29 ideas
| 9143 | Implicit definitions must be satisfiable, creative definitions introduce things, contextual definitions build on things [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
| Full Idea: Fine distinguishes 'implicit definitions', where we must know it is satisfiable before it is deployed, 'creative definitions', where objects are introduced in virtue of the definition, ..and 'contextual definitions', based on established vocabulary. | |
| From: report of Kit Fine (The Limits of Abstraction [2002], 060) by R Cook / P Ebert - Notice of Fine's 'Limits of Abstraction' 3 | |
| A reaction: Fine is a fan of creative definition. This sounds something like the distinction between cutting nature at the perceived joints, and speculating about where new joints might be inserted. Quite a helpful thought. |
| 10143 | 'Creative definitions' do not presuppose the existence of the objects defined [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: What I call 'creative definitions' are made from a standpoint in which the existence of the objects that are to be assigned to the terms is not presupposed. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Limits of Abstraction [2002], II.1) |
| 10145 | Abstracts cannot be identified with sets [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: It is impossible for a proponent of both sets and abstracts to identify the abstracts, in any reasonable manner, with the sets. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Limits of Abstraction [2002], IV.1) | |
| A reaction: [This observation emerges from a proof Fine has just completed] Cf Idea 10137. The implication is that there is no compromise view available, and one must choose between abstraction or sets as one's account of numbers and groups of concepts. |
| 10136 | Points in Euclidean space are abstract objects, but not introduced by abstraction [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Points in abstract Euclidean space are abstract objects, and yet are not objects of abstraction, since they are not introduced through a principle of abstraction of the sort envisaged by Frege. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Limits of Abstraction [2002], I.1) | |
| A reaction: The point seems to be that they are not abstracted 'from' anything, but are simpy posited as basic constituents. I suggest that points are idealisations (of smallness) rather than abstractions. They are idealised 'from' substances. |
| 10144 | Postulationism says avoid abstract objects by giving procedures that produce truth [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: A procedural form of postulationism says that instead of stipulating that certain statements are true, one specifies certain procedures for extending the domain to one in which the statement will in fact be true, without invoking an abstract ontology. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Limits of Abstraction [2002], II.5) | |
| A reaction: The whole of philosophy might go better if it was founded on procedures and processes, rather than on objects. The Hopi Indians were right. |
| 2176 | There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: There is a problem of free will only for those who think that the notion of voluntary can be metaphysically deepened. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], III - p.68) | |
| A reaction: Years later, I now see that his refers to a pet hate of mine in discussions of free will, which is the idea that a person can have something called 'ultimate' responsibility for an action (which is the 'deep' version of 'you did it'). |
| 2181 | It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: There is a deluded Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom will totally coincide. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], VI - p.158) |
| 9144 | Fine's 'procedural postulationism' uses creative definitions, but avoids abstract ontology [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
| Full Idea: Fine says creative definitions can found mathematics. His 'procedural postulationism' says one stipulates not truths, but certain procedures for extending a domain. The procedures can be stated without invoking an abstract ontology. | |
| From: report of Kit Fine (The Limits of Abstraction [2002], 100) by R Cook / P Ebert - Notice of Fine's 'Limits of Abstraction' 4 | |
| A reaction: (For creative definitions, see Idea 9143) This sounds close in spirit to fictionalism, but with the emphasis on the procedure (which can presumably be formalized) rather than a pure act of imaginative creation. |
| 10141 | Many different kinds of mathematical objects can be regarded as forms of abstraction [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Many different kinds of mathematical objects (natural numbers, the reals, points, lines, figures, groups) can be regarded as forms of abstraction, with special theories having their basis in a general theory of abstraction. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Limits of Abstraction [2002], I.4) | |
| A reaction: This result, if persuasive, would be just the sort of unified account which the whole problem of abstact ideas requires. |
| 10135 | We can abstract from concepts (e.g. to number) and from objects (e.g. to direction) [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: A principle of abstraction is 'conceptual' when the items upon which it abstracts are concepts (e.g. a one-one correspondence associated with a number), and 'objectual' if they are objects (parallel lines associated with a direction). | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Limits of Abstraction [2002], I) |
| 9142 | Fine considers abstraction as reconceptualization, to produce new senses by analysing given senses [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
| Full Idea: Fine considers abstraction principles as instances of reconceptualization (rather than implicit definition, or using the Context Principle). This centres not on reference, but on new senses emerging from analysis of a given sense. | |
| From: report of Kit Fine (The Limits of Abstraction [2002], 035) by R Cook / P Ebert - Notice of Fine's 'Limits of Abstraction' 2 | |
| A reaction: Fine develops an argument against this view, because (roughly) the procedure does not end in a unique result. Intuitively, the idea that abstraction is 'reconceptualization' sounds quite promising to me. |
| 10137 | Abstractionism can be regarded as an alternative to set theory [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: The uncompromising abstractionist rejects set theory, seeing the theory of abstractions as an alternative, rather than as a supplement, to the standard theory of sets. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Limits of Abstraction [2002], I.1) | |
| A reaction: There is also a 'compromising' version. Presumably you still have equivalence classes to categorise the objects, which are defined by their origin rather than by what they are members of... Cf. Idea 10145. |
| 10138 | An object is the abstract of a concept with respect to a relation on concepts [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: We can see an object as being the abstract of a concept with respect to a relation on concepts. For example, we may say that 0 is the abstract of the empty concept with respect to the relation of one-one correspondence. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Limits of Abstraction [2002], I.2) | |
| A reaction: This is Fine's attempt to give a modified account of the Fregean approach to abstraction. He says that the reference to a relation will solve the problem of identity between abstractions. |
| 4317 | We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham] |
| Full Idea: Williams has shown that whether an action was weakness of will depends on an evaluation after the event, as in the question of whether Gauguin was right to abandon his family to pursue his art. | |
| From: report of Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993]) by John Cottingham - Reason, Emotions and Good Life p.1 | |
| A reaction: The 'Gauguin Problem' is that Gauguin's actions only become weakness of will if the pictures are no good, and he can't know that till he's painted them. Good point. |
| 3546 | 'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence [Annas] |
| Full Idea: The best translation of 'phronesis' is probably not 'prudence' (which implies a non-moral motive), or 'practical wisdom' (which makes it sound contemplative), but 'practical intelligence', or just 'intelligence'. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.3) |
| 2174 | Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: The four elements of any conception of responsibility are cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], III - p.53) |
| 2178 | In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: In what I have done, the guilt points in one direction towards what has happened to others, and the shame in another direction to what I am. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], IV - p.92) | |
| A reaction: Not convinced. I think shame has the fear of being observed as an inescapable component. Even when alone shame involves imagining what others might think. |
| 3547 | Epicureans achieve pleasure through character development [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Since having a virtue does not reduce to performing certain kinds of acts, the Epicurean will achieve pleasure only by aiming at being a certain kind of person. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: No Epicurean would want to merely possess virtues, without enacting them. I assume that virtues are sought as guides to finding the finest pleasures (such as friendship). |
| 3543 | Cyrenaics pursue pleasure, but don't equate it with happiness [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Cyrenaics claimed our final good was pleasure, best achieved by seeking maximum intensity of pleasurable experiences, but they explicitly admitted that this was not happiness. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 1) |
| 2169 | Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: There was moral progress in the ancient Greek world, notably to the extent that the idea of areté, human excellence, was freed to some extent from determination by social position. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], I - p.7) |
| 3541 | Ancient ethics uses attractive notions, not imperatives [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Instead of modern 'imperative' notions of ethics (involving obligation, duty and rule-following), ancient ethics uses 'attractive' notions like those of goodness and worth | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], Intro) |
| 3550 | Principles cover life as a whole, where rules just cover actions [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Principles concern not just types of actions, but one's life as a whole, grasping truths about the nature of justice, and the like; they explain rules, giving the 'why' and not just the 'what'. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.4) |
| 3551 | Virtue theory tries to explain our duties in terms of our character [Annas] |
| Full Idea: An ethics of virtue moves from an initial interest in what we ought to do to an interest in the kinds of people we are and hope to be, because the latter is taken to be the best way of understanding the former. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.5) |
| 2172 | The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Duty in some abstract modern sense is largely unknown to the Greeks, in particular to archaic Greeks. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], II - p.41) |
| 3552 | If excessively good actions are admirable but not required, then duty isn't basic [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Supererogatory actions are admirable and valuable, and we praise people for doing them, but they do not generate obligations to perform them, which casts doubt on obligation as the basic notion in ethics. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.6) |
| 2180 | If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: If we think the power of reason is not enough by itself to distinguish good and bad, then we would hope that people have limited autonomy, that there is an internalised other in them that carries some social weight. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], IV - p.100) |
| 2179 | If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: The conception of the moral self as characterless leaves only a limited positive role to other people in one's moral life. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], IV - p.95) |
| 3542 | We should do good when necessary, not maximise it [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Why should I want to maximise my acting courageously? I act courageously when it is required. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 1) |
| 2175 | There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: There is a "problem of evil" only for those who expect the world to be good. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], III - p.68) |