53 ideas
4697 | There has been a distinct 'Social Turn' in recent philosophy, like the earlier 'Linguistic Turn' [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: The Social Turn is as defining a characteristic of contemporary philosophy as the Linguistic Turn has been of the earlier twentieth century period. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: A helpful observation. It ties in with externalism about concepts (Twin Earth), impossibility of Private Language, and externalism about knowledge. |
4731 | Good reasoning will avoid contradiction, enhance coherence, not ignore evidence, and maximise evidence [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: The four basic principles of rationality are 1) avoid contradiction, 2) enhance coherence, 3) avoid ignoring evidence, and 4) maximise evidence. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: I like this, and can't think of any additions. 'Coherence' is the vaguest of the conditions. Maximising evidence is still the driving force of science, even if it does sound quaintly positivist. |
9023 | If you say that a contradiction is true, you change the meaning of 'not', and so change the subject [Quine] |
Full Idea: Those who regard the conjunction p.not-p as true think they are talking about negation, 'not', but this ceases to be recognisable as negation. The deviant logician's predicament is when he tries to deny the doctrine he only changes the subject. | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: The charge of 'changing the subject' has become a classic move in modern discussions of non-standard logics. It is an important idea in discussions of arguments, and is found in Kant's account of the Ontological Argument. |
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Our concern in giving a definition is not to say how things are by to say how we wish to speak | |
From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310) | |
A reaction: This sounds like an acceptable piece of wisdom which arises out of analytical and linguistic philosophy. It puts a damper on the Socratic dream of using definition of reveal the nature of reality. |
4735 | Just as maps must simplify their subject matter, so thought has to be reductionist about reality [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: A map that is identical in all respects with that which is mapped is just useless. So reductionism is not just a good thing - it is essential to thought. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: A useful warning, when thinking about truth. It is folly to want your thoughts to exactly correspond to reality. I want to understand the world, but not if it requires being the world. |
4703 | The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality' [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality'. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Dangerous nonsense. This leaves truth shifting as our theories change, it leads to different truths in different cultures, and no palpable falsehood in ignorant cultures. Don't give it house-room. |
4701 | To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong' [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Weak alethic relativism holds that while a statement may be true in one framework, it is inexpressible in another. Strong alethic relativism is where a sentence is true relative to one framework, but false relative to another. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: The weak version will be Kuhn's 'incommensurability' of scientific theories, while the strong version will be full Protagorean relativism, saying all beliefs are true. |
9012 | Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences [Quine] |
Full Idea: The truth predicate has its utility in places where we are compelled to mention sentences. It then serves to point through the sentence to the reality; it serves as a reminder that though sentences are mentioned, reality is still the whole point. | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: A sensible interpretation of the Tarskian account of truth as disquotation. Quine neatly combines a common sense correspondence with a sophisticated logicians view of the role of truth. So what does "I want the truth here" mean? |
9011 | Truth is redundant for single sentences; we do better to simply speak the sentence [Quine] |
Full Idea: Rather than speak of truth, we do better simply to say the sentence and so speak not about language but about the world. Of singly given sentences, the perfect theory of truth is the 'disappearance theory of truth' (Sellars). | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Quine defends truth as the crucial link between language and reality, but only for large groups of sentences. If someone accuses you of lying or being incorrect, you can respond by repeating your sentence in a firmer tone of voice. |
9013 | We can eliminate 'or' from our basic theory, by paraphrasing 'p or q' as 'not(not-p and not-q)' [Quine] |
Full Idea: The construction of 'alternation' (using 'or') is useful in practice, but superfluous in theory. It can be paraphrased using only negation and conjunction. We say that 'p or q' is paraphrased as 'not(not-p and not-q)'. | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Quine treats 'not' and 'and' as the axiomatic logical connectives, and builds the others from those, presumably because that is the smallest number he could get it down to. I quite like it, because it seems to mesh with basic thought procedures. |
9020 | My logical grammar has sentences by predication, then negation, conjunction, and existential quantification [Quine] |
Full Idea: We chose a standard grammar in which the simple sentences are got by predication, and all further sentences are generated from these by negation, conjunction, and existential quantification. | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: It is interesting that we 'choose' our logic, apparently guided by an imperative to achieve minimal ontology. Of these basic ingredients, negation and predication are the more mysterious, especially the latter. Quine is a bit of an 'ostrich' about that. |
9028 | Maybe logical truth reflects reality, but in different ways in different languages [Quine] |
Full Idea: Perhaps the logical truths owe their truth to certain traits of reality which are reflected in one way by the grammar of our language, in another way by the grammar of another language, and in a third way by the grammar and lexicon of a third language. | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: This explains Quine's subsequent interest in translation, and the interest of his pupil Davidson in charity, and whether there could actually be rival conceptual schemes. I like the link between logical truths and reality, which follows Russell. |
4705 | Logical relativism appears if we allow more than one legitimate logical system [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Logical relativism emerges if one defends the existence of two or more rival systems that one may legitimately choose between, or move back and forth between. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: All my instincts rebel against this possibility. All of Aristotle's and Kant's philosophy would be rendered meaningless. Obviously you can create artificial logics (like games), but I believe there is a truth logic. (Pathetic, isn't it?) |
10014 | Quine rejects second-order logic, saying that predicates refer to multiple objects [Quine, by Hodes] |
Full Idea: Quine is unwilling to suppose second-order logic intelligible. He holds to Mill's account of the referential role of a predicate: it multiply denotes any and all objects to which it applies, and there is no need for a further 'predicative' entity. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970]) by Harold Hodes - Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic p.130 | |
A reaction: If we assume that 'quantifying over' something is a commitment to its existence, then I think I am with Quine, because you end up with a massive commitment to universals, which I prefer to avoid. |
10828 | Quantifying over predicates is treating them as names of entities [Quine] |
Full Idea: To put the predicate letter 'F' in a quantifier is to treat predicate position suddenly as name position, and hence to treat predicates as names of entities of some sort. | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: It is tricky to distinguish quantifying over predicates in a first-order way (by reifying them), and in a second-order way (where it is not clear whether you are quantifying over a property or a unified set of things. |
4700 | A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false' [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Suggestions for a third value for truth are "indeterminate", or a scale running from "true", through "mostly true", "mainly true", "half true", "mainly false", "mostly false", to "false", or maybe even "0.56 true". | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Anything on a sliding scale sounds wrong, as it seems to be paracitic on an underlying fixed idea of 'true'. "Indeterminate", though, seems just right for the truth of predictions ('sea-fight tomorrow'). |
9024 | Excluded middle has three different definitions [Quine] |
Full Idea: The law of excluded middle, or 'tertium non datur', may be pictured variously as 1) Every closed sentence is true or false; or 2) Every closed sentence or its negation is true; or 3) Every closed sentence is true or not true. | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: Unlike many top philosophers, Quine thinks clearly about such things. 1) is the classical bivalent reading of excluded middle; 2) is the purely syntactic version; 3) leaves open how we interpret the 'not-true' option. |
10012 | Quantification theory can still be proved complete if we add identity [Quine] |
Full Idea: Complete proof procedures are available not only for quantification theory, but for quantification theory and identity together. Gödel showed that the theory is still complete if we add self-identity and the indiscernability of identicals. | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Hence one talks of first-order logic 'with identity', even though, as Quine observes, it is unclear whether identity is actually a logical or a mathematical notion. |
4704 | Wittgenstein reduced Russell's five primitive logical symbols to a mere one [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: While Russell and Whitehead used five primitive logical symbols in their system, Wittgenstein suggested in his 'Tractatus' that this be reduced to one. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This certainly captures why Russell was so impressed by him. In retrospect what looked like progress presumably now looks like the beginning of the collapse of the enterprise. |
9016 | Names are not essential, because naming can be turned into predication [Quine] |
Full Idea: Names are convenient but redundant, because Fa is equivalent to (an x)(a=x,Fx), so a need only occur in the context a=, but this can be rendered as a simple predicate A, so that Fa gives way to (an x)(Ax.Fx). | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: In eliminating names from analysis, Quine takes Russell's strategy a step further. It is probably this which provoked Kripke into going right back to Mill's view of names as basic labels. The name/description boundary is blurred. Mr Gradgrind. |
9015 | Universal quantification is widespread, but it is definable in terms of existential quantification [Quine] |
Full Idea: Universal quantification is prominent in logical practice but superfluous in theory, since (for all x)Fx obviously amounts to not(exists an x)not-Fx. | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: The equivalence between these two works both ways, some you could take the universal quantifier as primitive instead, which would make general truths prior to particular ones. Is there something deep at stake here? |
9025 | You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named [Quine] |
Full Idea: A customary argument against quantification based on substitution of names for variables refers to the theorem of set theory that irrational numbers cannot all be assigned integers. Although the integers can all be named, the irrationals therefore can't. | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: [He names Ruth Marcus as a source of substitutional quantification] This sounds like more than a mere 'argument' against substitutional quantification, but an actual disproof. Or maybe you just can't quantify once you run out of names. |
9026 | Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects [Quine] |
Full Idea: An existential quantification could turn out false when substitutionally construed and true when objectually construed, because of there being objects of the purported kind but only nameless ones. | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: (Cf. Idea 9025) Some irrational numbers were his candidates for nameless objects, but as decimals they are infinite in length which seems unfair. I don't take even pi or root-2 to be objects in nature, so not naming irrationals doesn't bother me. |
10705 | Putting a predicate letter in a quantifier is to make it the name of an entity [Quine] |
Full Idea: To put the predicate letter 'F' in a quantifier is to treat predicate positions suddenly as name positions, and hence to treat predicates as names of entities of some sort. | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Quine's famous objection to second-order logic. But Quine then struggles to give an account of predicates and properties, and hence is accused by Armstrong of being an 'ostrich'. Boolos 1975 also attacks Quine here. |
9027 | A sentence is logically true if all sentences with that grammatical structure are true [Quine] |
Full Idea: A sentence is logically true if all sentences with that grammatical structure are true. | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: Quine spends some time on the tricky question of deciding which parts of a sentence are grammatical structure ('syncategorematic'), and which parts are what he calls 'lexicon'. I bet there is a Quinean argument which blurs the boundary. |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Neo-Fregeans have thought that Hume's Principle, and the like, might be definitive of number and therefore not subject to the usual epistemological worries over its truth. | |
From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the underlying dream of logicism - that arithmetic is actually brought into existence by definitions, rather than by truths derived from elsewhere. But we must be able to count physical objects, as well as just counting numbers. |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The fundamental difficulty facing the neo-Fregean is to either adopt the predicative reading of Hume's Principle, defining numbers, but inadequate, or the impredicative reading, which is adequate, but not really a definition. | |
From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.312) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but the general drift is the difficulty of building a system which has been brought into existence just by definition. |
4711 | Anti-realists say our theories (such as wave-particle duality) give reality incompatible properties [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: The anti-realist says we have theories about the world that are incompatible with each other, and irreducible to each other. They often cite wave-particle duality, which postulate incompatible properties to reality. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Most physicists, of course, hate this duality, precisely because they can't conceive how the two properties could be real. I say realism comes first, and the theories must try to accommodate that assumption. |
4698 | What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: What counts as a fact partly depends on human input, such as the availability of concepts to describe such facts. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: The point must be taken. I am happy to generalise about 'The Facts', meaning 'whatever is the case', but the individuation of specific facts is bound to hit the current problem. |
9017 | Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication [Quine] |
Full Idea: Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication. | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Does a wife only exist as party to a marriage? There's something missing here. We are taking predication to be primitive, but we then seem to single out one part of the process - the object - while ignoring the remainder. What are Quinean objects? |
9018 | A physical object is the four-dimensional material content of a portion of space-time [Quine] |
Full Idea: We might think of a physical object as simply the whole four-dimensional material content, however sporadic and heterogeneous, of some portion of space-time. If it is firm and coherent internally, we call it a body. | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: An early articulation of one of the two standard views of objects in recent philosophy. I think I prefer the Quinean view, but I am still looking into that one... |
4715 | We may say that objects have intrinsic identity conditions, but still allow multiple accounts of them [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Those defending the claim that objects exist with identity conditions not imposed by us, do not have to say that there is just one account of those objects possible. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This seems right, but the test question is whether the mind of God contains a single unified theory/account. Are multiple accounts the result of human inadequacy? Yes, I surmise. |
9019 | Four-d objects helps predication of what no longer exists, and quantification over items from different times [Quine] |
Full Idea: The four-dimensional view of objects aids relativity, and the grammar of tenses, but in logic it makes sense of applying a predicate to something that no longer exists, or of quantifying over objects that never coexisted at any one time. | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Since you can predicate of or quantify over hypothetical or fictional objects ('Hamlet is gloomy', 'phlogiston explained fire quite well', 'peace and quiet would be nice') I don't see the necessity for this bold ontological commitment, on these grounds. |
9014 | Some conditionals can be explained just by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q) [Quine] |
Full Idea: Often the purpose of a conditional, 'if p, q', can be served simply by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q), the so-called 'material conditional'. | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Logicians love the neatness of that, but get into trouble elsewhere with conditionals, particularly over the implications of not-p. |
4719 | Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: A weaker form of relativism holds that developments in logic, in maths and in geometry have shown how a relativised notion of the a priori is possible. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This is non-Euclidean geometry, and multiple formalisations of logic. Personally I don't believe it. You can expand these subjects, and pursue whimsical speculations, but I have faith in their stable natural core. Neo-Platonism. |
4720 | Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: The reason sense-data were immune from doubt was because they were so primitive; they were unstructured and below the level of conceptualisation. Once they were given structure and conceptualised, they were no longer safe from sceptical challenge. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: The question of whether sense-data are conceptualised doesn't have to be all-or-nothing. As concepts creep in, so does scepticism, but so what? Sensible philosophers live with scepticism, like a mad aunt in the attic. |
4722 | Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: The two dichotomies which set the agenda in contemporary epistemology are the foundationalist-coherentist debate, and the internalist-externalist debate. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Helpful. Roughly, foundationalists are often externalists (if they are empiricists), and coherentists are often internalists (esp. if they are rationalists). An eccentric combination would make a good PhD. |
4724 | Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Internalism about justification says that the reasons one has for a belief must be in some sense available to the knowing subject, ..while externalism holds that it is possible for a person to have a justified belief without having access to the reason. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: It strikes me that internalists are talking about the believer being justified, and externalists talk about the belief being justified. I'm with the internalists. If this means cats don't know much, so much the worse for cats. |
4723 | Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Coherentist justification is more than absence of contradictions, and will involve issues like explanatory support and evidential support, and perhaps issues about probability and confirmation too. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Something like this is obviously essential. Is the notion of 'relevance' also needed (e.g. to avoid the raven paradox of induction)? Coherence of justification will combine with correspondence for truth. |
4709 | Ontological relativists are anti-realists, who deny that our theories carve nature at the joints [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Ontological relativists are anti-realists in the strong sense; they hold as meaningless the view that our theories carve nature at the joints. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This pinpoints my disagreement with such relativism, as it seems obvious to me that nature has 'joints', and that we would agree with any sensible alien about lots of things. |
4725 | Contextualism says that knowledge is relative to its context; 'empty' depends on your interests [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Contextualist about knowledge say that "to know" means different things in different context. For example, a warehouse may be empty for a furniture owner, but not for a bacteriologist or a physicist. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: There is obviously some truth in this, but we might say that 'empty' is a secondary quality, or that 'empty for furniture' is not relative. We needn't accept relativism here. |
4732 | One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: It is possible to conceive of one understanding the meaning of a realm of ideas, but holding that one cannot judge as to the truth or rationality of the claims made in it. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: I think Davidson gives good grounds for challenging this, by doubt whether one 'conceptual scheme' can know another without grasping its rationality and truth-conditions. |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: If an abstraction principle is going to be acceptable, then it should not 'inflate', i.e. it should not result in there being more abstracts than there are objects. By this mark Hume's Principle will be acceptable, but Frege's Law V will not. | |
From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.307) | |
A reaction: I take this to be motivated by my own intuition that abstract concepts had better be rooted in the world, or they are not worth the paper they are written on. The underlying idea this sort of abstraction is that it is 'shared' between objects. |
4710 | Verificationism was attacked by the deniers of the analytic-synthetic distinction, needed for 'facts' [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Verificationism came under attack from empiricists who were friendly to the banishment of traditional metaphysics, but unfriendly to the analytic-synthetic distinction, on which the idea of a 'factual statement' depended. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: I don't accept this move because I don't consider the 'facts' to be language-dependent. They are pre-linguistic, they outrun that capacity of our language, and they are available to animals. |
9009 | Single words are strongly synonymous if their interchange preserves truth [Quine] |
Full Idea: We can define, it would seem, a strong synonymy relation for single words by them being interchangeable salva veritate. | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This is a first step in Quine's rejection of synonymous sentences. He goes on to raise the problem of renate/cordate. Presumably any two word types can have different connotations, and hence not always be interchangeable - in poetry, for example. |
9007 | It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition [Quine] |
Full Idea: My objection to propositions is not parsimony, or disapproval of abstract entities, ..but that propositions induce a relation of synonymy or equivalence between sentences (expressing the same proposition), and this makes no objective sense. | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Personally I think propositions are unavoidable when you try to connect language to activities of the brain, and also when you consider animal thought. And also when you introspect about your own language processes. Mr Quine, he wrong. |
9008 | There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences [Quine] |
Full Idea: There is no evident rule for separating the information from the stylistic or other immaterial features of the sentences. | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: There is no rule for deciding precisely when night falls, so I don't believe in night. I take a proposition, prima facie, as an answer to the question 'What exactly do you mean by that remark?' How do you extract logical form from sentences? |
9010 | We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence [Quine] |
Full Idea: Why not just talk of sentences and equivalence and let the propositions go? Propositions have been projected as shadows of sentences, but at best they will give us nothing the sentences will not give. | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: I don't understand how you decide that two sentences are equivalent. 'There's someone in that wood'; 'yes, there's a person amongst those trees'. Identical truth-conditions. We can formulate a non-linguistic fact about those truth-conditions. |
4717 | If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: There may be no way to avoid scepticism about meaning if you abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction in the way Quine does. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: My suspicion was always that Quine's proposal began the slippery road to hell. It appears to be pragmatists who are most drawn to Quine's idea. The proposal that all my analytic propositions could be treated as synthetic totally baffles me. |
9021 | A good way of explaining an expression is saying what conditions make its contexts true [Quine] |
Full Idea: A reasonable way of explaining an expression is by saying what conditions make its various contexts true. | |
From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: I like the circumspect phrasing of this, which carefully avoids any entities such as 'meanings' or 'truth conditions'. Maybe the whole core of philosophy of language should shift from theories of meaning to just trying to 'explain' sentences. |
4706 | Early Quine says all beliefs could be otherwise, but later he said we would assume mistranslation [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: In his earlier work, Quine defended the view that no belief (including logic) is in principle unrevisable, but in his later work (1970) he took the conservative view that we would always impute mistranslation rather than deviancy. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: I take it he was influenced by Davidson's 'principle of charity'. He says that if someone asserts 'p and not-p', we would assume a misunderstanding of 'and' or 'not'. |
4734 | Cryptographers can recognise that something is a language, without translating it [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: It makes sense to think that one could recognise that something is a language without necessarily being able to translate it; cryptographers do this all the time. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Maybe, but cryptographers usually have a lot of context to work with. If we met extraterrestrials if might not be so clear. One can only spot patterns, and crystals have those. |
4727 | The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: The other problem is trying to find grounds for sticking to the object of one's faith, rather than changing from time to time. |