted by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy 8 'Scientific'
	A reaction: [compressed] I wonder if Quine ever encountered this quotation. The idea refers to Kant's notion of analyticity, and makes the good point that predicates only become 'contained in the subject' once the situation is very familiar.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism

12705	Epicurean atoms are distinguished by their extreme hardness [Garber]
	Full Idea: In Epicurean atomism (of Cordemoy, for example) there is a world of basic things distinguished by virtue of their extreme hardness.
	From: Daniel Garber (Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad [2009], 2)
	A reaction: Garber says that Leibniz espouses 'substantial atomism', which is different from this. Leibniz's atoms have active power, where these atoms just embody total resistance.