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All the ideas for 'Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction'', 'The Varieties of Necessity' and 'Expositio super viii libros'

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10 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
10528 Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Our concern in giving a definition is not to say how things are by to say how we wish to speak
     From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310)
     A reaction: This sounds like an acceptable piece of wisdom which arises out of analytical and linguistic philosophy. It puts a damper on the Socratic dream of using definition of reveal the nature of reality.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
10529 If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Neo-Fregeans have thought that Hume's Principle, and the like, might be definitive of number and therefore not subject to the usual epistemological worries over its truth.
     From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310)
     A reaction: This seems to be the underlying dream of logicism - that arithmetic is actually brought into existence by definitions, rather than by truths derived from elsewhere. But we must be able to count physical objects, as well as just counting numbers.
10530 Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The fundamental difficulty facing the neo-Fregean is to either adopt the predicative reading of Hume's Principle, defining numbers, but inadequate, or the impredicative reading, which is adequate, but not really a definition.
     From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.312)
     A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but the general drift is the difficulty of building a system which has been brought into existence just by definition.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
9216 Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The three sources of necessity - the identity of things, the natural order, and the normative order - have their own peculiar forms of necessity. The three main areas of human enquiry - metaphysics, science and ethics - each has its own necessity.
     From: Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 6)
     A reaction: I would treat necessity in ethics with caution, if it is not reducible to natural or metaphysical necessity. Fine's proposal is interesting, but I did not find it convincing, especially in its view that metaphysical necessity doesn't intrude into nature.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
9089 Knowledge is a quality existing subjectively in the soul [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: Knowledge is a certain quality which exists in the soul as its subject ('existens subiective in anima').
     From: William of Ockham (Expositio super viii libros [1340], Prologue)
     A reaction: One might say here that knowledge is a property, and so it might not be susceptible to further analysis. It invites the question of how you could know by introspection that you have got it, which would be an extreme internalist view.
9091 Sometimes 'knowledge' just concerns the conclusion, sometimes the whole demonstration [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: Sometimes 'knowledge' means evident cognition of the conclusion alone, sometimes of the demonstration as a whole.
     From: William of Ockham (Expositio super viii libros [1340], Prologue)
     A reaction: 'Demonstration' will be something like Greek 'logos' - full understanding, ability to explain and give reasons. William is certainly right about normal usage. I know the answer in a quiz, without any requirement for justifications.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
9090 Knowledge is certain cognition of something that is true [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: Knowledge is certain cognition of something that is true.
     From: William of Ockham (Expositio super viii libros [1340], Prologue)
     A reaction: This view has problems. William is not facing up to the sceptical questions which can shake any degree of certainty, and also that someone who lacked self-confidence might know many things while always feeling uncertain about them. 'Cognition' must go!
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
9214 Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: I may have good reason to believe some testimony, for example, even though the person providing the testimony has no good reason for saying what he does.
     From: Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 5)
     A reaction: Thus small children, madmen and dreamers may occasionally get things right without realising it. I take testimony to be merely one more batch of evidence which has to be assessed in building the most coherent picture possible.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
10527 An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: If an abstraction principle is going to be acceptable, then it should not 'inflate', i.e. it should not result in there being more abstracts than there are objects. By this mark Hume's Principle will be acceptable, but Frege's Law V will not.
     From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.307)
     A reaction: I take this to be motivated by my own intuition that abstract concepts had better be rooted in the world, or they are not worth the paper they are written on. The underlying idea this sort of abstraction is that it is 'shared' between objects.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
9215 Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: It would be harder to break P-and-Q implying P than the connection between cause and effect. This difference in strictness means it is more plausible that natural necessities include metaphysical necessities, than vice versa.
     From: Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 6)
     A reaction: I cannot see any a priori grounds for the claim that causation is more easily disrupted than logic. It seems to be based on the strategy of inferring possibilities from what can be imagined, which seems to me to lead to wild misunderstandings.