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14193
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'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
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Full Idea:
Some deep essentialists resist the need to explain the structure under de re modal properties, taking them as primitive. One version (which we can call 'substance theory') takes them to fall under a sortal concept, with no further explanation.
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From:
L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1)
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A reaction:
A very helpful identification of what Wiggins stands for, and why I disagree with him. The whole point of essences is to provide a notion that fits in with sciences, which means they must have an explanatory role, which needs structures.
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14195
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If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
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Full Idea:
If the substance essentialist holds that the sort an object belongs to determines its de re modal properties (rather than the other way round), then he needs to give an (ontological, not conceptual) explanation of what determines an object's sort.
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From:
L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1)
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A reaction:
See Idea 14193 for 'substance essentialism'. I find it quite incredible that anyone could think that a thing's sort could determine its properties, rather than the other way round. Even if sortals are conventional, they are not arbitrary.
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14196
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Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
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Full Idea:
The explanation of material constitution given by substance essentialism is that there are multiple objects. A person is essentially human-shaped (falling under the human sort), while their hunk of tissue is accidentally human-shaped (as tissue).
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From:
L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1)
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A reaction:
At this point sortal essentialism begins to look crazy. Persons are dubious examples (with sneaky dualism involved). A bronze statue is essentially harder to dent than a clay one, because of its bronze. If you remake it of clay, it isn't the same statue.
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14190
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Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
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Full Idea:
Essentialism says that objects have their properties essentially. 'Deep' essentialists take the (nontrivial) essential properties of an object to determine its nature. 'Shallow' essentialists substitute context-dependent truths for the independent ones.
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From:
L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], Intro)
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A reaction:
If the deep essence determines a things nature, we should not need to say 'nontrivial'. This is my bete noire, the confusion of essential properties with necessary ones, where necessary properties (or predicates, at least) can indeed be trivial.
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8375
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'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument [Russell]
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Full Idea:
'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, meaning that it is true for all possible values of its argument or arguments. Thus 'If x is a man, x is mortal' is necessary, because it is true for any possible value of x.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (On the Notion of Cause [1912], p.175)
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A reaction:
This is presumably the intermediate definition of necessity, prior to modern talk of possible worlds. Since it is a predicate about functions, it is presumably a metalinguistic concept, like the semantic concept of truth.
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14189
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'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
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Full Idea:
A 'modal realist' believes that there are many concrete worlds, while the 'actualist' believes in only one concrete world, the actual world. The 'ersatzist' is an actualist who takes nonactual possible worlds and their contents to be abstracta.
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From:
L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], Intro)
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A reaction:
My view is something like that modal realism is wrong, and actualism is right, and possible worlds (if they really are that useful) are convenient abstract fictions, constructed (if we have any sense) out of the real possibilities in the actual world.
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4396
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The law of causality is a source of confusion, and should be dropped from philosophy [Russell]
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Full Idea:
The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (On the Notion of Cause [1912], p.173)
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A reaction:
A bold proposal which should be taken seriously. However, if we drop it from scientific explanation, we may well find ourselves permanently stuck with it in 'folk' explanation. What is the alternative?
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8379
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In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell]
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Full Idea:
An 'event' (in a statement of the 'law of causation') is intended to be something that is likely to recur, since otherwise the law becomes trivial. It follows that an 'event' is not some particular, but a universal of which there may be many instances.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (On the Notion of Cause [1912], p.179)
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A reaction:
I am very struck by this. It may be a key insight into understanding what a law of nature actually is. It doesn't follow that we must be realists about universals, but the process of abstraction from particulars is at the heart of generalisation.
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