18 ideas
16985 | Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke] |
Full Idea: The main and the original motivation for the 'possible worlds analysis' - and the way it clarified modal logic - was that it enabled modal logic to be treated by the same set theoretic techniques of model theory used successfully in extensional logic. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.19 n18) | |
A reaction: So they should be ascribed the same value that we attribute to classical model theory, whatever that is. |
16982 | A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke] |
Full Idea: Two totally distinct 'historical chains' that be sheer accident assign the same name to the same man should probably count as creating distinct names despite the identity of the referents. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.08 n9) | |
A reaction: A nice puzzle for his own theory. 'What's you name?' 'Alice, and Alice!' |
17818 | How many? must first partition an aggregate into sets, and then logic fixes its number [Yourgrau] |
Full Idea: We want to know How many what? You must first partition an aggregate into parts relevant to the question, where no partition is privileged. How the partitioned set is to be numbered is bound up with its unique members, and follows from logic alone. | |
From: Palle Yourgrau (Sets, Aggregates and Numbers [1985], 'New Problem') | |
A reaction: [Compressed wording of Yourgrau's summary of Frege's 'relativity argument'] Concepts do the partitioning. Yourgau says this fails, because the same argument applies to the sets themselves, as well as to the original aggregates. |
17822 | Nothing is 'intrinsically' numbered [Yourgrau] |
Full Idea: Nothing at all is 'intrinsically' numbered. | |
From: Palle Yourgrau (Sets, Aggregates and Numbers [1985], 'What the') | |
A reaction: Once you are faced with distinct 'objects' of some sort, they can play the role of 'unit' in counting, so his challenge is that nothing is 'intrinsically' an object, which is the nihilism explored by Unger, Van Inwagen and Merricks. Aristotle disagrees... |
17817 | Defining 'three' as the principle of collection or property of threes explains set theory definitions [Yourgrau] |
Full Idea: The Frege-Maddy definition of number (as the 'property' of being-three) explains why the definitions of Von Neumann, Zermelo and others work, by giving the 'principle of collection' that ties together all threes. | |
From: Palle Yourgrau (Sets, Aggregates and Numbers [1985], 'A Fregean') | |
A reaction: [compressed two or three sentences] I am strongly in favour of the best definition being the one which explains the target, rather than just pinning it down. I take this to be Aristotle's view. |
17815 | We can't use sets as foundations for mathematics if we must await results from the upper reaches [Yourgrau] |
Full Idea: Sets could hardly serve as a foundation for number theory if we had to await detailed results in the upper reaches of the edifice before we could make our first move. | |
From: Palle Yourgrau (Sets, Aggregates and Numbers [1985], 'Two') |
17821 | You can ask all sorts of numerical questions about any one given set [Yourgrau] |
Full Idea: We can address a set with any question at all that admits of a numerical reply. Thus we can ask of {Carter, Reagan} 'How many feet do the members have?'. | |
From: Palle Yourgrau (Sets, Aggregates and Numbers [1985], 'On Numbering') | |
A reaction: This is his objection to the Fregean idea that once you have fixed the members of a set, you have thereby fixed the unique number that belongs with the set. |
12295 | 3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Three-dimensionalist think a thing is somehow 'stretched out' through its location at a given time though not through the period during which it exists, and it is present in its entirety at a moment when it exists though not at a position of its location. | |
From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.1) | |
A reaction: This definition is designed to set up Fine's defence of the 3-D view, by showing that various dubious asymmetries show up if you do not respect the distinctions offered by the 3-D view. |
12298 | Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: In order to have genuine motion, rather than mere variation in position, it is necessary that the object should be 'entirely present' at each moment of the change. Thus without entire presence, or existence, genuine motion will not be possible. | |
From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.6) | |
A reaction: See Idea 4786 for a rival view of motion. Of course, who says we have to have Kit Fine's 'genuine' motion, if some sort of ersatz motion still gets you to work in the morning? |
12296 | 4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Four-dimensionalists have thought that a material thing is as equally 'stretched out' in time as it is in space, and that there is no special way in which it is entirely present at a moment rather than at a position. | |
From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.1) | |
A reaction: Compare his definition of 3-D in Idea 12295. The 4-D is contrary to our normal way of thinking. Since I don't think the future exists, I presume that if I am a 4-D object then I have to say that I don't yet exist, and I disapprove of such talk. |
18882 | You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons] |
Full Idea: Fine says it is acceptable to ask when a wedding was and where it was, and it is acceptable to ask or state where the bride was (at a certain time), but not when she was. | |
From: report of Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.18) by Peter Simons - Modes of Extension: comment on Fine p.18 | |
A reaction: This is aimed at three-dimensionalists who seem to think that a bride is a prolonged event, just as a wedding is. Fine is, interestingly, invoking ordinary language. When did the wedding start and end? When was the bride's birth and death? |
12297 | Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Even if one is a three-dimensionalist, one might affirm the existence of temporal parts, on the grounds that everything merely endures for an instant. | |
From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.2) | |
A reaction: This seems an important point, as belief in temporal parts is normally equated with four-dimensionalism (see Idea 12296). The idea is that a thing might be 'entirely present' at each instant, only to be replaced by a simulacrum. |
16981 | With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke] |
Full Idea: It is clear from (x)□(x=x) and Leibniz's Law that identity is an 'internal' relation: (x)(y)(x=y ⊃ □x=y). What pairs (w,y) could be counterexamples? Not pairs of distinct objects, …nor an object and itself. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.03) | |
A reaction: I take 'internal' to mean that the necessity of identity is intrinsic to the item(s), and not imposed by some other force. |
4942 | The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke] |
Full Idea: It seems to me that the Leibnizian principle of the indiscernibility of identicals (not to be confused with the identity of indiscernibles) is as self-evident as the law of contradiction. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.03) | |
A reaction: This seems obviously correct, as it says no more than that a thing has whatever properties it has. If a difference is discerned, either you have made a mistake, or it isn't identical. |
16984 | I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke] |
Full Idea: I do not think of 'possible worlds' as providing a reductive analysis in any philosophically significant sense, that is, as uncovering the ultimate nature, from either an epistemological or a metaphysical view, of modal operators, propositions etc. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.19 n18) | |
A reaction: I think this remark opens the door for Kit Fine's approach, of showing what modality is by specifying its sources. Possible worlds model the behaviour of modal inferences. |
9385 | The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke] |
Full Idea: If a speaker introduced a designator into a language by a ceremony, then in virtue of his very linguistic act, he would be in a position to say 'I know that Fa', but nevertheless 'Fa' would be a contingent truth (provided F is not an essential property). | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.14) | |
A reaction: If someone else does the designation, I seem to have contingent knowledge that the ceremony has taken place. You needn't experience the object, but you must experience the ceremony, even if you perform it. |
4943 | Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke] |
Full Idea: We should remind ourselves the 'possible worlds' terminology can always be replaced by modal talk, such as "It is possible that…" | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.15) | |
A reaction: Coming from an originator of the possible worlds idea, this is a useful reminder that we don't have to get too excited about the ontological commitments involved. It may be just a 'way to talk', and hence a tool, rather than a truth about reality. |
16983 | Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke] |
Full Idea: In studying probabilities with dice, we are introduced at a tender age to a set of 36 (miniature) possible worlds, if we (fictively) ignore everything except the two dice. …The possibilities are abstract states of the dice, not physical entities. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.16) | |
A reaction: Interesting for the introduction by the great man of the words 'fictional' and 'abstract' into the discussion. He says elsewhere that he takes worlds to be less than real, but more than mere technical devices. |