Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to a German Princess', 'Properties' and 'Letter to the Editor about Bayle'

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7 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties

18430	We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards]
	Full Idea: Three main reasons for thinking properties exist: the one-over-many argument (that a type can have many tokens), the reference argument (to understand predicates and singular terms), and the quantification argument (that we quantify over them).
	From: Douglas Edwards (Properties [2014], 1.1)
	A reaction: [Bits in brackets are compressions of his explanations]. I don't find any of these remotely persuasive. Why would we infer how the world is, simply from how we talk about or reason about the world? His first reason is the only interesting one.

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates

18432	Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable [Edwards]
	Full Idea: The Quinean claims that the application of a predicate cannot, in principle, be explained - it is a 'primitive' fact.
	From: Douglas Edwards (Properties [2014], 4.4)
	A reaction: I am not clear what 'principle' could endorse this claim. There just seems to be a possible failure of all the usual attempts at explaining predication.

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism

18437	Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards]
	Full Idea: For resemblance nominalism the sentence 'the rose is crimson' commits us to at least one other entity that the rose resembles in order for it to be crimson.
	From: Douglas Edwards (Properties [2014], 5.5.2)
	A reaction: If the theory really needs this, then it has just sunk without trace. It can't suddenly cease to be crimson when the last resembling entity disappears.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts

18434	That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards]
	Full Idea: The view of 'priority monism' - that the whole is prior to its parts - is controversial, but has been growing in support
	From: Douglas Edwards (Properties [2014], 5.4.4)
	A reaction: The simple and plausible thought is, I take it, that parts only count as parts when a whole comes into existence, so a whole is needed to generate parts. Thus the whole must be prior to the parts. Fine by me.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature

5467	Euler said nature is instrinsically passive, and minds cause change [Euler, by Ellis]
	Full Idea: Euler thought the powers necessary for the maintenance of the changing universe would turn out to be just the passive ones of inertia and impenetrability. There are no active powers, he urged, other than those of God and living beings.
	From: report of Leonhard Euler (Letters to a German Princess [1765]) by Brian Ellis - The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism Ch.4
	A reaction: Very significant, I think, for revealing the religious framework behind early theories of natural laws. If there is nothing external to impose powers and movements on nature, the source must be sought within - hence essentialism.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws

11945	In addition to laws, God must also create appropriate natures for things [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: It isn't sufficient to say that God has made a general law, for in addition to the decree there has also to be a natural way of carrying it out. It is necessary, that is, that what happens should be explicable in terms of the God-given nature of things.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letter to the Editor about Bayle [1698], p.205)
	A reaction: Thus Leibniz is an ancestor of scientific essentialism, but he was too frightened to take the next step, which is to see that once God has endowed the natures, he doesn't need to wield his laws as well. The natures will do the whole job.

27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement

19348	All that is real in motion is the force or power which produces change [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: As for motion, what is real in it is force or power; that is to say, what there is in the present state which carries with it a change in the future. The rest is only phenomena and relations.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letter to the Editor about Bayle [1698], §13)
	A reaction: This presumably contradicts Newton's concept of inertia, which allows constant motion without force. I always like a reference to powers. What is 'kinetic energy' in this context?