Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect' and 'Philosophy of Chemistry'

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26 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
     Full Idea: Some deep essentialists resist the need to explain the structure under de re modal properties, taking them as primitive. One version (which we can call 'substance theory') takes them to fall under a sortal concept, with no further explanation.
     From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1)
     A reaction: A very helpful identification of what Wiggins stands for, and why I disagree with him. The whole point of essences is to provide a notion that fits in with sciences, which means they must have an explanatory role, which needs structures.
If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
     Full Idea: If the substance essentialist holds that the sort an object belongs to determines its de re modal properties (rather than the other way round), then he needs to give an (ontological, not conceptual) explanation of what determines an object's sort.
     From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1)
     A reaction: See Idea 14193 for 'substance essentialism'. I find it quite incredible that anyone could think that a thing's sort could determine its properties, rather than the other way round. Even if sortals are conventional, they are not arbitrary.
Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
     Full Idea: The explanation of material constitution given by substance essentialism is that there are multiple objects. A person is essentially human-shaped (falling under the human sort), while their hunk of tissue is accidentally human-shaped (as tissue).
     From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §1)
     A reaction: At this point sortal essentialism begins to look crazy. Persons are dubious examples (with sneaky dualism involved). A bronze statue is essentially harder to dent than a clay one, because of its bronze. If you remake it of clay, it isn't the same statue.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
     Full Idea: Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would imply that objects with incompatible properties and objects such as winged pigs or golden mountains were actual.
     From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §5)
     A reaction: Note that this is 'qualitative' composition, and not composition of parts. The objection seems to rule out unrestricted qualitative composition, since you could hardly combine squareness with roundness.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
     Full Idea: Essentialism says that objects have their properties essentially. 'Deep' essentialists take the (nontrivial) essential properties of an object to determine its nature. 'Shallow' essentialists substitute context-dependent truths for the independent ones.
     From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], Intro)
     A reaction: If the deep essence determines a things nature, we should not need to say 'nontrivial'. This is my bete noire, the confusion of essential properties with necessary ones, where necessary properties (or predicates, at least) can indeed be trivial.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
     Full Idea: The deep essentialist holds that most objects have essential properties such that there are many ways they could not be, or many changes through which they could not persist. Objects' modal profiles characterize their natures.
     From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], Intro)
     A reaction: This is the view I like, especially the last bit. If your modal profile doesn't determine your nature, then what does? Think of how you sum up a person at a funeral. Your modal profile is determined by dispositions and powers.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
     Full Idea: Two objections to deep essentialism are that it falters when faced with a skeptical objection concerning arbitrariness, and the need for a reductive account of de re modality.
     From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], Intro)
     A reaction: An immediate response to the second objection might be to say that modal facts about things are not reducible. The charge of arbitrariness (i.e. total arbitrariness, not just a bit of uncertainty) is the main thing a theory of essences must deal with.
An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
     Full Idea: I reject the view that an object's de re modal properties determine its relations to possibilia.
     From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], §3)
     A reaction: You'll have to read Paul to see why, but I flat disagree with her on this. The whole point of accepting such properties is to determine the modal profile of the thing, and hence see how it can fit into and behave in the world.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
     Full Idea: A 'modal realist' believes that there are many concrete worlds, while the 'actualist' believes in only one concrete world, the actual world. The 'ersatzist' is an actualist who takes nonactual possible worlds and their contents to be abstracta.
     From: L.A. Paul (In Defense of Essentialism [2006], Intro)
     A reaction: My view is something like that modal realism is wrong, and actualism is right, and possible worlds (if they really are that useful) are convenient abstract fictions, constructed (if we have any sense) out of the real possibilities in the actual world.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Thick mechanisms map whole reactions, and thin mechanism chart the steps [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: In chemistry the 'thick' notion of a mechanism traces out positions of electrons and atomic cores, and correlates them with energies, showing the whole reaction. 'Thin' mechanisms focus on a discrete set of intermediate steps.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 5.1)
Using mechanisms as explanatory schemes began in chemistry [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: The production of mechanisms as explanatory schemes finds its original home in chemistry.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 5.1)
     A reaction: This is as opposed to mechanisms in biology or neuroscience, which come later.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot]
     Full Idea: 'Double effect' refers to action having an effect aimed at, and also one foreseen but in now way desired. The 'doctrine' is that it is sometimes permissible to bring about by oblique intention what one may not directly intend.
     From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.20)
     A reaction: Presumably this can only be justified by a trade-off. The unfortunate side effect must be rated as a price worth paying. If the side effect is not foreseen, that is presumably either understandable, or wickedly negligent. No clear rule is possible.
The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot]
     Full Idea: Supporters of double effect say that sometimes it makes a difference to the permissibility of an action involving harm to others that this harm, although foreseen, is not part of the agent's intention.
     From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.22)
     A reaction: The obvious major case is the direction of wartime bombing raids. Controversial, because how can someone foresee a side effect and yet claim to have no intention to cause it? Isn't it wickedly self-deluding?
Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot]
     Full Idea: The doctrine of double effect offers us a way out [of the trolley problem], insisting that it is one thing to steer towards someone foreseeing that you will kill him, and another to aim at his death as part of your plan.
     From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.23)
     A reaction: [She has just created her famous Trolley Problem]. Utilitarians must constantly rely on the doctrine of double effect, as they calculate their trade-offs.
Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot]
     Full Idea: Rejection of the doctrine of double effect puts us hopelessly in the power of bad men. Anyone who wants us to do something we think is wrong has only to threaten that otherwise he himself will do something we think worse.
     From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.25)
     A reaction: Her example is they will torture five if you don't torture one. Bernard Williams's famous Jim and the Indians is they will shoot twenty if you don't shoot one. Williams aims it at utilitarian calculations. Double effect is highly relevant.
Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot]
     Full Idea: The strength of the doctrine of double effect seems to lie in the distinction it makes between what we do (equated with direct intention) and what we allow (thought of as obliquely intended).
     From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.25)
     A reaction: She objects (nicely), saying her trolley driver 'does' the side-effect killing, and someone might 'allow' an obvious criminal death. There is also an intermediate class of 'brought about', where you set up a killing, but don't do it.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights [Foot]
     Full Idea: One reason why most of us feel puzzled about the problem of abortion is that we want, and do not want, to allow to the unborn child the rights that belong to adults and children.
     From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.19)
     A reaction: We also do and don't want children to have the same rights as adults. Rights should accrue with development and maturity, it seems. No one thinks sperm and egg have rights. Why stop at 'adult'? Superior adults deserve more rights!
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Lavoisier's elements included four types of earth [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: Four types of earth found a place on Lavoisier's list of elements.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 1.2)
     A reaction: A nice intermediate point between the ancient Greek and the modern view of earth.
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
Over 100,000,000 compounds have been discovered or synthesised [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: There are well over 100,000,000 chemical compounds that have been discovered or synthesised, all of which have been formally characterised.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 4.3)
Water molecules dissociate, and form large polymers, explaining its properties [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: Water's structure cannot simply be described as a collection of individual molecules. There is a continual dissociation of H2O molecules into hydrogen and hydroxide ions; they former larger polymeric species, explaining conductivity, melting and boiling.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 4.5)
     A reaction: [compressed] If philosophers try to state the 'essence of water', they had better not be too glib about it.
It is unlikely that chemistry will ever be reduced to physics [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: Most philosophers believe chemistry has not been reduced to physics nor is it likely to be.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 6)
     A reaction: [Le Poidevin 2007 argues the opposite] That chemical features are actually metaphysically 'emergent' is a rare view, defended by Hendry. The general view is that the concepts are too different, and approximations render it hopeless.
Quantum theory won't tell us which structure a set of atoms will form [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: Quantum mechanics cannot tell us why a given collection of atoms will adopt one molecular structure (and set of chemical properties) or the other.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 6.1)
     A reaction: Presumably it the 'chance' process of how the atoms are thrown together.
For temperature to be mean kinetic energy, a state of equilibrium is also required [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: Having a particular average kinetic energy is only a necessary condition for having a given temperature, not a sufficient one, because only gases at equilibrium have a well-defined temperature.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 6.2)
     A reaction: If you try to pin it all down more precisely, the definition turns out to be circular.
'H2O' just gives the element proportions, not the microstructure [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: 'H2O' is not a description of any microstructure. It is a compositional formula, describing the combining proportions of hydrogen and oxygen to make water.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 4.5)
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
Isotopes (such as those of hydrogen) can vary in their rates of chemical reaction [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: There are chemically salient differences among the isotopes, best illustrated by the three isotopes of hydrogen: protium, deuterium and tritium, which show different rates of reaction, making heavy water poisonous where ordinary water is not.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 1.4)
     A reaction: [They cite Paul Needham 2008] The point is that the isotopes are the natural kinds, rather than the traditional elements. The view is unorthodox, but clearly makes a good point.
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
Mendeleev systematised the elements, and also gave an account of their nature [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
     Full Idea: In addition to providing the systematization of the elements used in modern chemistry, Mendeleev also gave an account of the nature of the elements which informs contemporary philosophical understanding.
     From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 1.3)