Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction'', 'Comments on a Certain Broadsheet' and 'Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories''

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / b. Early medieval philosophy

16137	Earlier views of Aristotle were dominated by 'Categories' [Frede,M]
	Full Idea: For centuries 'Categories' and 'De Interpretatione' (+ Porphyry's 'Isagoge') formed the core of the philosophical corpus still being seriously studied. It is hardly surprising that our received view of Aristotle was coloured substantially by 'Categories'.
	From: Michael Frede (Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' [1983], I)
	A reaction: He adds that doubts remain about the authenticity of the second part, and the whole thing bears marks of having been edited.

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition

10528	Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Our concern in giving a definition is not to say how things are by to say how we wish to speak
	From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310)
	A reaction: This sounds like an acceptable piece of wisdom which arises out of analytical and linguistic philosophy. It puts a damper on the Socratic dream of using definition of reveal the nature of reality.

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle

10529	If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Neo-Fregeans have thought that Hume's Principle, and the like, might be definitive of number and therefore not subject to the usual epistemological worries over its truth.
	From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310)
	A reaction: This seems to be the underlying dream of logicism - that arithmetic is actually brought into existence by definitions, rather than by truths derived from elsewhere. But we must be able to count physical objects, as well as just counting numbers.

10530	Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: The fundamental difficulty facing the neo-Fregean is to either adopt the predicative reading of Hume's Principle, defining numbers, but inadequate, or the impredicative reading, which is adequate, but not really a definition.
	From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.312)
	A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but the general drift is the difficulty of building a system which has been brought into existence just by definition.

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities

2602	What experience could prove 'If a=c and b=c then a=b'? [Descartes]
	Full Idea: Please tell me what the corporeal motion is that is capable of forming some common notion to the effect that 'things which are equal to a third thing are equal to each other'.
	From: René Descartes (Comments on a Certain Broadsheet [1644], p.366)

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts

2600	The mind's innate ideas are part of its capacity for thought [Descartes]
	Full Idea: I have never written or taken the view that the mind requires innate ideas which are something distinct from its own faculty of thinking.
	From: René Descartes (Comments on a Certain Broadsheet [1644], p.365)

2601	Qualia must be innate, because physical motions do not contain them [Descartes]
	Full Idea: The ideas of pains, colours, sounds etc. must be all the more innate if, on the occasion of certain corporeal motions, our mind is to be capable of representing them to itself, for there is no similarity between these ideas and the corporeal motions.
	From: René Descartes (Comments on a Certain Broadsheet [1644], p.365)
	A reaction: Simple and brilliant! We know perfectly well that there is no redness zooming through the air from a tomato (or the air would be pink!). Redness occurs when the light arrives, so we add the redness, so it is innate.

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence

10527	An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: If an abstraction principle is going to be acceptable, then it should not 'inflate', i.e. it should not result in there being more abstracts than there are objects. By this mark Hume's Principle will be acceptable, but Frege's Law V will not.
	From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.307)
	A reaction: I take this to be motivated by my own intuition that abstract concepts had better be rooted in the world, or they are not worth the paper they are written on. The underlying idea this sort of abstraction is that it is 'shared' between objects.