Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Counterfactuals' and 'The Origin of the Work of Art'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
15585 Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt]
     Full Idea: In his later work Heidegger came to view philosophy as closer to poetry than to science.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (The Origin of the Work of Art [1935], p.178) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 5 'Signs'
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
490 Everything happens by reason and necessity [Leucippus]
     Full Idea: Nothing happens at random; everything happens out of reason and by necessity.
     From: Leucippus (fragments/reports [c.435 BCE], B002), quoted by (who?) - where?
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
14361 Lewis says indicative conditionals are truth-functional [Lewis, by Jackson]
     Full Idea: Unlike Stalnaker, Lewis holds that indicative conditionals have the truth conditions of material conditionals.
     From: report of David Lewis (Counterfactuals [1973]) by Frank Jackson - Conditionals 'Further'
     A reaction: Thus Lewis only uses the possible worlds account for subjunctive conditionals, where Stalnaker uses it for both. Lewis is defending the truth-functional account for the indicative conditionals.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
8434 In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true [Lewis, by Horwich]
     Full Idea: According to Lewis, a counterfactual holds when the consequent is true in possible worlds very like our own except for the fact that the antecedent is true.
     From: report of David Lewis (Counterfactuals [1973]) by Paul Horwich - Lewis's Programme p.213
     A reaction: Presumably the world being very like our own would make it unlikely that there would be anything else to cause the consequent, apart from the counterfactual antecedent.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
9419 A law of nature is a general axiom of the deductive system that is best for simplicity and strength [Lewis]
     Full Idea: A contingent generalization is a law of nature if and only if it appears as a theorem (or axiom) in each of the true deductive systems that achieves a best combination of simplicity and strength.
     From: David Lewis (Counterfactuals [1973], 3.3)