64 ideas
19275 | You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale] |
Full Idea: I defend the thesis that questions about what kinds of things there are cannot be properly understood or adequately answered without recourse to considerations about possibility and necessity. | |
From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], Intro) | |
A reaction: Good. I would say that this is a growing realisation in contemporary philosophy. The issue is focused when we ask what are the limitations of Quine's approach to metaphysics. If you don't see possibilities around you, you are a fool. |
18835 | Logic doesn't have a metaphysical basis, but nor can logic give rise to the metaphysics [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: There is surely no metaphysical basis for logic, but equally there is no logical basis for metaphysics, if that implies that we can settle the choice of logic in advance of settling any seriously contested metaphysical-cum-semantic issues. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 7.5) | |
A reaction: Is this aimed at Tim Williamson's book on treating modal logic as metaphysics? I agree with the general idea that logic won't deliver a metaphysics. I might want to defend a good metaphysics giving rise to a good logic. |
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Our concern in giving a definition is not to say how things are by to say how we wish to speak | |
From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310) | |
A reaction: This sounds like an acceptable piece of wisdom which arises out of analytical and linguistic philosophy. It puts a damper on the Socratic dream of using definition of reveal the nature of reality. |
19291 | A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale] |
Full Idea: One might think of a full dress, or canonical, definition as specifying what type of thing it is, and what distinguishes it from everything else within its type. | |
From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 06.4) | |
A reaction: Good! At last someone embraces the Aristotelian ideas that definitions are a) quite extensive and detailed (unlike lexicography), and b) they aim to get right down to the individual. In that sense, an essence is captured by a definition. |
18819 | The idea that there are unrecognised truths is basic to our concept of truth [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The realist principle that a statement may be true even though no one is able to recognise its truth is so deeply embedded in our ordinary conception of truth that any account that flouts it is liable to engender confusion. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 5.1) |
18826 | 'True at a possibility' means necessarily true if what is said had obtained [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A statement is 'true at a possibility' if, necessarily, things would have been as the statement (actually) says they are, had the possibility obtained. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 6.6) | |
A reaction: This is deliberately vague about what a 'possibility' is, but it is intended to be more than a property instantiation, and less than a possible world. |
18803 | Semantics for propositions: 1) validity preserves truth 2) non-contradition 3) bivalence 4) truth tables [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The classical semantics of natural language propositions says 1) valid arguments preserve truth, 2) no statement is both true and false, 3) each statement is either true or false, 4) the familiar truth tables. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 1.1) |
18814 | 'Absolute necessity' would have to rest on S5 [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If there is such a notion as 'absolute necessity', its logic is surely S5. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 3.3) | |
A reaction: There are plenty of people (mainly in the strict empiricist tradition) who don't believe in 'absolute' necessity. |
19301 | With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale] |
Full Idea: I reject both Barcan and Converse Barcan by adopting a negative free logic. | |
From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 11.3) | |
A reaction: See section 9.2 of Hale's book, where he makes his case. I can't evaluate this bold move, though I don't like the Barcan Formulae. We can anticipate objections to Hale: are you prepared to embrace the unexpected consequences of your new logic? |
19297 | The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale] |
Full Idea: If the Brouwersche principle, p ⊃ □◊p is adjoined to a standard quantified vesion of the weakest modal logic K, then one can prove both the Barcan principle, and its converse. | |
From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 09.2) | |
A reaction: The Brouwersche principle (that p implies that p must be possible) sounds reasonable, but the Barcan principles strike me as false, so something has to give. They are theorems of S5. Hale proposes giving up classical logic. |
18798 | It is the second-order part of intuitionistic logic which actually negates some classical theorems [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Although intuitionistic propositional and first-order logics are sub-systems of the corresponding classical systems, intuitionistic second-order logic affirms the negations of some classical theorems. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 1.1) |
18799 | Intuitionists can accept Double Negation Elimination for decidable propositions [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Double Negation Elimination is a rule of inference which the classicist accepts without restriction, but which the intuitionist accepts only for decidable propositions. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 1.1) | |
A reaction: This cures me of my simplistic understanding that intuitionists just reject the rules about double negation. |
18830 | Most set theorists doubt bivalence for the Continuum Hypothesis, but still use classical logic [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Many set theorists doubt if the Generalised Continuum Hypothesis must be either true or false; certainly, its bivalence is far from obvious. All the same, almost all set theorists use classical logic in their proofs. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 7.2) | |
A reaction: His point is that classical logic is usually taken to rest on bivalence. He offers the set theorists a helping hand, by defending classical logic without resorting to bivalence. |
18843 | The iterated conception of set requires continual increase in axiom strength [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: We are doomed to postulate an infinite sequence of successively stronger axiom systems as we try to spell out what is involved in iterating the power set operation 'as far as possible'. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 9.3) | |
A reaction: [W.W. Tait is behind this idea] The problem with set theory, then, especially as a foundation of mathematics, is that it doesn't just expand, but has to keep reinventing itself. The 'large cardinal axioms' are what is referred to. |
18836 | A set may well not consist of its members; the empty set, for example, is a problem [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: There seem strong grounds for rejecting the thesis that a set consists of its members. For one thing, the empty set is a perpetual embarrassment for the thesis. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 8.4) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt also says that if 'red' has an extension, then membership of that set must be vague. Extensional sets are precise because their objects are decided in advance, but intensional (or logical) sets, decided by a predicate, can be vague. |
18837 | A set can be determinate, because of its concept, and still have vague membership [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistent with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of the concept A. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 8.4) | |
A reaction: To be determinate, it must be presumed that there is some test which will decide what falls under the concept. The rule can say 'if it is vague, reject it' or 'if it is vague, accept it'. Without one of those, how could the set have a clear identity? |
18845 | If the totality of sets is not well-defined, there must be doubt about the Power Set Axiom [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Someone who is sympathetic to the thesis that the totality of sets is not well-defined ought to concede that we have no reason to think that the Power Set Axiom is true. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 9.6) | |
A reaction: The point is that it is only this Axiom which generates the vast and expanding totality. In principle it is hard, though, to see what is intrinsically wrong with the operation of taking the power set of a set. Hence 'limitation of size'? |
18815 | Logic is higher-order laws which can expand the range of any sort of deduction [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: On the conception of logic recommended here, logical laws are higher-order laws that can be applied to expand the range of any deductive principles. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 3.3) | |
A reaction: You need the concept of a 'deductive principle' to get this going, but I take it that might be directly known, rather than derived from a law. |
18805 | Classical logic rules cannot be proved, but various lines of attack can be repelled [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: There is not the slightest prospect of proving that the rules of classical logic are sound. ….All that the defender of classical logic can do is scrutinize particular attacks and try to repel them. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 1.1) | |
A reaction: This is the agenda for Rumfitt's book. |
18804 | The case for classical logic rests on its rules, much more than on the Principle of Bivalence [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: I think it is a strategic mistake to rest the case for classical logic on the Principle of Bivalence: the soundness of the classical logic rules is far more compelling than the truth of Bivalence. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 1.1) | |
A reaction: The 'rules' to which he is referring are those of 'natural deduction', which make very few assumptions, and are intended to be intuitively appealing. |
18827 | If truth-tables specify the connectives, classical logic must rely on Bivalence [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If we specify the senses of the connectives by way of the standard truth-tables, then we must justify classical logic only by appeal to the Principle of Bivalence. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 7) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt proposes to avoid the truth-tables, and hence not to rely on Bivalence for his support of classical logic. He accepts that Bivalence is doubtful, citing the undecidability of the Continuum Hypothesis as a problem instance. |
19296 | If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale] |
Full Idea: Contrary to what Quine supposes, it is neither necessary nor desirable to interpret bound higher-order variables as ranging over sets. Sets are a species of object. They should range over entities of a completely different type: properties and relations. | |
From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 08.2) | |
A reaction: This helpfully clarifies something which was confusing me. If sets are objects, then 'second-order' logic just seems to be the same as first-order logic (rather than being 'set theory in disguise'). I quantify over properties, but deny their existence! |
18813 | Logical consequence is a relation that can extended into further statements [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Logical consequence, I argue, is distinguished from other implication relations by the fact that logical laws may be applied in extending any implication relation so that it applies among some complex statements involving logical connectives. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 3.3) | |
A reaction: He offers implication in electronics as an example of a non-logical implication relation. This seems to indicate that logic must be monotonic, that consequence is transitive, and that the Cut Law always applies. |
18808 | Normal deduction presupposes the Cut Law [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Our deductive practices seem to presuppose the Cut Law. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 2.3) | |
A reaction: That is, if you don't believe that deductions can be transitive (and thus form a successful chain of implications), then you don't really believe in deduction. It remains a well known fact that you can live without the Cut Law. |
19289 | Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale] |
Full Idea: An old objection to conventionalism claims that it confuses sentences with propositions, confusing what makes sentences mean what they do with what makes them (as propositions) true. | |
From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 05.2) | |
A reaction: The conventions would presumably apply to the sentences, but not to the propositions. Since I think that focusing on propositions solves a lot of misunderstandings in modern philosophy, I like the sound of this. |
18840 | When faced with vague statements, Bivalence is not a compelling principle [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: I do not regard Bivalence, when applied to vague statements, as an intuitively compelling principle which we ought to try to preserve. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 8.7) | |
A reaction: The point of Rumfitt's book is to defend classical logic despite failures of bivalence. He also cites undecidable concepts such as the Continuum Hypothesis. |
18802 | In specifying a logical constant, use of that constant is quite unavoidable [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: There is no prospect whatever of giving the sense of a logical constant without using that very constant, and much else besides, in the metalinguistic principle that specifies that sense. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 1.1) |
19298 | Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale] |
Full Idea: In contrast with axiomatic systems, in natural deductions systems of logic neither the premises nor the conclusions of steps in a derivation need themselves be logical truths or theorems of logic. | |
From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 09.2 n7) | |
A reaction: Not sure I get that. It can't be that everything in an axiomatic proof has to be a logical truth. How would you prove anything about the world that way? I'm obviously missing something. |
18800 | Introduction rules give deduction conditions, and Elimination says what can be deduced [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: 'Introduction rules' state the conditions under which one may deduce a conclusion whose dominant logical operator is the connective. 'Elimination rules' state what may be deduced from some premises, where the major premise is dominated by the connective. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 1.1) | |
A reaction: So Introduction gives conditions for deduction, and Elimination says what can actually be deduced. If my magic wand can turn you into a frog (introduction), and so I turn you into a frog, how does that 'eliminate' the wand? |
18809 | Logical truths are just the assumption-free by-products of logical rules [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Gentzen's way of formalising logic has accustomed people to the idea that logical truths are simply the by-products of logical rules, that arise when all the assumptions on which a conclusion rests have been discharged. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 2.5) | |
A reaction: This is the key belief of those who favour the natural deduction account of logic. If you really believe in separate logic truths, then you can use them as axioms. |
18807 | Monotonicity means there is a guarantee, rather than mere inductive support [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Monotonicity seems to mark the difference between cases in which a guarantee obtains and those where the premises merely provide inductive support for a conclusion. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 2.3) | |
A reaction: Hence it is plausible to claim that 'non-monotonic logic' is a contradiction in terms. |
18842 | Maybe an ordinal is a property of isomorphic well-ordered sets, and not itself a set [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Menzel proposes that an ordinal is something isomorphic well-ordered sets have in common, so while an ordinal can be represented as a set, it is not itself a set, but a 'property' of well-ordered sets. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 9.2) | |
A reaction: [C.Menzel 1986] This is one of many manoeuvres available if you want to distance mathematics from set theory. |
18834 | Infinitesimals do not stand in a determinate order relation to zero [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Infinitesimals do not stand in a determinate order relation to zero: we cannot say an infinitesimal is either less than zero, identical to zero, or greater than zero. ….Infinitesimals are so close to zero as to be theoretically indiscriminable from it. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 7.4) |
18846 | Cantor and Dedekind aimed to give analysis a foundation in set theory (rather than geometry) [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: One of the motivations behind Cantor's and Dedekind's pioneering explorations in the field was the ambition to give real analysis a new foundation in set theory - and hence a foundation independent of geometry. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 9.6) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt is inclined to think that the project has failed, although a weaker set theory than ZF might do the job (within limits). |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Neo-Fregeans have thought that Hume's Principle, and the like, might be definitive of number and therefore not subject to the usual epistemological worries over its truth. | |
From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the underlying dream of logicism - that arithmetic is actually brought into existence by definitions, rather than by truths derived from elsewhere. But we must be able to count physical objects, as well as just counting numbers. |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The fundamental difficulty facing the neo-Fregean is to either adopt the predicative reading of Hume's Principle, defining numbers, but inadequate, or the impredicative reading, which is adequate, but not really a definition. | |
From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.312) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but the general drift is the difficulty of building a system which has been brought into existence just by definition. |
19295 | Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale] |
Full Idea: The existence of the natural numbers is not a matter of pure logic - it cannot be proved in pure logic. It can be proved in second-order logic plus Hume's principle. Truths of arithmetic are not logic - they depend on the nature of natural numbers. | |
From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 07.4) | |
A reaction: Hume's principles needs entities which can be matched to one another, so a certain ontology is needed to get neo-logicism off the ground. |
19281 | Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale] |
Full Idea: Any intereresting supervenience thesis requires that the class of facts on which the allegedly supervening facts supervene be characterizable independently, without use or presupposition of the notions involved in stating the supervening facts. | |
From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 03.4.1) | |
A reaction: There might be intermediate cases here, since having descriptions which are utterly unconnected (at any level) might be rather challenging. |
19278 | There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale] |
Full Idea: There is no clear gap between its being a fact that p and its being true that p, no obvious way to individuate the fact a true statement records other than via that statement's truth-conditions. | |
From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 03.2) | |
A reaction: Typical of philosophers of language. The concept of a fact is of something mind-independent; the concept of a truth is of something mind-dependent. They can't therefore be the same thing (by the contrapositive of the indiscernability of identicals!). |
18839 | An object that is not clearly red or orange can still be red-or-orange, which sweeps up problem cases [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A borderline red-orange object satisfies the disjunctive predicate 'red or orange', even though it satisfies neither 'red' or 'orange'. When applied to adjacent bands of colour, the disjunction 'sweeps up' objects which are reddish-orange. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 8.5) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt offers a formal principle in support of this. There may be a problem with 'adjacent'. Different colour systems will place different colours adjacent to red. In other examples the idea of 'adjacent' may make no sense. Rumfitt knows this! |
18838 | The extension of a colour is decided by a concept's place in a network of contraries [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: On Sainsbury's picture, a colour has an extension that it has by virtue of its place in a network of contrary colour classifications. Something is determined to be 'red' by being a colour incompatible with orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo and violet. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 8.5) | |
A reaction: Along with Idea 18839, this gives quite a nice account of vagueness, by requiring a foil to the vague predicate, and using the disjunction of the predicate and its foil to handle anything caught in between them. |
19302 | If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale] |
Full Idea: How shall we prevent a sorites taking us to the conclusion that a chair might have originated in a completely disjoint lot of wood, or even in some other material altogether? | |
From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 11.3.7) | |
A reaction: This seems a good criticism of Kripke's implausible claim that his lectern is necessarily (or essentially) made of the piece of wood it is made of. Could his lectern have had a small piece of plastic inserted in it? |
19290 | Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale] |
Full Idea: I argue that any absolute necessity is necessarily necessary. | |
From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 05.5.2) | |
A reaction: This requires the principle of S4 modal logic, that necessity implies necessary necessity. He argues that S5 is the logical of absolute necessity. |
19286 | 'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale] |
Full Idea: The strength of the claim that p is 'absolutely necessary' derives from the fact that in its expression as a universally quantified counterfactual ('everything will necessitate p'), the quantifier ranges over all propositions whatever. | |
From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 04.1) | |
A reaction: Other philosophers don't seem to use the term 'absolute necessity', but it seems a useful concept, in contrast to conditional or local necessities. You can't buy chocolate on the sun. |
19288 | Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale] |
Full Idea: The difference between logical and metaphysical necessities lies, not in the range of possibilities for which they hold, but - at the linguistic level - in the kind of vocabulary essential to their expression, and the kinds of entities that explain them. | |
From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 04.5) | |
A reaction: I don't think much of the idea that the difference is just linguistic, and I don't like the idea of 'entities' as grounding them. I see logical necessities as arising from natural deduction rules, and metaphysical ones coming from the nature of reality. |
18816 | Metaphysical modalities respect the actual identities of things [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The central characteristic mark of metaphysical necessity is that a metaphysical possibility respects the actual identities of things - in a capacious sense of 'thing'. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 3.4) | |
A reaction: He contrast this with logical necessity, and concludes that some truths are metaphysically but not logically necessary, such as 'Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus'. Personally I like the idea of a 'necessity-maker', so that fits. |
19285 | Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale] |
Full Idea: We can identify the belief that the proposition that p is logically necessary, where p may be of any logical form, with the belief that, no matter what else was the case, it would be true that p. | |
From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 04.1) | |
A reaction: I find this surprising. I take it that logical necessity must be the consequence of logic. That all squares have corners doesn't seem to be a matter of logic. But then he seems to expand logical necessity to include conceptual necessity. Why? |
19287 | Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale] |
Full Idea: We can distinguish between narrower and broader kinds of logical necessity. There are, for example, the logical necessities of propostional logic, those of first-order logic, and so on. Maybe they are necessities expressed using logical vocabulary. | |
From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 04.5) | |
A reaction: Hale goes on to prefer a view that embraces conceptual necessities. I think in philosophy we should designate the necessities according to their sources. This might clarify a currently rather confused situation. First-order includes propositional logic. |
18825 | S5 is the logic of logical necessity [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: I accept the widely held thesis that S5 is the logic of logical necessity. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 6.4 n16) | |
A reaction: It seems plausible that S5 is also the logic of metaphysical necessity, but that does not make them the same thing. The two types of necessity have two different grounds. |
18828 | If two possibilities can't share a determiner, they are incompatible [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Two possibilities are incompatible when no possibility determines both. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 7.1) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as just the right sort of language for building up a decent metaphysical picture of the world, which needs to incorporate possibilities as well as actualities. |
18824 | Since possibilities are properties of the world, calling 'red' the determination of a determinable seems right [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers describe the colour scarlet as a determination of the determinable red; since the ways the world might be are naturally taken to be properties of the world, it helps to bear this analogy in mind. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 6.4) | |
A reaction: This fits nicely with the disposition accounts of modality which I favour. Hence being 'coloured' is a real property of objects, even in the absence of the name of its specific colour. |
19282 | It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale] |
Full Idea: I think we may conclude that there is no significant version of modal supervenience which both commands acceptance and implies that all modal facts depend asymmetrically on non-modal ones. | |
From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 03.4.3) | |
A reaction: This is the conclusion of a sustained and careful discussion, recorded here for interest. I'm inclined to think that there are very few, if any, non-modal facts in the world, if those facts are accurately characterised. |
19276 | The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale] |
Full Idea: Whether the essentialist theory can account for all absolute necessities depends in part on whether the theory can explain the necessities of existence (of certain objects, properties and entities). | |
From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], Intro) | |
A reaction: Hale has a Fregean commitment to all sorts of abstract objects, and then finds difficulty in explaining them from his essentialist viewpoint. His book didn't convince me. I'm more of a nominalist, me, so I sleep better at nights. |
19293 | Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale] |
Full Idea: The point of the essentialist theory is not to provide a reductive explanation of necessities. It is, rather, to locate a base class of necessities - those which directly reflect the natures of things - in terms of which the remainder may be explained. | |
From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 06.6) | |
A reaction: My picture is of most of the necessities being directly explained by the natures of things, rather than a small core of natures generating all the derived ones. All the necessities of squares derive from the nature of the square. |
19294 | If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale] |
Full Idea: If the essentialist theory of necessity is to be adequate, it must be able to explain how the existence of certain objects - such as the natural numbers - can itself be absolutely necessary. | |
From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 07.1) | |
A reaction: Hale and his neo-logicist pals think that numbers are 'objects', and they necessarily exist, so he obviously has a problem. I don't see any alternative for essentialists to treating the existing (and possible) natures as brute facts. |
19279 | What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale] |
Full Idea: We need an explanation of what worlds are that makes clear why being true at all of them should be necessary and sufficient for being necessary (and true at one of them suffices for being possible). | |
From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 03.3.2) | |
A reaction: Hale is introducing combinatorial accounts of worlds, as one possible answer to this. Hale observes that all the worlds might be identical to our world. It is always assumed that the worlds are hugely varied. But maybe worlds are constrained. |
19299 | Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale] |
Full Idea: The standard conception of worlds incorporates the assumption of bivalence - every proposition is either true or false. But it is infelicitous to build into one's basic semantic machinery a principle endorsing classical logic against its rivals. | |
From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 10.3) | |
A reaction: No wonder Dummett (with his intuitionist logic) immediately spurned possible worlds. This objection must be central to many recent thinkers who have begun to doubt possible worlds. I heard Kit Fine say 'always kick possible worlds where you can'. |
18821 | Possibilities are like possible worlds, but not fully determinate or complete [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Possibilities are things of the same general character as possible worlds, on one popular conception of the latter. They differ from worlds, though, in that they are not required to be fully determinate or complete. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 6) | |
A reaction: A rather promising approach to such things, even though a possibility is fairly determinate at its core, but very vague at the edges. It is possible that the UK parliament might be located in Birmingham, for example. Is this world 'complete'? |
18831 | Medieval logicians said understanding A also involved understanding not-A [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Mediaeval logicians had a principle, 'Eadem est scientia oppositorum': in order to attain a clear conception of what it is for A to be the case, one needs to attain a conception of what it is for A not to be the case. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 7.2) | |
A reaction: Presumably 'understanding' has to be a fairly comprehensive grasp of the matter, so understanding the negation sounds like a reasonable requirement for the real thing. |
18820 | In English 'evidence' is a mass term, qualified by 'little' and 'more' [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: In English, the word 'evidence' behaves as a mass term: we speak of someone's having little evidence for an assertion, and of one thinker's having more evidence than another for a claim. One the other hand, we also speak of 'pieces' of evidence. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 5.2) | |
A reaction: And having 'more' evidence does not mean having a larger number of pieces of evidence, so it really is like an accumulated mass. |
19300 | The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale] |
Full Idea: What it is to be (pure) water is to be explained in terms of being composed of H2O molecules, but this is not what the word 'water' means. | |
From: Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 11.2) | |
A reaction: Hale says when the real and verbal definitions match, we can know the essence a priori. If they come apart, presumably we need a posteriori research. Interesting. It is certainly dubious to say a stuff-word means its chemical composition. |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: If an abstraction principle is going to be acceptable, then it should not 'inflate', i.e. it should not result in there being more abstracts than there are objects. By this mark Hume's Principle will be acceptable, but Frege's Law V will not. | |
From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.307) | |
A reaction: I take this to be motivated by my own intuition that abstract concepts had better be rooted in the world, or they are not worth the paper they are written on. The underlying idea this sort of abstraction is that it is 'shared' between objects. |
18817 | We understand conditionals, but disagree over their truth-conditions [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: It is striking that our understanding of conditionals is not greatly impeded by widespread disagreement about their truth-conditions. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 4.2) | |
A reaction: Compare 'if you dig there you might find gold' with 'if you dig there you will definitely find gold'. The second but not the first invites 'how do you know that?', implying truth. Two different ifs. |
18829 | The truth grounds for 'not A' are the possibilities incompatible with truth grounds for A [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The truth-grounds of '¬A' are precisely those possibilities that are incompatible with any truth-ground of A. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 7.1) | |
A reaction: This is Rumfitt's proposal for the semantics of 'not', based on the central idea of a possibility, rather than a possible world. The incompatibility tracks back to an absence of shared grounding. |