Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Varieties of Necessity', 'An Outline of Empiricism' and 'Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks'

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5 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason

23248	Early empiricists said reason was just a useless concept introduced by philosophers [Galen, by Frede,M]
	Full Idea: The so-called Empiricists in Hellenistic times [as cited by Galen] denied the existence of reason, treating it as a useless theoretical postulate introduced by some philosophers
	From: report of Galen (An Outline of Empiricism [c.170], 87.4-9.28ff) by Michael Frede - Intro to 'Rationality in Greek Thought' p.3
	A reaction: I think 'be sensible' is understood by everyone, but 'use your reason' is far from obvious. The main role of reason seems to be as an identifier for human exceptionalism. Animals obviously make good judgements. Frede thinks the empiricists were right.

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity

9216	Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: The three sources of necessity - the identity of things, the natural order, and the normative order - have their own peculiar forms of necessity. The three main areas of human enquiry - metaphysics, science and ethics - each has its own necessity.
	From: Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 6)
	A reaction: I would treat necessity in ethics with caution, if it is not reducible to natural or metaphysical necessity. Fine's proposal is interesting, but I did not find it convincing, especially in its view that metaphysical necessity doesn't intrude into nature.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony

9214	Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: I may have good reason to believe some testimony, for example, even though the person providing the testimony has no good reason for saying what he does.
	From: Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 5)
	A reaction: Thus small children, madmen and dreamers may occasionally get things right without realising it. I take testimony to be merely one more batch of evidence which has to be assessed in building the most coherent picture possible.

23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence

20130	It is absurd to think you can change your own essence, like a garment [Nietzsche]
	Full Idea: Man is necessity down to his last fibre, and totally 'unfree', that is if one means by freedom the foolish demand to be able to change one's 'essentia' arbitrarily, like a garment.
	From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks [1873], p.7), quoted by Brian Leiter - Nietzsche On Morality 2 'Realism'
	A reaction: This is the big difference between the existentialism of Nietzsche and the more famous Sartrean approach, where the idea of being able to remake your essence is the most exciting and glamorous proposal. I'm with Nietzsche.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism

9215	Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: It would be harder to break P-and-Q implying P than the connection between cause and effect. This difference in strictness means it is more plausible that natural necessities include metaphysical necessities, than vice versa.
	From: Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 6)
	A reaction: I cannot see any a priori grounds for the claim that causation is more easily disrupted than logic. It seems to be based on the strategy of inferring possibilities from what can be imagined, which seems to me to lead to wild misunderstandings.