21844
|
The history of philosophy is an agent of power: how can you think if you haven't read the great names? [Deleuze]
|
|
Full Idea:
The history of philosophy has always been the agent of power in philosophy, and even in thought. It has played the oppressor's role: how can you think without having read Plato, Descartes, Kant and Heidegger.
|
|
From:
Gilles Deleuze (A Conversation: what is it? What is it for? [1977], I)
|
|
A reaction:
I find it hard to relate to this French 1960s obsession with everybody being oppressed in every conceivable way, so that 'liberation' is the only value that matters. If you ask why liberty is needed, you seem to have missed the point.
|
9766
|
Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
My investigation of vagueness began with the question 'What is the correct logic of vagueness?', which led to the further question 'What are the correct truth-conditions for a vague language?', which led to questions of meaning and existence.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], Intro)
|
|
A reaction:
This is the most perfect embodiment of the strategy of analytical philosophy which I have ever read. It is the strategy invented by Frege in the 'Grundlagen'. Is this still the way to go, or has this pathway slowly sunk into the swamp?
|
21839
|
When I meet objections I just move on; they never contribute anything [Deleuze]
|
|
Full Idea:
Not reflection, and objections are even worse. Every time someone puts an objection to me, I want to say: 'OK, OK, let's get on to something else'. Objections have never contributed anything.
|
|
From:
Gilles Deleuze (A Conversation: what is it? What is it for? [1977], I)
|
|
A reaction:
I know it is heresy in analytic philosophy, but I love this! In analytic seminars you can barely complete your first sentence before someone interrupts. It's like road range - the philosophical mind state is always poised to attack, attack.
|
21842
|
Don't assess ideas for truth or justice; look for another idea, and establish a relationship with it [Deleuze]
|
|
Full Idea:
You should not try to find whether an idea is just or correct. You should look for a completely different idea, elsewhere, in another area, so that something passes between the two which is neither in one nor the other.
|
|
From:
Gilles Deleuze (A Conversation: what is it? What is it for? [1977], I)
|
|
A reaction:
Neither relativism nor dialectic. Sounds like just having fun with ideas, but a commentator tells me it is a strategy for liberating our thought, following an agenda created by Nietzsche.
|
21850
|
Dualisms can be undone from within, by tracing connections, and drawing them to a new path [Deleuze]
|
|
Full Idea:
It is always possible to undo dualisms from the inside, by tracing the line of flight which passes between the two terms or the two sets …and which draws both into a non-parallel evolution. At least this does not belong to the dialectic.
|
|
From:
Gilles Deleuze (A Conversation: what is it? What is it for? [1977], II)
|
|
A reaction:
Deleuze disliked Hegel's version of the dialectic. Not clear what he means here, but he is evidently groping for an alternative account of the reasoning process, which is interesting. Deleuze hates rigid dualisms.
|
9775
|
Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
Maybe classical logic fails for vagueness in Excluded Middle. If 'H bald ∨ ¬(H bald)' is true, then one disjunct is true. But if the second is true the first is false, and the sentence is either true or false, contrary to the borderline assumption.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], 4)
|
|
A reaction:
Fine goes on to argue against the implication that we need a special logic for vague predicates.
|
9768
|
Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
I take vagueness to be a semantic feature, a deficiency of meaning. It is to be distinguished from generality, undecidability, and ambiguity.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], Intro)
|
|
A reaction:
Sounds good. If we cut nature at the joints with our language, then nature is going to be too subtle and vast for our finite and gerrymandered language, and so it will break down in tricky situations. But maybe epistemology precedes semantics?
|
9776
|
A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
There is a possibility of 'higher-order vagueness'. The vague may be vague, or vaguely vague, and so on. If J has few hairs on his head than H, then he may be a borderline case of a borderline case.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], 5)
|
|
A reaction:
Such slim grey areas can also be characterised as those where you think he is definitely bald, but I am not so sure.
|
9770
|
Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
With a three-value approach, if P is 'blob is pink' and R is 'blob is red', then P&P is indefinite, but P&R is false, and P∨P is indefinite, but P∨R is true. This means the connectives & and ∨ are not truth-functional.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], 1)
|
|
A reaction:
The point is that there could then be no logic in any way classical for vague sentences and three truth values. A powerful point.
|
9773
|
With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
With the super-truth approach, if P is 'blob is pink' and R is 'blob is red', then P&R is false, and P∨R is true, since one of P and R is true and one is false in any complete and admissible specification. It encompasses all 'penumbral truths'.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], 3)
|
|
A reaction:
[See Idea 9767 for the super-truth approach, and Idea 9770 for a contrasting view] The approach, which seems quite appealing, is that we will in no circumstances give up basic classical logic, but we will make maximum concessions to vagueness.
|
21843
|
People consist of many undetermined lines, some rigid, some supple, some 'lines of flight' [Deleuze]
|
|
Full Idea:
Things, people, are made up of varied lines, and they do not necessarily know which line they are on or where they should make the line which they are tracing pass; there is a whole geography in people, with rigid lines, supple lines, lines of flight etc.
|
|
From:
Gilles Deleuze (A Conversation: what is it? What is it for? [1977], I)
|
|
A reaction:
An example of Deleuze creating a novel concept, in order to generate a liberating way of seeing our lives. His big focus is on 'lines of flight' (which, I think, are less restrained by local culture than the others).
|
21848
|
Some lines (of flight) are becomings which escape the system [Deleuze]
|
|
Full Idea:
There are lines which do not amount to the path of a point, which break free from structure - lines of flight, becomings, without future or past, without memory, which resist the binary machine. …The rhizome is all this.
|
|
From:
Gilles Deleuze (A Conversation: what is it? What is it for? [1977], II)
|
|
A reaction:
The binary machine enforces simplistic either/or choices. I assume the 'lines' are to replace the Self, with something much more indeterminate, active and changing.
|