Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Things and Their Parts', 'Does moral phil rest on a mistake?' and 'works'

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14 ideas

4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology

13331	Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: The whole identity of a part is relevant to whether it is a part, but the identity of the whole makes a part a part. The whole part belongs to the whole as a part. The standard account in terms of time-slices fails to respect this part/whole asymmetry.
	From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §2)
	A reaction: Hard to follow, but I think the asymmetry is that the wholeness of the part contributes to the wholeness of the whole, while the wholeness of the whole contributes to the parthood of the part. Wholeness does different jobs in different directions. OK?

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual

13332	Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: It is the hierarchical conception of sets and their members, rather than the linear conception of set and subset or of aggregate and component, that provides us with the better model for the structure of part-whole in its application to material things.
	From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §5)
	A reaction: His idea is to give some sort of internal structure. He says of {a,b,c,d} that we can create subsets {a,b} and {c,d} from that. But {{a,b},{c,d}} has given member sets, and he is looking for 'natural' divisions between the members.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object

13333	The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: The wood is, as it were, a relatively unstructured version of the tree, just as the set {a,b,c,d} is an unstructured counterpart of the set {{a,b},{c,d}}.
	From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §5)
	A reaction: He is trying to give a modern logicians' account of the Aristotelian concept of 'form' (as applied to matter). It is part of the modern project that objects must be connected to the formalism of mereology or set theory. If it works, are we thereby wiser?

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects

13326	A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: First, a thing can be a part in a way that is relative to a time, for example, that a newly installed carburettor is now part of my car, whereas earlier it was not. (This will be called a 'temporary' part).
	From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], Intro)
	A reaction: [Cf Idea 13327 for the 'second' concept of part] I'm immediately uneasy. Being a part seems to be a univocal concept. He seems to be distinguishing parts which are necessary for identity from those which aren't. Fine likes to define by example.

13327	A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Second, an object can be a part of another in a way that is not relative to time ('timeless'). It is not appropriate to ask when it is a part. Thus pants and jacket are parts of the suit, atoms of a water molecule, and two pints part of a quart of milk.
	From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], Intro)
	A reaction: [cf Idea 13326 for the other concept of 'part'] Again I am uneasy that 'part' could have two meanings. A Life Member is a member in the same way that a normal paid up member is a member.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts

13329	An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: In the 'aggregative' understanding of a sum, it is spread out in time, so that exists whenever any of its components exists (just as it is located at any time wherever any of its components are located).
	From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §1)
	A reaction: This works particularly well for something like an ancient forest, which steadily changes its trees. On that view, though, the ship which has had all of its planks replaced will be the identical single sum of planks all the way through. Fine agrees.

13330	An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: In the 'compound' notion of sum, the mereological sum is spread out only in space, not also in time. For it to exist at a time, all of its components must exist at the time.
	From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §1)
	A reaction: It is hard to think of anything to which this applies, apart from for a classical mereologist. Named parts perhaps, like Tom, Dick and Harry. Most things preserve sum identity despite replacement of parts by identical components.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts

13328	Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: I develop a version of hylomorphism, in which the theory of 'rigid embodiment' provides an account of the timeless relation of part, and the theory of 'variable embodiment' is an account of the temporary relation. We must accept two new kinds of whole.
	From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], Intro)
	A reaction: [see Idea 13326 and Idea 13327 for the two concepts of 'part'] This is easier to take than the two meanings for 'part'. Since Aristotle, everyone has worried about true wholes (atoms, persons?) and looser wholes (houses).

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism

6587	It is always wrong to believe things on insufficient evidence [Clifford]
	Full Idea: It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.
	From: William K. Clifford (works [1870]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4
	A reaction: This is a famous remark, but is in danger of being tautological unless one gives some account of what 'insufficient' means. If Clifford means the evidence must be conclusive, this is nonsense. 'Never believe if there is no evidence' is better.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics

9261	The 'Ethics' is disappointing, because it fails to try to justify our duties [Prichard]
	Full Idea: Reading the 'Ethics' is so disappointing, because Aristotle does not try to convince us that we really ought to do what our non-reflective consciousness has hitherto believed we ought to do.
	From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912])
	A reaction: Aristotle didn't speak the language of 'duty' (see Idea 2172), but he could work it into his account if Prichard asked nicely. I take the truly virtuous person to be, above all, a wonderful citizen. Duties are contractual; good deeds flow from virtue.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism

9262	The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard]
	Full Idea: Moral Philosophy rests on the mistake of supposing the possibility of proving what can only be apprehended directly by an act of moral thinking.
	From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912])
	A reaction: This is a beginning of the rebellion against the Enlightenment Project in ethics, which is why Prichard has become popular. At bottom he is offering intuition ('direct moral thinking'), which is a frustratingly thin concept.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique

9260	Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard]
	Full Idea: It is untrue to urge that, since courage is a virtue, we ought to act courageously. We feel an obligation to act, but not from a certain desire. The action is done from obligation, so isn't an act of courage. ..In fact, virtue is no basis for morality.
	From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912])
	A reaction: One of the few interesting and direct attacks on virtue theory, before its modern revival. Prichard urges a perception of what is valuable (or good) as the basis for obligation and right action. He is right that values come first, in virtue and elsewhere.

23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty

9259	We feel obligations to overcome our own failings, and these are not relations to other people [Prichard]
	Full Idea: The relation involved in an obligation need not be a relation to another at all. Thus we should admit that there is an obligation to overcome our natural timidity or greediness, and this involves no relations to others.
	From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912])
	A reaction: An interesting un-Aristotelian and individualistic view of virtue. Why would we want to rid ourselves of timidity or greediness? Either it is self-interested, or we wish to be better citizens. See Richard Taylor on duty.

23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism

9258	If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves [Prichard]
	Full Idea: If the badness of pain were the reason why we ought not to inflict pain on another, it would equally be a reason why we ought not to inflict pain on ourselves; yet, though we would call such behaviour foolish, we wouldn't think it wrong.
	From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912], n4)
	A reaction: A very nice point. Note that it will equally well apply to 'benefit' or 'preferences', or any other ideal which utilitarians set out to maximise. It may not be bad to hurt yourself, but it might still be bad to harm yourself.