7024
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Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil]
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Full Idea:
Armstrong takes properties to be universals, and believes there are no 'uninstantiated' universals.
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From:
report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by John Heil - From an Ontological Point of View §9.3
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A reaction:
At first glance this, like many theories of universals, seems to invite Ockham's Razor. If they are always instantiated, perhaps we should perhaps just try to talk about the instantiations (i.e. tropes), and skip the universal?
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9478
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Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird]
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Full Idea:
Armstrong says all properties are categorical, but a dispositional predicate may denote such a property; the dispositional predicate denotes the categorical property in virtue of the dispositional role it happens, contingently, to play in this world.
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From:
report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 3.1
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A reaction:
I favour the fundamentality of the dispositional rather than the categorical. The world consists of powers, and we find ourselves amidst their categorical expressions. I could be persuaded otherwise, though!
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10728
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A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver]
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Full Idea:
Armstrong says that if it can be proved a priori that a thing falls under a certain universal, then there is no such universal - and hence there is no universal of a thing being identical with itself.
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From:
report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978], II p.11) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties 11
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A reaction:
This is a distinctively Armstrongian view, based on his belief that universals must be instantiated, and must be discoverable a posteriori, as part of science. I'm baffled by self-identity, but I don't think this argument does the job.
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5467
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Euler said nature is instrinsically passive, and minds cause change [Euler, by Ellis]
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Full Idea:
Euler thought the powers necessary for the maintenance of the changing universe would turn out to be just the passive ones of inertia and impenetrability. There are no active powers, he urged, other than those of God and living beings.
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From:
report of Leonhard Euler (Letters to a German Princess [1765]) by Brian Ellis - The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism Ch.4
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A reaction:
Very significant, I think, for revealing the religious framework behind early theories of natural laws. If there is nothing external to impose powers and movements on nature, the source must be sought within - hence essentialism.
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19371
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Nine principles of God: goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, will, virtue, truth and glory [Lull, by Arthur,R]
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Full Idea:
Lull restricted himself to only nine 'absolute principles' of God: goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, will, virtue, truth and glory
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From:
report of Ramon (Ars Magna [1305]) by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 2 'Combinatorics'
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A reaction:
Leibniz responded that God's perfections are infinite in number, and thus beyond human comprehension. Lull cut them down to nine, because he was designing a sort of conceptual logic that employed them.
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