56 ideas
| 8893 | For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: The 2nd standard objection to coherence is 'alternative coherent systems' - that there will be indefinitely many possible systems of belief in relation to any given subject area, each as internally coherent as the others. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: This seems to imply that you could just invent an explanation, as long as it was coherent, but presumably good coherence is highly sensitive to the actual evidence. Bonjour observes that many of these systems would not survive over time. |
| 501 | Reason is a more powerful persuader than gold [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: In power of persuasion, reasoning is far stronger than gold. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B051), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.04.12 |
| 9570 | In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things [Field,H, by Chihara] |
| Full Idea: Field commits himself to a Platonic view of mathematics. The theorems of set theory are held to imply or presuppose the existence of things that don't in fact exist. That is why he believes that these theorems are false. | |
| From: report of Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980]) by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics 11.1 | |
| A reaction: I am sympathetic to Field, but this sounds wrong. A response that looks appealing is that maths is hypothetical ('if-thenism') - the truth is in the logical consequences, not in the ontological presuppositions. |
| 10260 | Logical consequence is defined by the impossibility of P and ¬q [Field,H, by Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: Field defines logical consequence by taking the notion of 'logical possibility' as primitive. Hence q is a consequence of P if the conjunction of the items in P with the negation of q is not possible. | |
| From: report of Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.2 | |
| A reaction: The question would then be whether it is plausible to take logical possibility as primitive. Presumably only intuition could support it. But then intuition will equally support natural and metaphysical possibilities. |
| 8958 | In Field's version of science, space-time points replace real numbers [Field,H, by Szabó] |
| Full Idea: Field's nominalist version of science develops a version of Newtonian gravitational theory, where no quantifiers range over mathematical entities, and space-time points and regions play the role of surrogates for real numbers. | |
| From: report of Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980]) by Zoltán Gendler Szabó - Nominalism 5.1 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a very artificial contrivance, but Field has launched a programme for rewriting science so that numbers can be omitted. All of this is Field's rebellion against the Indispensability Argument for mathematics. I sympathise. |
| 18221 | 'Metric' axioms uses functions, points and numbers; 'synthetic' axioms give facts about space [Field,H] |
| Full Idea: There are two approaches to axiomatising geometry. The 'metric' approach uses a function which maps a pair of points into the real numbers. The 'synthetic' approach is that of Euclid and Hilbert, which does without real numbers and functions. | |
| From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 5) |
| 8757 | The Indispensability Argument is the only serious ground for the existence of mathematical entities [Field,H] |
| Full Idea: There is one and only one serious argument for the existence of mathematical entities, and that is the Indispensability Argument of Putnam and Quine. | |
| From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], p.5), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 9.1 | |
| A reaction: Personally I don't believe (and nor does Field) that this gives a good enough reason to believe in such things. Quine (who likes 'desert landscapes' in ontology) ends up believing that sets are real because of his argument. Not for me. |
| 18212 | Nominalists try to only refer to physical objects, or language, or mental constructions [Field,H] |
| Full Idea: The most popular approach of nominalistically inclined philosophers is to try to reinterpret mathematics, so that its terms and quantifiers only make reference to, say, physical objects, or linguistic expressions, or mental constructions. | |
| From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], Prelim) | |
| A reaction: I am keen on naturalism and empiricism, but only referring to physical objects is a non-starter. I think I favour constructions, derived from the experience of patterns, and abstracted, idealised and generalised. Field says application is the problem. |
| 10261 | The application of mathematics only needs its possibility, not its truth [Field,H, by Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: Field argues that to account for the applicability of mathematics, we need to assume little more than the possibility of the mathematics, not its truth. | |
| From: report of Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.2 | |
| A reaction: Very persuasive. We can apply chess to real military situations, provided that chess isn't self-contradictory (or even naturally impossible?). |
| 18218 | Hilbert explains geometry, by non-numerical facts about space [Field,H] |
| Full Idea: Facts about geometric laws receive satisfying explanations, by the intrinsic facts about physical space, i.e. those laid down without reference to numbers in Hilbert's axioms. | |
| From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 3) | |
| A reaction: Hilbert's axioms mention points, betweenness, segment-congruence and angle-congruence (Field 25-26). Field cites arithmetic and geometry (as well as Newtonian mechanics) as not being dependent on number. |
| 9623 | Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets [Brown,JR on Field,H] |
| Full Idea: Field needs the notion of logical consequence in second-order logic, but (since this is not recursively axiomatizable) this is a semantical notion, which involves the idea of 'true in all models', a set-theoretic idea if there ever was one. | |
| From: comment on Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], Ch.4) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics | |
| A reaction: Brown here summarises a group of critics. Field was arguing for modern nominalism, that actual numbers could (in principle) be written out of the story, as useful fictions. Popper's attempt to dump induction seemed to need induction. |
| 18215 | It seems impossible to explain the idea that the conclusion is contained in the premises [Field,H] |
| Full Idea: No clear explanation of the idea that the conclusion was 'implicitly contained in' the premises was ever given, and I do not believe that any clear explanation is possible. | |
| From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 1) |
| 18216 | Abstractions can form useful counterparts to concrete statements [Field,H] |
| Full Idea: Abstract entities are useful because we can use them to formulate abstract counterparts of concrete statements. | |
| From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 3) | |
| A reaction: He defends the abstract statements as short cuts. If the concrete statements were 'true', then it seems likely that the abstract counterparts will also be true, which is not what fictionalism claims. |
| 18214 | Mathematics is only empirical as regards which theory is useful [Field,H] |
| Full Idea: Mathematics is in a sense empirical, but only in the rather Pickwickian sense that is an empirical question as to which mathematical theory is useful. | |
| From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 1) | |
| A reaction: Field wants mathematics to be fictions, and not to be truths. But can he give an account of 'useful' that does not imply truth? Only in a rather dubiously pragmatist way. A novel is not useful. |
| 18210 | Why regard standard mathematics as truths, rather than as interesting fictions? [Field,H] |
| Full Idea: Why regard the axioms of standard mathematics as truths, rather than as fictions that for a variety of reasons mathematicians have become interested in? | |
| From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], p.viii) |
| 18211 | You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic [Field,H] |
| Full Idea: One can often reduce one's ontological commitments by expanding one's logic. | |
| From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], p.ix) | |
| A reaction: I don't actually understand this idea, but that's never stopped me before. Clearly, this sounds like an extremely interesting thought, and hence I should aspire to understand it. So I do aspire to understand it. First, how do you 'expand' a logic? |
| 8959 | Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science [Field,H, by Szabó] |
| Full Idea: Field regards the eliminability of apparent reference to properties from the language of science as a foregone result. | |
| From: report of Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980]) by Zoltán Gendler Szabó - Nominalism 5.1 n50 | |
| A reaction: Field is a nominalist who also denies the existence of mathematics as part of science. He has a taste for ontological 'desert landscapes'. I have no idea what a property really is, so I think he is on to something. |
| 18213 | Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical [Field,H] |
| Full Idea: To be able to apply any postulated abstract entities to the physical world, we need impure abstact entities, e.g. functions that map physical objects into pure abstract objects. | |
| From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 1) | |
| A reaction: I am a fan of 'impure metaphysics', and this pinpoints my reason very nicely. |
| 8888 | The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: The concept of knowledge is seriously problematic in more than one way, and is best avoided as far as possible in sober epistemological discussion. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: Two sorts of states seem to be conflated: one where an animal has a true belief caused by an environmental event, and the other where a scholar pores over books and experiments to arrive at a hard-won truth. I say only the second is 'knowledge'. |
| 8887 | It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: Foundationalists find it difficult to attach a clear and defensible content to the idea that basic beliefs that are characterized as 'self-justified' or 'self-evident'. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: A little surprising from a fan of a priori foundations, especially given that 'self-evident' is common usage, and not just philosophers' jargon. I think we can talk of self-evidence without a precise definition. We talk of an 'ocean' without trouble. |
| 8897 | The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: The adverbial account of the content of experience is almost certainly correct, because no account can be given of the relation between sense-data and the apprehending mind that is independent of the adverbial theory. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 5.1 n3) | |
| A reaction: This boils down to the usual objection to sense-data, which is 'cut out the middle man'. Bonjour is right that at some point the mind has finally to experience whatever is coming in, and it must experience it in a particular way. |
| 8896 | Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: If we describe a non-conceptual conscious state, we are aware of its character via the constitutive or 'built-in' awareness of content without need for a conceptual description, and so recognise that a conceptually formulated belief about it is correct. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 4.3) | |
| A reaction: This is Bonjour working very hard to find an account of primitive sense experiences which will enable them to function as 'basic beliefs' for foundations, without being too thin to do anything, or too thick to be basic. I'm not convinced. |
| 8891 | My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: If coherentism is construed as involving the believer's entire body of beliefs, that would imply, most implausibly, that the justification of a belief in one area (physics) could be undermined by serious incoherence in another area (art history). | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: Bonjour suggests that a moderated coherentism is needed to avoid this rather serious problem. It is hard to see how a precise specification could be given of 'areas' and 'local coherence'. An idiot about art would inspire little confidence on physics. |
| 8892 | Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: The 1st standard objection to coherence is the 'isolation problem', that contingent apparently-empirical beliefs might be justified in the absence of any informational input from the extra-conceptual world they attempt to describe. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: False beliefs can be well justified. In a perfect virtual reality we would believe our experiences precisely because they were so coherent. Messengers from the front line have top priority, but how do you detect infiltrators and liars? |
| 8894 | Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: The 3rd standard objection to coherence is the demand for a meta-justification for coherence, a reason for thinking that justification on the basis of the coherentist view of justification is in fact likely to lead to believing the truth. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: Some coherentists respond by adopting a coherence theory of truth, which strikes me as extremely unwise. There must be an underlying optimistic view, centred on the principle of sufficient reason, that reality itself is coherent. I like Idea 8618. |
| 8889 | Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: Reliabilist views differ among themselves with regard to whether a belief's being produced in a reliable way is by itself sufficient for epistemic justification or whether there are further requirements that must be satisfied as well. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: If 'further requirements' are needed, the crucial question would be which one is trumps when they clash. If the further requirements can correct the reliable source, then it cannot any longer be called 'reliabilism'. It's Further-requirement-ism. |
| 8890 | If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: How can the fact that a belief is reliably produced make my acceptance of that belief rational and responsible when that fact itself is entirely unavailable to me? | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: This question must rival Pollock's proposal (Idea 8815) as the master argument against externalism. Bonjour is assuming that knowledge has to be 'rational and responsible', but clearly externalists take a more lax view of knowledge. |
| 18222 | Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation [Field,H] |
| Full Idea: A plausible methodological principle is that underlying every good extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation. | |
| From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 5) | |
| A reaction: I'm thinking that Hartry Field is an Aristotelian essentialist, though I bet he would never admit it. |
| 8895 | If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: In the higher-order thought theory of consciousness, if the first-order thought is not itself conscious and the second-order thought is not itself conscious, then there seems to be no consciousness of the first-level content present at all. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 4.2) | |
| A reaction: A nice basic question. The only plausible answer seems to be that consciousness arises out of the combination of levels. Otherwise one of the levels is redundant, or we are facing a regress. |
| 9917 | 'Abstract' is unclear, but numbers, functions and sets are clearly abstract [Field,H] |
| Full Idea: The term 'abstract entities' may not be entirely clear, but one thing that does seem clear is that such alleged entities as numbers, functions and sets are abstract. | |
| From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], p.1), quoted by JP Burgess / G Rosen - A Subject with No Object I.A.1.a | |
| A reaction: Field firmly denies the existence of such things. Sets don't seem a great problem, if the set is a herd of elephants, but the null and singleton sets show up the difficulties. |
| 514 | Beauty is merely animal without intelligence [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Physical beauty is merely animal unless intelligence be present. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B105) |
| 525 | Behave well when alone, and feel shame in you own eyes [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Do not say or do what is base, even when you are alone. Learn to feel shame in your own eyes much more than before others. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B244), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.31.7 | |
| A reaction: I like this. How you think and behave when unobserved is the true test of who you are. Feeling shame at a very private failing is an interesting phenomenon. |
| 502 | Good breeding in men means having a good character [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Good breeding in cattle depends on physical health, but in men on a well-formed character. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B057), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.29.18 | |
| A reaction: In our ultra-democratic age (supposedly) it is heresy to talk about good breeding, or some people being superior to others. But surely people should aim to improve their characters? |
| 507 | Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B073), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.5.23 | |
| A reaction: Is it possible to love something without seeing it as beautiful? A badly crippled dog, for example. If not, that seems to reveal something about beauty. |
| 521 | We should only choose pleasures which are concerned with the beautiful [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: One should choose not every pleasure, but only that concerned with the beautiful. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B207), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.22 | |
| A reaction: The pleasures we should prefer are those which involve the whole person, rather than the mere stimulation of one sense. Sez me. |
| 505 | Good and true are the same for everyone, but pleasures differ [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: For all men, good and true are the same; but pleasant differs for different men. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B069) | |
| A reaction: Truth is not 'for' anyone, but there's good-in-itself, and good-for-me. Are there some pleasures we should all enjoy (such as watching our children flourish)? |
| 508 | Only accept beneficial pleasures [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Accept no pleasure unless it is beneficial. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B074) | |
| A reaction: Maybe all pleasures bestow some benefit - even if they are linked to harm. I struggle to see what is wrong with a harmless and non-beneficial pleasure, and I doubt if anyone could explain it to me. |
| 520 | The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B194), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.03.46 | |
| A reaction: Only, of course, for those able to perceive the nobility. In what does the 'nobility' consist, other than in the morally acceptable pleasure? Hard to explain 'noble'. Just 'wow!'? |
| 522 | Moderation brings more pleasures, and so increases pleasure [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Moderation multiplies pleasures, and increases pleasure. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B211), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.27 | |
| A reaction: So moderation is a sneaky trick to avoid moderation? I presume the most intense pleasures are mostly unfamiliar, and so add novelty to the mix. Apart from eating chocolate, of course. |
| 506 | Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not an adult [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not a man. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B070) | |
| A reaction: Not factually correct, since the world is full of adults who have immoderate desires (notably for money). However, there are plenty of grown ups who don't seem very adult. |
| 523 | It is as brave to master pleasure as to overcome the enemy [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: The brave man is not only he who overcomes the enemy, but he who is stronger than pleasures. Some men are masters of cities, but are enslaved by women. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B214), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.07.25 | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure if 'bravery' is the relevant virtue here.Sounds like self-control or temperance. I suspect that mastering a city is quite pleasurable, if that's your thing. |
| 503 | Virtue doesn't just avoid evil, but also doesn't desire it [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Virtue consists, not in avoiding wrong-doing, but in having no wish thereto. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B062), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.17.37 |
| 518 | A bad life is just a drawn-out death [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: To live badly is not just to live badly, but to spend a long time dying. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B160), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 497 | Be virtuous from duty, not from fear [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Refrain from crimes not through fear but through duty [deon]. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B041), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.95 | |
| A reaction: [not sure about the translation here] |
| 499 | Repentance of shameful deeds is salvation [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Repentance for shameful deeds is salvation in life. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B043) |
| 524 | Virtue comes more from practice than from nature [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: More men become good through practice than by nature. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B242), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.29.66 |
| 519 | One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B190), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.91 |
| 500 | The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the person wronged [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the man wronged. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B045) |
| 526 | Small appetite makes poverty equal to wealth [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Small appetite makes poverty equivalent to wealth. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B284), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.33.24 |
| 1539 | The endless desire for money is a crueller slavery than poverty [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Unless a point of satiety is reached, the desire for money is far more cruel than the utmost poverty, because the greater the desire, the greater the need | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B219), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.10.43 |
| 511 | It is better to have one intelligent friend than many unintelligent [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: The friendship of one intelligent man is better than that of all the unintelligent. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B098) |
| 498 | It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B042), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.44.68 | |
| A reaction: Something wrong with the translation here, if there is no Greek word for 'duty'. |
| 1541 | It is better to be poor in a democracy than be rich without freedom [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Poverty in a democracy is as preferable to what is called prosperity under autocracy as freedom is to slavery. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B251), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.40.42 |
| 18223 | In theories of fields, space-time points or regions are causal agents [Field,H] |
| Full Idea: According to theories that take the notion of a field seriously, space-time points or regions are fully-fledge causal agents. | |
| From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], n 23) |
| 18220 | Both philosophy and physics now make substantivalism more attractive [Field,H] |
| Full Idea: In general, it seems to me that recent developments in both philosophy and physics have made substantivalism a much more attractive position than it once was. | |
| From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 4) | |
| A reaction: I'm intrigued as to what philosophical developments are involved in this. The arrival of fields is the development in physics. |
| 18219 | Relational space is problematic if you take the idea of a field seriously [Field,H] |
| Full Idea: The problem of the relational view of space is especially acute in the context of physical theories that take the notion of a field seriously, e.g. classical electromagnetic theory. | |
| From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 4) | |
| A reaction: In the Leibniz-Clarke debate I sided with the Newtonian Clarke (defending absolute space), and it looks like modern science agrees with me. Nothing exists purely as relations. |