16 ideas
10882 | Predicative definitions only refer to entities outside the defined collection [Horsten] |
Full Idea: Definitions are called 'predicative', and are considered sound, if they only refer to entities which exist independently from the defined collection. | |
From: Leon Horsten (Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], §2.4) |
10884 | A theory is 'categorical' if it has just one model up to isomorphism [Horsten] |
Full Idea: If a theory has, up to isomorphism, exactly one model, then it is said to be 'categorical'. | |
From: Leon Horsten (Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], §5.2) |
10885 | Computer proofs don't provide explanations [Horsten] |
Full Idea: Mathematicians are uncomfortable with computerised proofs because a 'good' proof should do more than convince us that a certain statement is true. It should also explain why the statement in question holds. | |
From: Leon Horsten (Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], §5.3) |
10881 | The concept of 'ordinal number' is set-theoretic, not arithmetical [Horsten] |
Full Idea: The notion of an ordinal number is a set-theoretic, and hence non-arithmetical, concept. | |
From: Leon Horsten (Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], §2.3) |
15797 | All structures are dispositional, objects are dispositions sets, and events manifest dispositions [Fetzer] |
Full Idea: I propose a dispositional ontology for the physical world, according to which a) every structural property is a dispositional one, b) a physical object is an ordered set of dispositions, and c) every event manifests a dispositional property of the world. | |
From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], Intro) | |
A reaction: Mumford says this is consistent with ontology as a way of describing the world, rather than being facts about the world. I like Fetzer's sketch, which sounds to have a lot in common with 'process philosophy'. |
15800 | All events and objects are dispositional, and hence all structural properties are dispositional [Fetzer] |
Full Idea: Every atomic event in the world's history is a manifestation of some dispositional property of the world and every physical object is an instantiation of some set of dispositions; hence, every structural property is dispositional in kind. | |
From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 5) | |
A reaction: I quite like this drastic view, but there remains the intuition that there must always be something which has the disposition. That may be because I have not yet digested the lessons of modern physics. |
19451 | When absorbed in deep reflection, is your reason in control, or is it you? [Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: When, submerged in deep reflection, you forget both yourself and your surroundings, is it you who controls reason, or is it rather reason that controls and absorbs you? | |
From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], I) | |
A reaction: A delightful question, even if it looks like a false dichotomy. I'm not sure what to make of 'me', if my reason can be subtracted from it. Aquinas was one the same wavelength here. |
19450 | Reason, love and will are the highest perfections and essence of man - the purpose of his life [Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: Reason, love and power of will are perfections of man; they are his highest powers, his absolute essence in so far as he is man, the purpose of his existence. Man exists in order to think, love and will. | |
From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], I) | |
A reaction: Feuerbach was a notable atheist, but adopts a religious style of language which modern atheists would find rather alien. Personally I love talk of ideals and perfections. Ideals have been discredited in modern times, but need a revival. |
15798 | Kinds are arrangements of dispositions [Fetzer] |
Full Idea: Kinds of things are specific arrangements of dispositions. | |
From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 2) | |
A reaction: A 'disposition' doesn't seem quite the right word for what is basic to the physical world, though Harré and Madden make a good case for the 'fields' of physic being understood in that way. I prefer 'power', though that doesn't solve anything. |
15799 | Lawlike sentences are general attributions of disposition to all members of some class [Fetzer] |
Full Idea: Lawlike sentences are conceived as logically general dispositional statements attributing permanent dispositional properties to every member of a reference class. ...Their basic form is that of subjunctive generalizations. | |
From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 3) | |
A reaction: I much prefer talk of 'lawlike sentences' to talk of 'laws'. At least they imply that the true generalisations about nature are fairly fine-grained. Why not talk of 'generalisations' instead of 'laws'? Fetzer wants dispositions to explain everything. |
19448 | Consciousness is said to distinguish man from animals - consciousness of his own species [Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: What constitutes the essential difference between man and animal? The most simple, general, and most widely held answer to this question is consciousness. Consciousness is given only in the case of a being to whom his species ...is an object of thought. | |
From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], I) | |
A reaction: Rather speculative. Since other species cohabit and breed only with their fellow species members, one might have thought they were aware of them. |
19454 | A God needs justice, kindness and wisdom, but those concepts don't depend on the concept of God [Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: The concept of God depends on the concepts of justice, kindness and wisdom - a God who is not kind, not just, and not wise is no God. But these concepts do not depend on the concept of God. That a quality is possessed by God does not make it divine. | |
From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], II) | |
A reaction: This is part of Feuerbach's argument for atheism, but if you ask for the source of our human concepts of justice, kindness and wisdom, no one, I would have thought, could cite God for the role. |
19452 | The nature of God is an expression of human nature [Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: God is the manifestation of man's inner nature, his expressed self. | |
From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], II) | |
A reaction: Even if you are a deeply committed theist, you have to concede some of this point. The perfections attributed to God are usually of human qualities. Leibniz, though, says that God has an infinity of perfection, mostly unknown to us. |
19453 | If love, goodness and personality are human, the God who is their source is anthropomorphic [Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: If love, goodness, and personality are human determinations, the being which constitutes their source and ...their presupposition is also an anthropomorphism; so is the existence of God. | |
From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], II) | |
A reaction: It is certainly a struggle for the imagination to grasp a being which is characterised by idealised versions of human virtues, and yet has an intrinsic nature which is utterly different from humanity. |
19449 | Religion is the consciousness of the infinite [Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: Religion is the consciousness of the infinite. | |
From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], I) |
19455 | Today's atheism will tomorrow become a religion [Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: What is regarded as atheism today will be religion tomorrow. | |
From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], II) | |
A reaction: Modern critics of atheism frequently accuse it of being a new religion. I doubt whether Feuerbach is right, but it is a nice provocative idea. |