Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Varieties of Necessity', 'Philosophy of Mind (Encylopedia III)' and 'Letters to Antoine Arnauld'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

6 ideas

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
21963 It is possible that an omnipotent God might make one and two fail to equal three [Descartes]
     Full Idea: Since every basic truth depends on God's omnipotence, I would not dare to say that God cannot make it....that one and two should not be three.
     From: René Descartes (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1645]), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 01.3
     A reaction: An unusual view. Most people would say that if Descartes can doubt something that simple, he should also doubt his reasons for believing in God's existence.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
9216 Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The three sources of necessity - the identity of things, the natural order, and the normative order - have their own peculiar forms of necessity. The three main areas of human enquiry - metaphysics, science and ethics - each has its own necessity.
     From: Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 6)
     A reaction: I would treat necessity in ethics with caution, if it is not reducible to natural or metaphysical necessity. Fine's proposal is interesting, but I did not find it convincing, especially in its view that metaphysical necessity doesn't intrude into nature.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
9214 Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: I may have good reason to believe some testimony, for example, even though the person providing the testimony has no good reason for saying what he does.
     From: Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 5)
     A reaction: Thus small children, madmen and dreamers may occasionally get things right without realising it. I take testimony to be merely one more batch of evidence which has to be assessed in building the most coherent picture possible.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
22040 Freedom is produced by the activity of the mind, and is not intrinsically given [Hegel]
     Full Idea: Actual freedom is not something immediately existent in mindedness, but is something to be produced by the mind's own activity. It is thus as the producer of its freedom that we have to consider mindedness in philosophy.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Philosophy of Mind (Encylopedia III) [1817], §382, Zusatz), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 11
     A reaction: Pinkard glosses this as an agent being free by being the centre of a group of social responsibilities. Hence I presume small children have no freedom. Presumably we could deprive citizens of all responsibility, and hence of metaphysical freedom.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
22039 Geist is distinct from nature, not as a substance, but because of its normativity [Hegel, by Pinkard]
     Full Idea: Hegel argued that it was the impossibility of a naturalistic account of normativity that distinguished Geist from nature, not Geist's being any kind of metaphysical substance.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Philosophy of Mind (Encylopedia III) [1817]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 11
     A reaction: Hegel always seems to want to have his cake and eat it. Without a mental substance, how can Geist not be part of nature? What is Geist made of? Is his view functionalist? But that is usually naturalistic. Is normativity magic?
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
9215 Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: It would be harder to break P-and-Q implying P than the connection between cause and effect. This difference in strictness means it is more plausible that natural necessities include metaphysical necessities, than vice versa.
     From: Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 6)
     A reaction: I cannot see any a priori grounds for the claim that causation is more easily disrupted than logic. It seems to be based on the strategy of inferring possibilities from what can be imagined, which seems to me to lead to wild misunderstandings.