Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction'', 'Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed)' and 'Three theses about dispositions'

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32 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Our concern in giving a definition is not to say how things are by to say how we wish to speak
     From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310)
     A reaction: This sounds like an acceptable piece of wisdom which arises out of analytical and linguistic philosophy. It puts a damper on the Socratic dream of using definition of reveal the nature of reality.
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic is one of the few first-order non-classical logics [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: Free logic is an unusual example of a non-classical logic which is first-order.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], Pref)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / a. Symbols of ST
X1 x X2 x X3... x Xn indicates the 'cartesian product' of those sets [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: X1 x X2 x X3... x Xn indicates the 'cartesian product' of those sets, the set of all the n-tuples with its first member in X1, its second in X2, and so on.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.0)
<a,b&62; is a set whose members occur in the order shown [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: <a,b> is a set whose members occur in the order shown; <x1,x2,x3, ..xn> is an 'n-tuple' ordered set.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.10)
a ∈ X says a is an object in set X; a ∉ X says a is not in X [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: a ∈ X means that a is a member of the set X, that is, a is one of the objects in X. a ∉ X indicates that a is not in X.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2)
{x; A(x)} is a set of objects satisfying the condition A(x) [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: {x; A(x)} indicates a set of objects which satisfy the condition A(x).
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2)
{a1, a2, ...an} indicates that a set comprising just those objects [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: {a1, a2, ...an} indicates that the set comprises of just those objects.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2)
Φ indicates the empty set, which has no members [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: Φ indicates the empty set, which has no members
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4)
{a} is the 'singleton' set of a (not the object a itself) [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: {a} is the 'singleton' set of a, not to be confused with the object a itself.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4)
X⊂Y means set X is a 'proper subset' of set Y [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: X⊂Y means set X is a 'proper subset' of set Y (if and only if all of its members are members of Y, but some things in Y are not in X)
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6)
X⊆Y means set X is a 'subset' of set Y [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: X⊆Y means set X is a 'subset' of set Y (if and only if all of its members are members of Y).
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6)
X = Y means the set X equals the set Y [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: X = Y means the set X equals the set Y, which means they have the same members (i.e. X⊆Y and Y⊆X).
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6)
X ∩ Y indicates the 'intersection' of sets X and Y, the objects which are in both sets [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: X ∩ Y indicates the 'intersection' of sets X and Y, which is a set containing just those things that are in both X and Y.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8)
X∪Y indicates the 'union' of all the things in sets X and Y [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: X ∪ Y indicates the 'union' of sets X and Y, which is a set containing just those things that are in X or Y (or both).
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8)
Y - X is the 'relative complement' of X with respect to Y; the things in Y that are not in X [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: Y - X indicates the 'relative complement' of X with respect to Y, that is, all the things in Y that are not in X.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
A 'singleton' is a set with only one member [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: A 'singleton' is a set with only one member.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4)
The 'empty set' or 'null set' has no members [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: The 'empty set' or 'null set' is a set with no members.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4)
A set is a 'subset' of another set if all of its members are in that set [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: A set is a 'subset' of another set if all of its members are in that set.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6)
A 'proper subset' is smaller than the containing set [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: A set is a 'proper subset' of another set if some things in the large set are not in the smaller set
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6)
The 'relative complement' is things in the second set not in the first [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: The 'relative complement' of one set with respect to another is the things in the second set that aren't in the first.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8)
The 'intersection' of two sets is a set of the things that are in both sets [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: The 'intersection' of two sets is a set containing the things that are in both sets.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8)
The 'union' of two sets is a set containing all the things in either of the sets [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: The 'union' of two sets is a set containing all the things in either of the sets
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8)
The 'induction clause' says complex formulas retain the properties of their basic formulas [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: The 'induction clause' says that whenever one constructs more complex formulas out of formulas that have the property P, the resulting formulas will also have that property.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.2)
An 'ordered pair' (or ordered n-tuple) is a set with its members in a particular order [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: An 'ordered pair' (or ordered n-tuple) is a set with its members in a particular order.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.10)
A 'cartesian product' of sets is the set of all the n-tuples with one member in each of the sets [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: A 'cartesian product' of sets is the set of all the n-tuples with one member in each of the sets.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.10)
A 'set' is a collection of objects [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: A 'set' is a collection of objects.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2)
A 'member' of a set is one of the objects in the set [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: A 'member' of a set is one of the objects in the set.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / c. Basic theorems of ST
The empty set Φ is a subset of every set (including itself) [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: The empty set Φ is a subset of every set (including itself).
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6)
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Neo-Fregeans have thought that Hume's Principle, and the like, might be definitive of number and therefore not subject to the usual epistemological worries over its truth.
     From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310)
     A reaction: This seems to be the underlying dream of logicism - that arithmetic is actually brought into existence by definitions, rather than by truths derived from elsewhere. But we must be able to count physical objects, as well as just counting numbers.
Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The fundamental difficulty facing the neo-Fregean is to either adopt the predicative reading of Hume's Principle, defining numbers, but inadequate, or the impredicative reading, which is adequate, but not really a definition.
     From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.312)
     A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but the general drift is the difficulty of building a system which has been brought into existence just by definition.
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Dispositions are second-order properties, the property of having some property [Jackson/Pargetter/Prior, by Armstrong]
     Full Idea: It was proposed that dispositions are second-order properties of objects: the property of having some property.
     From: report of Jackson/Pargetter/Prior (Three theses about dispositions [1982]) by David M. Armstrong - Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' p.xvii
     A reaction: It seems more plausible to say that dispositions are first-order properties - that is, properties are dispositions, which are causal powers. A disposition to smoke is to have a causal power which leads to smoking.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: If an abstraction principle is going to be acceptable, then it should not 'inflate', i.e. it should not result in there being more abstracts than there are objects. By this mark Hume's Principle will be acceptable, but Frege's Law V will not.
     From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.307)
     A reaction: I take this to be motivated by my own intuition that abstract concepts had better be rooted in the world, or they are not worth the paper they are written on. The underlying idea this sort of abstraction is that it is 'shared' between objects.