8 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Our concern in giving a definition is not to say how things are by to say how we wish to speak | |
From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310) | |
A reaction: This sounds like an acceptable piece of wisdom which arises out of analytical and linguistic philosophy. It puts a damper on the Socratic dream of using definition of reveal the nature of reality. |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Neo-Fregeans have thought that Hume's Principle, and the like, might be definitive of number and therefore not subject to the usual epistemological worries over its truth. | |
From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the underlying dream of logicism - that arithmetic is actually brought into existence by definitions, rather than by truths derived from elsewhere. But we must be able to count physical objects, as well as just counting numbers. |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The fundamental difficulty facing the neo-Fregean is to either adopt the predicative reading of Hume's Principle, defining numbers, but inadequate, or the impredicative reading, which is adequate, but not really a definition. | |
From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.312) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but the general drift is the difficulty of building a system which has been brought into existence just by definition. |
19691 | Unlike knowledge, you can achieve understanding through luck [Grimm] |
Full Idea: It may be that understanding is compatible with luck, in a way that knowledge is not. | |
From: Stephen R. Grimm (Understanding [2011], 3) | |
A reaction: [He cites Kvanvig and Prichard] If so, then we cannot say that knowledge is a lesser type of understanding. If you ask a trusted person how a mechanism works, and they have a wild guess that is luckily right, you would then understand it. |
19690 | 'Grasping' a structure seems to be modal, because we must anticipate its behaviour [Grimm] |
Full Idea: 'Graspng' a structure would seem to bring into play something like a modal sense or ability, not just to register how things are, but also to anticipate how certain elements of the system would behave. | |
From: Stephen R. Grimm (Understanding [2011], 2) | |
A reaction: In the case of the chronology of some historical events, talking of 'grasping' or 'understanding' seems wrong because the facts are static and invariant. That seems to support the present idea. But you might 'understand' a pattern if you can reproduce it. |
19692 | You may have 'weak' understanding, if by luck you can answer a set of 'why questions' [Grimm] |
Full Idea: There may be a 'weak' sense of understanding, where all you need to do is to be able to answer 'why questions' successfully, where one might have come by this ability in a lucky way. | |
From: Stephen R. Grimm (Understanding [2011], 3) | |
A reaction: We can see this point (in Idea 19691), but the idea that one could come by true complex understanding of something by purely lucky means is a bit absurd. Surely you would get one or two why questions wrong? 100%, just by luck? |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: If an abstraction principle is going to be acceptable, then it should not 'inflate', i.e. it should not result in there being more abstracts than there are objects. By this mark Hume's Principle will be acceptable, but Frege's Law V will not. | |
From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.307) | |
A reaction: I take this to be motivated by my own intuition that abstract concepts had better be rooted in the world, or they are not worth the paper they are written on. The underlying idea this sort of abstraction is that it is 'shared' between objects. |
16707 | Cold and hot are the swiftness and slowness of corpuscular motion [Beeckman] |
Full Idea: There is no doubt that the nature of cold and hot are taken from the swiftness and slowness of the motion of corpuscules. | |
From: Isaac Beeckman (Journals [1617], I:132), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 19.6 | |
A reaction: This is so right it takes your breath away. For 'corpuscles' we should normally read 'molecules'. Atomism is a further refinement. This is the rejection of the orthodox view of separate qualities. |