Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Puzzle Concerning Matter and Form', 'Molyneux's Question' and 'Phil of Mathematics and Natural Science'

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3 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence

16755	The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong [Fine,K, by Pasnau]
	Full Idea: Aristotle seems to have a possible basis for the belief [in individual forms], namely that forms are real and active principles in the world, which is denied by any right-minded modern.
	From: report of Kit Fine (A Puzzle Concerning Matter and Form [1994], p.19) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.3 n8
	A reaction: Pasnau says this is the view of forms promoted by the scholastics, whereas Aristotle's own view should be understood as 'metaphysical'.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems

7639	The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans]
	Full Idea: The 'homunculus fallacy' attempts to explain what is involved in a subject's being related to objects in the external world by appealing to the existence of an inner situation which recapitulates the essential features of the original situation.
	From: Gareth Evans (Molyneux's Question [1978], p.397)
	A reaction: This is obviously right, but we aren't forced to settle for direct realism. Inner perception may be very different, or we may employ the idea of Dennett and Lycan, that the homunculi don't regress, they deteriorate steadily down into mechanisms.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism

10246	The limit of science is isomorphism of theories, with essences a matter of indifference [Weyl]
	Full Idea: A science can determine its domain of investigation up to an isomorphic mapping. It remains quite indifferent as to the 'essence' of its objects. The idea of isomorphism demarcates the self-evident boundary of cognition.
	From: Hermann Weyl (Phil of Mathematics and Natural Science [1949], 25-7), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics
	A reaction: Shapiro quotes this in support of his structuralism, but it is a striking expression of the idea that if there are such things as essences, they are beyond science. I take Weyl to be wrong. Best explanation reaches out beyond models to essences.