18967
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A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence [Quine]
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Full Idea:
A 'proposition' is the meaning of a sentence. More precisely, since propositions are supposed to be true or false once and for all, it is the meaning of an eternal sentence. More precisely still, it is the 'cognitive' meaning, involving truth, not poetry.
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From:
Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.139)
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A reaction:
Quine defines this in order to attack it. I equate a proposition with a thought, and take a sentence to be an attempt to express a proposition. I have no idea why they are supposed to be 'timeless'. Philosophers have some very odd ideas.
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18968
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The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine]
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Full Idea:
The trouble with propositions, as cognitive meanings of eternal sentences, is individuation. Given two eternal sentences, themselves visibly different linguistically, it is not sufficiently clear under when to say that they mean the same proposition.
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From:
Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.140)
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A reaction:
If a group of people agree that two sentences mean the same thing, which happens all the time, I don't see what gives Quine the right to have a philosophical moan about some dubious activity called 'individuation'.
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20444
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If paintings could be perfectly duplicated, it would be a multiple art form [Currie, by Bacharach]
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Full Idea:
Currie claims that, in principle, all art forms are multiple. A superxerox machine, duplicating a painting molecule by molecule, would show that paintings are singular only contingently.
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From:
report of Gregory Currie (An Ontology of Art [1988]) by Sondra Bacharach - Arthur C. Danto 3
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A reaction:
This strikes me as correct. An original painting would then have the same status as the manuscript of a poem, giving it an authority, and being moving by its personal contact with the artist. But worth far less than current original paintings.
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