12302
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Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
For us it is sets which constitute the most natural example of a hierarchical structure within the abstract realm; but for Aristotle it would have been definitions, via their natural division into genus and differentia.
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From:
Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], §1 n4)
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A reaction:
I suppose everyone who thinks about reality in abstraction ends up with a hierarchy. Compare the hierarchy of angelic hosts, or Greek gods. Could we get back to the Aristotelian view, instead of sets, which are out of control at the top end?
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14193
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'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
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Full Idea:
Some deep essentialists resist the need to explain the structure under de re modal properties, taking them as primitive. One version (which we can call 'substance theory') takes them to fall under a sortal concept, with no further explanation.
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From:
L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1)
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A reaction:
A very helpful identification of what Wiggins stands for, and why I disagree with him. The whole point of essences is to provide a notion that fits in with sciences, which means they must have an explanatory role, which needs structures.
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14195
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If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
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Full Idea:
If the substance essentialist holds that the sort an object belongs to determines its de re modal properties (rather than the other way round), then he needs to give an (ontological, not conceptual) explanation of what determines an object's sort.
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From:
L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1)
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A reaction:
See Idea 14193 for 'substance essentialism'. I find it quite incredible that anyone could think that a thing's sort could determine its properties, rather than the other way round. Even if sortals are conventional, they are not arbitrary.
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14196
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Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
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Full Idea:
The explanation of material constitution given by substance essentialism is that there are multiple objects. A person is essentially human-shaped (falling under the human sort), while their hunk of tissue is accidentally human-shaped (as tissue).
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From:
L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1)
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A reaction:
At this point sortal essentialism begins to look crazy. Persons are dubious examples (with sneaky dualism involved). A bronze statue is essentially harder to dent than a clay one, because of its bronze. If you remake it of clay, it isn't the same statue.
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14267
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There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
If the parts of a body can constitute a man, then why should men not constitute a family? Why draw the line at the level of the man? ...Thus the idea of a distinctive notion of constitution, terminating in concrete substances, should be given up.
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From:
Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1)
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A reaction:
This is in the context of Aristotle, but Fine's view seems to apply to Rudder Baker's distinctive approach.
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14264
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Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
There is a question of whether there is a viable conception of constitution of the sort Aristotle supposes, one which is uniformly applicable to physical and non-physical objects alike, and which is capable of hierarchical application.
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From:
Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1)
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A reaction:
This is part of an explication of Aristotle's 'matter' [hule], which might be better translated as 'ingredients', which would fit non-physical things quite well.
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14190
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Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
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Full Idea:
Essentialism says that objects have their properties essentially. 'Deep' essentialists take the (nontrivial) essential properties of an object to determine its nature. 'Shallow' essentialists substitute context-dependent truths for the independent ones.
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From:
L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], Intro)
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A reaction:
If the deep essence determines a things nature, we should not need to say 'nontrivial'. This is my bete noire, the confusion of essential properties with necessary ones, where necessary properties (or predicates, at least) can indeed be trivial.
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14189
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'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
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Full Idea:
A 'modal realist' believes that there are many concrete worlds, while the 'actualist' believes in only one concrete world, the actual world. The 'ersatzist' is an actualist who takes nonactual possible worlds and their contents to be abstracta.
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From:
L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], Intro)
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A reaction:
My view is something like that modal realism is wrong, and actualism is right, and possible worlds (if they really are that useful) are convenient abstract fictions, constructed (if we have any sense) out of the real possibilities in the actual world.
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21240
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The truth about events always comes from the oppressed and disadvantaged [Sartre, by Bakewell]
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Full Idea:
Work out who is most oppressed and disadvantaged in the situation, and then adopt their version of events as the right one. If something is not true in the eyes of the least favoured, then it is not true.
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From:
report of Jean-Paul Sartre (The Communists and Peace [1953], final part) by Sarah Bakewell - At the Existentialist Café 12
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A reaction:
A theory of social truth, rather than truth in general. A bit simplistic, but appealing. If you want to know the truth, ask the people involved. This is true of the Savoy Grill, as well as of homeless life. You must first care about the oppressed.
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