13 ideas
9327 | Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick] |
Full Idea: Organisms come to better understand their worlds by coming to better understand themselves and the ways in which their own structures engage their worlds. | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §III) | |
A reaction: Van Gulick is defending a higher-order theory of consciousness, but this strikes me as a good rationale for the target of philosophy, which has increasingly (since Descartes) focused on understanding our own minds. |
16755 | The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong [Fine,K, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Aristotle seems to have a possible basis for the belief [in individual forms], namely that forms are real and active principles in the world, which is denied by any right-minded modern. | |
From: report of Kit Fine (A Puzzle Concerning Matter and Form [1994], p.19) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.3 n8 | |
A reaction: Pasnau says this is the view of forms promoted by the scholastics, whereas Aristotle's own view should be understood as 'metaphysical'. |
9325 | In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick] |
Full Idea: In contrast with standard notions of knowledge, the concept of understanding emphasizes the element of practical engagement from the outset. | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §II) | |
A reaction: This could be the very interesting germ of a huge revolution in our approach to epistemology, which I find rather appealing. Plato's desire that knowledge should have 'logos' seems to me in the same area. It sounds rather internalist, which is good. |
9326 | Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick] |
Full Idea: Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how. | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §II) | |
A reaction: This thought could rather rapidly revive the discredited notion of knowing-how. I think it might slot into an account of the mind in terms of levels, so that my internalist view of knowledge emerges at higher levels, built on more basic responses. |
7401 | Heat and colour don't exist, so cannot mislead about the external world [Galileo, by Tuck] |
Full Idea: Galileo argued that there is no such thing as heat (and hence also as colour) in the external world, so there is no reason to conclude from colour-blindness that we cannot know the truth about the world. | |
From: report of Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.1 | |
A reaction: This key idea, taken up by Gassendi, Descartes and Locke, seems to me to be one of the most important (and, in retrospect, rather obvious) facts ever worked out by the human mind. Why does anyone still doubt it? |
5454 | Tastes, odours and colours only reside in consciousness, and would disappear with creatures [Galileo] |
Full Idea: I think tastes, odours, colours, and so on are mere names as far as the objects are concerned, and only reside in consciousness. Hence if the living creature were removed, all these qualities would be wiped away and annihilated. | |
From: Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]), quoted by Brian Ellis - The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism Ch.3 | |
A reaction: A nice bold assertion of the primary/secondary distinction from the first great scientist. I agree, and to disagree (and hence side with Berkeley and Hume) is to head for metaphsical and epistemological confusion. |
16560 | Galileo introduced geometrico-mechanical explanation, based on Archimedes [Galileo, by Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: The modern idea of explaining with mechanisms became current in the 17th century when Galileo articulated a geometrico-mechanical form of explanation based on Archimedes' simple machines. This became the 'mechanical philosophy'. | |
From: report of Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]) by Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C - Thinking About Mechanisms 5.2 | |
A reaction: So is Archimedes the source? I would say that mechanical explanation is just commonsense, and is predominant in all human thinking, even in tiny infants. |
9319 | Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick] |
Full Idea: Is consciousness just a special type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a special way of being conscious? | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is a really good key question, which has hovered over the debate since Locke's definition of a person (as 'self-aware'). I take the self to be a mechanism of most brains, which is prior to consciousness. Maybe the two are inseparable. |
9320 | Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick] |
Full Idea: Higher-order thought (HOT) models treat metastates as thought-like, and higher-order perception (HOP) models regard them as at least quasi-perceptual and resulting from some form of inner monitoring or inner sense. | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §I) | |
A reaction: I would understand 'thought' to at least partially involve judgements. The HOT theory (Carruthers) seems to suit epistemological foundationalists, who want truth to enter on the ground floor. This pushes me towards the HOP model (Lycan) as more plausible. |
9321 | Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick] |
Full Idea: Higher-order models would effectively reduce the problem of consciousness to that of intentionality. | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §I) | |
A reaction: This gives the bigger picture - that higher-order theories are the cutting edge of attempts to give a naturalistic, reductivist account of consciousness. That seems to be the only way to go, so we should encourage them in the enterprise. |
9322 | Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick] |
Full Idea: Some higher-order theorists say we have qualitative but unconscious mental states of color or pain (qualia), but there is nothing it is like to be in such a state, which needs higher-order awareness. The meta-states are devoid of qualia. | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §I.5) | |
A reaction: He calls this the 'stranded qualia' problem. Clearly one begins to sharpen Ockham's Razor at this point, if the higher-level state isn't contributing something. I don't rule out unconscious qualia. The strength of a real pain is distorted in a dream. |
3645 | To understand the universe mathematics is essential [Galileo] |
Full Idea: The great book of the universe cannot be understood unless one can understand the language in which it is written - the language of mathematics. | |
From: Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623], VI.232) | |
A reaction: Nice, though one might say that humans created the language of maths to help them discuss the patterns they perceived in nature. Maybe what is special is order, and all order can be described mathematically. |
9324 | From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick] |
Full Idea: From the teleopragmatic perspective, life itself is largely an informational process. | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006]) | |
A reaction: From the cynical perspective a human is just 'blood and foul smell in a bag', but that may not give you whole story. The point here is that the informational view will cover both the genetic and the mental levels of human life. True but unilluminating? |