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All the ideas for 'Philosophy of Mathematics', 'Principles of Arithmetic, by a new method' and 'Quantum: Einstein and Bohr'

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10 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
Predicative definitions only refer to entities outside the defined collection [Horsten]
     Full Idea: Definitions are called 'predicative', and are considered sound, if they only refer to entities which exist independently from the defined collection.
     From: Leon Horsten (Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], §2.4)
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
A theory is 'categorical' if it has just one model up to isomorphism [Horsten]
     Full Idea: If a theory has, up to isomorphism, exactly one model, then it is said to be 'categorical'.
     From: Leon Horsten (Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], §5.2)
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
Computer proofs don't provide explanations [Horsten]
     Full Idea: Mathematicians are uncomfortable with computerised proofs because a 'good' proof should do more than convince us that a certain statement is true. It should also explain why the statement in question holds.
     From: Leon Horsten (Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], §5.3)
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
All models of Peano axioms are isomorphic, so the models all seem equally good for natural numbers [Cartwright,R on Peano]
     Full Idea: Peano's axioms are categorical (any two models are isomorphic). Some conclude that the concept of natural number is adequately represented by them, but we cannot identify natural numbers with one rather than another of the isomorphic models.
     From: comment on Giuseppe Peano (Principles of Arithmetic, by a new method [1889], 11) by Richard Cartwright - Propositions 11
     A reaction: This is a striking anticipation of Benacerraf's famous point about different set theory accounts of numbers, where all models seem to work equally well. Cartwright is saying that others have pointed this out.
PA concerns any entities which satisfy the axioms [Peano, by Bostock]
     Full Idea: Peano Arithmetic is about any system of entities that satisfies the Peano axioms.
     From: report of Giuseppe Peano (Principles of Arithmetic, by a new method [1889], 6.3) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 6.3
     A reaction: This doesn't sound like numbers in the fullest sense, since those should facilitate counting objects. '3' should mean that number of rose petals, and not just a position in a well-ordered series.
Peano axioms not only support arithmetic, but are also fairly obvious [Peano, by Russell]
     Full Idea: Peano's premises are recommended not only by the fact that arithmetic follows from them, but also by their inherent obviousness.
     From: report of Giuseppe Peano (Principles of Arithmetic, by a new method [1889], p.276) by Bertrand Russell - Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics p.276
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
We can add Reflexion Principles to Peano Arithmetic, which assert its consistency or soundness [Halbach on Peano]
     Full Idea: Peano Arithmetic cannot derive its own consistency from within itself. But it can be strengthened by adding this consistency statement or by stronger axioms (particularly ones partially expressing soundness). These are known as Reflexion Principles.
     From: comment on Giuseppe Peano (Principles of Arithmetic, by a new method [1889], 1.2) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) 1.2
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
The concept of 'ordinal number' is set-theoretic, not arithmetical [Horsten]
     Full Idea: The notion of an ordinal number is a set-theoretic, and hence non-arithmetical, concept.
     From: Leon Horsten (Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], §2.3)
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Arithmetic can have even simpler logical premises than the Peano Axioms [Russell on Peano]
     Full Idea: Peano's premises are not the ultimate logical premises of arithmetic. Simpler premises and simpler primitive ideas are to be had by carrying our analysis on into symbolic logic.
     From: comment on Giuseppe Peano (Principles of Arithmetic, by a new method [1889], p.276) by Bertrand Russell - Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics p.276
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Bohr explained the periodic table and chemical properties of elements, using the quantum atom [Kumar]
     Full Idea: Bohr used the quantum atom to explain the periodic table and the chemical properties of the elements. ...It was his new theory about the arrangement of electrons inside atoms that explained the placing and grouping of elements in the periodic table.
     From: Manjit Kumar (Quantum: Einstein and Bohr [2008], Ch 04)
     A reaction: (second sentence p.133) This is Exhibit A for the idea that essences are explanatory, and are discovered by scientists. The moot point would be whether it is appropriate to describe electron shells as part of the 'essence' of an atom.