Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Reference and Generality (3rd ed)' and 'Events'

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17 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts

12154	Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry]
	Full Idea: If we list the words 'bull', 'bull' and 'cow', it is often said that there are three 'word tokens' but only two 'word types', but Geach says there are not two kinds of object to be counted, but two different ways of counting the same object.
	From: report of Peter Geach (Reference and Generality (3rd ed) [1980]) by John Perry - The Same F II
	A reaction: Insofar as the notion that a 'word type' is an 'object', my sympathies are entirely with Geach, to my surprise. Geach's point is that 'bull' and 'bull' are the same meaning, but different actual words. Identity is relative to a concept.

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes

8979	Slow and continuous events (like balding or tree-growth) are called 'processes', not 'events' [Simons]
	Full Idea: Some changes are slow and continuous and are called 'processes' rather than events; the growth of a tree or the greying of John's hair.
	From: Peter Simons (Events [2003], 3.2)
	A reaction: So making a loaf of bread is an event rather than a process, and World War I was a process rather than an event? If you slow down a dramatic event (on film), you see that it is really a process. I take 'process' to be a much more illuminating word.

8981	Maybe processes behave like stuff-nouns, and events like count-nouns [Simons]
	Full Idea: There is arguably a parallel between the mass-count distinction among meanings of nouns and the process-event distinction among meanings of verbs. Processes, like stuff, do not connote criteria for counting, whereas events, like things, do.
	From: Peter Simons (Events [2003], 6.2)
	A reaction: Hm. You can have several processes, and a process can come to an end - but then you can have several ingredients of a cake, and you can run out of one of them. This may be quite a helpful distinction.

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events

8973	Einstein's relativity brought events into ontology, as the terms of a simultaneity relationships [Simons]
	Full Idea: The ontology of events rose in philosophy with the rise of relativity theory in physics. Einstein postulated the relativity of simultaneity to an observer's state of motion. The terms of the relation of simultaneity must be events or their parts.
	From: Peter Simons (Events [2003], 1.1.2)
	A reaction: Intriguing. Philosophers no doubt think they are way ahead of physicists in such a metaphysical area. Personally I regard the parentage of the concept as good grounds for scepticism about it. See Idea 7621 for my reason.

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind

14193	'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
	Full Idea: Some deep essentialists resist the need to explain the structure under de re modal properties, taking them as primitive. One version (which we can call 'substance theory') takes them to fall under a sortal concept, with no further explanation.
	From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1)
	A reaction: A very helpful identification of what Wiggins stands for, and why I disagree with him. The whole point of essences is to provide a notion that fits in with sciences, which means they must have an explanatory role, which needs structures.

14195	If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
	Full Idea: If the substance essentialist holds that the sort an object belongs to determines its de re modal properties (rather than the other way round), then he needs to give an (ontological, not conceptual) explanation of what determines an object's sort.
	From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1)
	A reaction: See Idea 14193 for 'substance essentialism'. I find it quite incredible that anyone could think that a thing's sort could determine its properties, rather than the other way round. Even if sortals are conventional, they are not arbitrary.

14196	Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
	Full Idea: The explanation of material constitution given by substance essentialism is that there are multiple objects. A person is essentially human-shaped (falling under the human sort), while their hunk of tissue is accidentally human-shaped (as tissue).
	From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1)
	A reaction: At this point sortal essentialism begins to look crazy. Persons are dubious examples (with sneaky dualism involved). A bronze statue is essentially harder to dent than a clay one, because of its bronze. If you remake it of clay, it isn't the same statue.

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects

8969	We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: Geach argued that the notion of absolute identity should be abandoned. ..We can only grasp the meaning of a count noun when we associate it with a criterion of identity, expressed by a particular relative identity sortal.
	From: report of Peter Geach (Reference and Generality (3rd ed) [1980]) by John Hawthorne - Identity
	A reaction: In other words, identity needs categorisation. Hawthorne concludes that Geach is wrong. Geach clearly has much common usage on his side. 'What's that?' usually invites a categorisation. Sameness of objects seems to need a 'respect'.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts

14198	Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
	Full Idea: Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would imply that objects with incompatible properties and objects such as winged pigs or golden mountains were actual.
	From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §5)
	A reaction: Note that this is 'qualitative' composition, and not composition of parts. The objection seems to rule out unrestricted qualitative composition, since you could hardly combine squareness with roundness.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence

14190	Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
	Full Idea: Essentialism says that objects have their properties essentially. 'Deep' essentialists take the (nontrivial) essential properties of an object to determine its nature. 'Shallow' essentialists substitute context-dependent truths for the independent ones.
	From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], Intro)
	A reaction: If the deep essence determines a things nature, we should not need to say 'nontrivial'. This is my bete noire, the confusion of essential properties with necessary ones, where necessary properties (or predicates, at least) can indeed be trivial.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier

14191	Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
	Full Idea: The deep essentialist holds that most objects have essential properties such that there are many ways they could not be, or many changes through which they could not persist. Objects' modal profiles characterize their natures.
	From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], Intro)
	A reaction: This is the view I like, especially the last bit. If your modal profile doesn't determine your nature, then what does? Think of how you sum up a person at a funeral. Your modal profile is determined by dispositions and powers.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism

14192	Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
	Full Idea: Two objections to deep essentialism are that it falters when faced with a skeptical objection concerning arbitrariness, and the need for a reductive account of de re modality.
	From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], Intro)
	A reaction: An immediate response to the second objection might be to say that modal facts about things are not reducible. The charge of arbitrariness (i.e. total arbitrariness, not just a bit of uncertainty) is the main thing a theory of essences must deal with.

14197	An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
	Full Idea: I reject the view that an object's de re modal properties determine its relations to possibilia.
	From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §3)
	A reaction: You'll have to read Paul to see why, but I flat disagree with her on this. The whole point of accepting such properties is to determine the modal profile of the thing, and hence see how it can fit into and behave in the world.

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity

16075	Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach]
	Full Idea: Geach's denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory. He must deny the axiom of extensionality in set theory, for example.
	From: comment on Peter Geach (Reference and Generality (3rd ed) [1980]) by Ryan Wasserman - Material Constitution 6
	A reaction: I'm beginning to think we have two entirely different concepts here - the logicians' and mathematicians' notion of when two things are identical, and the ordinary language concept of two things being 'the same'. 'We like the same music'.

12152	Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach]
	Full Idea: Identity is relative. When one says 'x is identical with y' this is an incomplete expression. It is short for 'x is the same A as y', where 'A' represents some count noun understood from the context of utterance.
	From: Peter Geach (Reference and Generality (3rd ed) [1980], p.39), quoted by John Perry - The Same F I
	A reaction: Perry notes that Geach's view is in conscious opposition to Frege, who had a pure notion of identity. We say 'they are the same insofar as they are animals', but not 'they are the same animal'. Perfect identity involves all possible A's.

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law

16073	Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman]
	Full Idea: Geach rejects the standard formulation of Leibniz's Law as incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate.
	From: report of Peter Geach (Reference and Generality (3rd ed) [1980]) by Ryan Wasserman - Material Constitution 6
	A reaction: Not many people accept Geach's premiss that identity is a relative matter. I agree with Wiggins on this, that identity is an absolute (and possibly indefinable). The problem with the Law is what you mean by a 'property'.

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds

14189	'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
	Full Idea: A 'modal realist' believes that there are many concrete worlds, while the 'actualist' believes in only one concrete world, the actual world. The 'ersatzist' is an actualist who takes nonactual possible worlds and their contents to be abstracta.
	From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], Intro)
	A reaction: My view is something like that modal realism is wrong, and actualism is right, and possible worlds (if they really are that useful) are convenient abstract fictions, constructed (if we have any sense) out of the real possibilities in the actual world.