Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction'', 'Law,Liberty and Morality' and 'Schopenhauer'

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15 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
21373 We become objective when we detach ourselves from the world [Janaway]
     Full Idea: We apprehend the world purely objectively, only when we no longer know that we belong to it.
     From: Christopher Janaway (Schopenhauer [1994], II:368), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 6 'Objectivity'
     A reaction: Since we are not actually detached from the world, that makes objective thought an act of imagination. And none the worse for that, I would say, since philosophers don't seem to understand the central epistemological importance of imagination.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
10528 Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Our concern in giving a definition is not to say how things are by to say how we wish to speak
     From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310)
     A reaction: This sounds like an acceptable piece of wisdom which arises out of analytical and linguistic philosophy. It puts a damper on the Socratic dream of using definition of reveal the nature of reality.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
10529 If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Neo-Fregeans have thought that Hume's Principle, and the like, might be definitive of number and therefore not subject to the usual epistemological worries over its truth.
     From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310)
     A reaction: This seems to be the underlying dream of logicism - that arithmetic is actually brought into existence by definitions, rather than by truths derived from elsewhere. But we must be able to count physical objects, as well as just counting numbers.
10530 Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The fundamental difficulty facing the neo-Fregean is to either adopt the predicative reading of Hume's Principle, defining numbers, but inadequate, or the impredicative reading, which is adequate, but not really a definition.
     From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.312)
     A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but the general drift is the difficulty of building a system which has been brought into existence just by definition.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
10527 An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: If an abstraction principle is going to be acceptable, then it should not 'inflate', i.e. it should not result in there being more abstracts than there are objects. By this mark Hume's Principle will be acceptable, but Frege's Law V will not.
     From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.307)
     A reaction: I take this to be motivated by my own intuition that abstract concepts had better be rooted in the world, or they are not worth the paper they are written on. The underlying idea this sort of abstraction is that it is 'shared' between objects.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
23529 Conduct is not isolated from its effect on the moral code [Hart,HLA]
     Full Idea: We must not view conduct in isolation from its effect on the moral code.
     From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Moderate')
     A reaction: The moral code may be excessively conservative, but there is no denying this point. Extreme individualistic libertarians must recognise that 'no man is an island'.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
23530 The great danger of democracy is that the oppression of the minority becomes unobjectionable [Hart,HLA]
     Full Idea: For Mill and De Tocqueville the greatest of the dangers was not that in fact the majority might use their power to oppress a minority, but that, with the spread of democratic ideas, it might come to be thought unobjectionable that they should do so.
     From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], III 'Populism')
     A reaction: This was vivid in the 2016 Brexit referendum, which was 52-48 in favour of leaving. There were lots voices saying 'you lost, get over it'. It should be a basic (if neglected) principle that the winners of elections now represent the whole population.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
23522 In an organised society all actions have some effect on other people [Hart,HLA]
     Full Idea: In an organised society it is impossible to identify classes of actions which harm no one, or no one but the individual who does them.
     From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Enforcement')
     A reaction: This is attributed to 'some critics' of Mill. I agree with this. The idea that actions performed behind close doors never come to influence social life is an illusion, held by people whose quest for freedom is selfish.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
23528 The value of liberty allows freedom of action, even if that distresses other people [Hart,HLA]
     Full Idea: Recognition of individual liberty as a value involves, as a minimum, acceptance of the principle that the individual may do what he wants, even if others are distressed when the learn what it is that he does.
     From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Private')
     A reaction: He notes that there could be other reasons to block the freedom, such as harm done. This idea seems to identify a key component of liberalism - that we must all tolerate actions which we dislike.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
23523 The principle of legality requires crimes to be precisely defined in advance of any action [Hart,HLA]
     Full Idea: The principle of legality requires criminal offences to be as precisely defined as possible, so that it can be known with reasonable certainty beforehand what acts are criminal and what are not.
     From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Conspiracy')
     A reaction: Hart is discussing a breach of this, where moral judgements are used to condemn something which was not obviously illegal. Families and schools don't have such precise rules, but it seems needed in a vast and pluralistic society.
23524 Some private moral issues are no concern of the law [Hart,HLA]
     Full Idea: An official report [of 1957] on homosexuality declared that 'there must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's business'.
     From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Conspiracy')
     A reaction: We might wonder whether these issues are actually moral, if the law is not interested in them. Are they just a matter of taste? The law doesn't enforce a preference for Mozart over Salieri.
23521 Do morals influence law? Is morality an aspect of law? Can law be morally criticised? [Hart,HLA]
     Full Idea: Four questions: 1) Has the development of law been influenced by morals? 2) Must reference to morality enter into an adequate definition of law or legal system? 3) Is law open to moral criticism? 4) Does immorality justify legal punishment?
     From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Enforcement')
     A reaction: [compressed] Three nice questions, which are his agenda for the book. It is obvious that immoral laws can be created, and that laws can be criticised for being too concerned with morality, so there is no clear general answer to these dilemmas.
23525 Is the enforcement of morality morally justifiable? [Hart,HLA]
     Full Idea: The question about morality and the law is also a question of morality - of whether the enforcement of morality is morally justified.
     From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Positive')
     A reaction: This is a very nice meta-moral question. What moral standards are used to justify the enforcement of moral standards? Presumably there should be no contradiction between the levels, to brutally enforce softness, or softly recommend brutality?
23526 Modern law still suppresses practices seen as immoral, and yet harmless [Hart,HLA]
     Full Idea: English and American law still [in1963] contain rules which suppress practices condemned as immoral by positive morality though they involve nothing that would be ordinarily thought of as harm to other persons.
     From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Use')
     A reaction: He says most of the examples of this concern sexual practices. In the UK we have moved away from such laws, but many states of the USA still maintain them (or are reintroducing them, in 2023).
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
23527 Moral wickedness of an offence is always relevant to the degree of punishment [Hart,HLA]
     Full Idea: Leslie Stephen argued that when the question is how severely an offender should be punished, an estimate of the degree of moral wickedness involved in the crime is always relevant.
     From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Moral')
     A reaction: [Stephen 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' 1873] The degree of responsibility (after excuses etc.) is obviously also highly relevant. If vicious murder is punished more harshly, that seems to be an assessment of the character of the murderer.