8 ideas
17809 | Gödel showed that the syntactic approach to the infinite is of limited value [Kreisel] |
Full Idea: Usually Gödel's incompleteness theorems are taken as showing a limitation on the syntactic approach to an understanding of the concept of infinity. | |
From: Georg Kreisel (Hilbert's Programme [1958], 05) |
17810 | The study of mathematical foundations needs new non-mathematical concepts [Kreisel] |
Full Idea: It is necessary to use non-mathematical concepts, i.e. concepts lacking the precision which permit mathematical manipulation, for a significant approach to foundations. We currently have no concepts of this kind which we can take seriously. | |
From: Georg Kreisel (Hilbert's Programme [1958], 06) | |
A reaction: Music to the ears of any philosopher of mathematics, because it means they are not yet out of a job. |
490 | Everything happens by reason and necessity [Leucippus] |
Full Idea: Nothing happens at random; everything happens out of reason and by necessity. | |
From: Leucippus (fragments/reports [c.435 BCE], B002), quoted by (who?) - where? |
7401 | Heat and colour don't exist, so cannot mislead about the external world [Galileo, by Tuck] |
Full Idea: Galileo argued that there is no such thing as heat (and hence also as colour) in the external world, so there is no reason to conclude from colour-blindness that we cannot know the truth about the world. | |
From: report of Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.1 | |
A reaction: This key idea, taken up by Gassendi, Descartes and Locke, seems to me to be one of the most important (and, in retrospect, rather obvious) facts ever worked out by the human mind. Why does anyone still doubt it? |
5454 | Tastes, odours and colours only reside in consciousness, and would disappear with creatures [Galileo] |
Full Idea: I think tastes, odours, colours, and so on are mere names as far as the objects are concerned, and only reside in consciousness. Hence if the living creature were removed, all these qualities would be wiped away and annihilated. | |
From: Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]), quoted by Brian Ellis - The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism Ch.3 | |
A reaction: A nice bold assertion of the primary/secondary distinction from the first great scientist. I agree, and to disagree (and hence side with Berkeley and Hume) is to head for metaphsical and epistemological confusion. |
16560 | Galileo introduced geometrico-mechanical explanation, based on Archimedes [Galileo, by Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: The modern idea of explaining with mechanisms became current in the 17th century when Galileo articulated a geometrico-mechanical form of explanation based on Archimedes' simple machines. This became the 'mechanical philosophy'. | |
From: report of Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]) by Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C - Thinking About Mechanisms 5.2 | |
A reaction: So is Archimedes the source? I would say that mechanical explanation is just commonsense, and is predominant in all human thinking, even in tiny infants. |
3645 | To understand the universe mathematics is essential [Galileo] |
Full Idea: The great book of the universe cannot be understood unless one can understand the language in which it is written - the language of mathematics. | |
From: Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623], VI.232) | |
A reaction: Nice, though one might say that humans created the language of maths to help them discuss the patterns they perceived in nature. Maybe what is special is order, and all order can be described mathematically. |
17811 | The natural conception of points ducks the problem of naming or constructing each point [Kreisel] |
Full Idea: In analysis, the most natural conception of a point ignores the matter of naming the point, i.e. how the real number is represented or by what constructions the point is reached from given points. | |
From: Georg Kreisel (Hilbert's Programme [1958], 13) | |
A reaction: This problem has bothered me. There are formal ways of constructing real numbers, but they don't seem to result in a name for each one. |