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21918
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Sufficient Reason can't be proved, because all proof presupposes it [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
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Full Idea:
Schopenhauer said the principle of sufficient reason is not susceptible to proof for the simple reason that it is presupposed in any argument or proof.
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From:
report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813], §14 p.32-3) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
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A reaction:
I would have thought it might be disproved by a counterexample, such as the Gödel sentence of his incompleteness proof, or quantum effects which seem to elude causation. Personally I believe the principle, which I see as the first axiom of philosophy.
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21362
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Necessity is physical, logical, mathematical or moral [Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
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Full Idea:
For Schopenauer there are physical necessity, logical necessity, mathematical necessity and moral necessity.
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From:
report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813]) by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 2 'Fourfold'
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A reaction:
These derive from four modes of explanation, by causes, by grounding in truths or facts, by mathematical reality, and by motives. Not clear why mathematics gets its own necessity. I like metaphysics derived from explanations, though. Necessity makers.
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21361
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For Schopenhauer, material things would not exist without the mind [Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
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Full Idea:
Schopenhauer is not a realist about material things, but an idealist: that is, material things would not exist, for him, without the mind.
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From:
report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813]) by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 2 'Fourfold'
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A reaction:
Janaway places his views as close to Kant's, but it is not clear that Kant would agree that no mind means no world. Did Schopenhauer believe in the noumenon?
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16726
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Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan]
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Full Idea:
The entire difficulty in this question is why through a knowledge of the primary tangible qualities we cannot come to a knowledge of flavors or odors, since these are their causes, since we often go from knowledge of causes to knowing their effects.
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From:
Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics [1344], I.28c), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.2
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A reaction:
He is commenting on Idea 16725. Still a nice puzzle in the philosophy of mind. Will neuroscientists ever be able to infer to actual character of some quale, just from the structures of the neurons?
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21917
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The four explanations: objects by causes, concepts by ground, maths by spacetime, ethics by motive [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
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Full Idea:
There are four forms of explanation, depending on their topic. Causes explain objects. Grounding explains concepts, Points and moments explain mathematics. Motives explain ethics.
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From:
report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813], §43 p.214) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
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A reaction:
[My compression of Lewis's summary. I'm particularly pleased with this. I have done Schopenhauer a huge favour, should anyone ever visit this website]. The quirky account of mathematics derives from Kant. I greatly admire this whole idea.
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5467
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Euler said nature is instrinsically passive, and minds cause change [Euler, by Ellis]
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Full Idea:
Euler thought the powers necessary for the maintenance of the changing universe would turn out to be just the passive ones of inertia and impenetrability. There are no active powers, he urged, other than those of God and living beings.
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From:
report of Leonhard Euler (Letters to a German Princess [1765]) by Brian Ellis - The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism Ch.4
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A reaction:
Very significant, I think, for revealing the religious framework behind early theories of natural laws. If there is nothing external to impose powers and movements on nature, the source must be sought within - hence essentialism.
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