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7726
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Aristotelian logic dealt with inferences about concepts, and there were also proposition inferences [Weiner]
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Full Idea:
Till the nineteenth century, it was a common view that Aristotelian logic could evaluate inferences whose validity was based on relations between concepts, while propositional logic could evaluate inferences based on relations between propositions.
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From:
Joan Weiner (Frege [1999], Ch.3)
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A reaction:
Venn diagrams relate closely to Aristotelian syllogisms, as each concept is represented by a circle, and shows relations between sets. Arrows seem needed to represent how to go from one proposition to another. Is one static, the other dynamic?
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14193
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'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
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Full Idea:
Some deep essentialists resist the need to explain the structure under de re modal properties, taking them as primitive. One version (which we can call 'substance theory') takes them to fall under a sortal concept, with no further explanation.
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From:
L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1)
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A reaction:
A very helpful identification of what Wiggins stands for, and why I disagree with him. The whole point of essences is to provide a notion that fits in with sciences, which means they must have an explanatory role, which needs structures.
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14195
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If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
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Full Idea:
If the substance essentialist holds that the sort an object belongs to determines its de re modal properties (rather than the other way round), then he needs to give an (ontological, not conceptual) explanation of what determines an object's sort.
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From:
L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1)
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A reaction:
See Idea 14193 for 'substance essentialism'. I find it quite incredible that anyone could think that a thing's sort could determine its properties, rather than the other way round. Even if sortals are conventional, they are not arbitrary.
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14196
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Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
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Full Idea:
The explanation of material constitution given by substance essentialism is that there are multiple objects. A person is essentially human-shaped (falling under the human sort), while their hunk of tissue is accidentally human-shaped (as tissue).
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From:
L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1)
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A reaction:
At this point sortal essentialism begins to look crazy. Persons are dubious examples (with sneaky dualism involved). A bronze statue is essentially harder to dent than a clay one, because of its bronze. If you remake it of clay, it isn't the same statue.
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14190
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Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
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Full Idea:
Essentialism says that objects have their properties essentially. 'Deep' essentialists take the (nontrivial) essential properties of an object to determine its nature. 'Shallow' essentialists substitute context-dependent truths for the independent ones.
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From:
L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], Intro)
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A reaction:
If the deep essence determines a things nature, we should not need to say 'nontrivial'. This is my bete noire, the confusion of essential properties with necessary ones, where necessary properties (or predicates, at least) can indeed be trivial.
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14189
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'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
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Full Idea:
A 'modal realist' believes that there are many concrete worlds, while the 'actualist' believes in only one concrete world, the actual world. The 'ersatzist' is an actualist who takes nonactual possible worlds and their contents to be abstracta.
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From:
L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], Intro)
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A reaction:
My view is something like that modal realism is wrong, and actualism is right, and possible worlds (if they really are that useful) are convenient abstract fictions, constructed (if we have any sense) out of the real possibilities in the actual world.
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23530
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The great danger of democracy is that the oppression of the minority becomes unobjectionable [Hart,HLA]
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Full Idea:
For Mill and De Tocqueville the greatest of the dangers was not that in fact the majority might use their power to oppress a minority, but that, with the spread of democratic ideas, it might come to be thought unobjectionable that they should do so.
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From:
H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], III 'Populism')
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A reaction:
This was vivid in the 2016 Brexit referendum, which was 52-48 in favour of leaving. There were lots voices saying 'you lost, get over it'. It should be a basic (if neglected) principle that the winners of elections now represent the whole population.
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23528
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The value of liberty allows freedom of action, even if that distresses other people [Hart,HLA]
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Full Idea:
Recognition of individual liberty as a value involves, as a minimum, acceptance of the principle that the individual may do what he wants, even if others are distressed when the learn what it is that he does.
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From:
H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Private')
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A reaction:
He notes that there could be other reasons to block the freedom, such as harm done. This idea seems to identify a key component of liberalism - that we must all tolerate actions which we dislike.
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23521
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Do morals influence law? Is morality an aspect of law? Can law be morally criticised? [Hart,HLA]
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Full Idea:
Four questions: 1) Has the development of law been influenced by morals? 2) Must reference to morality enter into an adequate definition of law or legal system? 3) Is law open to moral criticism? 4) Does immorality justify legal punishment?
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From:
H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Enforcement')
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A reaction:
[compressed] Three nice questions, which are his agenda for the book. It is obvious that immoral laws can be created, and that laws can be criticised for being too concerned with morality, so there is no clear general answer to these dilemmas.
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23527
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Moral wickedness of an offence is always relevant to the degree of punishment [Hart,HLA]
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Full Idea:
Leslie Stephen argued that when the question is how severely an offender should be punished, an estimate of the degree of moral wickedness involved in the crime is always relevant.
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From:
H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Moral')
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A reaction:
[Stephen 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' 1873] The degree of responsibility (after excuses etc.) is obviously also highly relevant. If vicious murder is punished more harshly, that seems to be an assessment of the character of the murderer.
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