Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Letters to Samuel Clarke' and 'Epistemic Injustice'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: In order to proceed from mathematics to physics the principle of sufficient reason is necessary, that nothing happens without there being a reason why it should be thus rather than otherwise.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], §2)
There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Nothing happens without a sufficient reason why it should be thus rather than otherwise.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 3.2)
No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There is no possible reason which could limit the quantity of matter; therefore there cannot in fact be any such limitation.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.21)
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: All simple substances will always have a harmony among themselves, because they always represent the same universe.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], V §91), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz
     A reaction: We can accept that the universe itself does not contain contradictions (how could it), but it is a leap of faith to say that all monads represent the universe well enough to avoid contradictions. Maps can contradict one another.
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: If the ratio of two lines L and M is conceived as abstracted from them both, without considering which is the subject and which the object, which will then be the subject? We cannot say both, for then we should have an accident in two subjects.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 5th Paper, §47), quoted by John Heil - Relations 'External'
     A reaction: [compressed] Leibniz is rejecting external relations as having any status in ontology. It looks like a mistake (originating in Aristotle) to try to shoehorn the ontology of relations into the substance-properties framework.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
Everything happens by reason and necessity [Leucippus]
     Full Idea: Nothing happens at random; everything happens out of reason and by necessity.
     From: Leucippus (fragments/reports [c.435 BCE], B002), quoted by (who?) - where?
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
It is necessary for a belief that it be held for a length of time [Fricker,M]
     Full Idea: A mental state cannot count as a belief unless it has a reasonable life expectancy. It must be the sort of thing that one is disposed to assert not only now but in the future too.
     From: Miranda Fricker (Epistemic Injustice [2007], 2.3)
     A reaction: There are obvious counterexamples, where a firm belief is strongly formed, only to be dashed by a counterexample (such as a new witness in court) soon afterwards. That said, this idea is obviously correct.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
Offering knowledge needs accuracy and sincerity; receiving it needs testimonial justice [Fricker,M]
     Full Idea: Accuracy and Sincerity sustain trust as regards contributing knowledge to the pool; Testimonial Justice helps sustain trust as regards acquiring knowledge from the pool.
     From: Miranda Fricker (Epistemic Injustice [2007], 5.1)
     A reaction: Fricker's contribution is to show that acquiring knowledge has its own virtues, alongside discovering and communicating it. I take the underlying virtue to be absolute respect for all possible contributors.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
Burge says we are normally a priori entitled to believe testimony [Fricker,M]
     Full Idea: In Tyler Burge's view we have an a priori entitlement for believing what others tell us, other things being equal.
     From: Miranda Fricker (Epistemic Injustice [2007], 1.3 n11)
     A reaction: [Burge 'Content Preservation' 1992] Close to Davidson's Charity (that without a default assumption of truth-speaking language won't work at all). Davidson is right about casual conversation, but for important testimony Burge should be more cautious.
We assess testimonial probabilities by the speaker, the listener, the facts, and the circumstances [Fricker,M]
     Full Idea: A person should receive the word of his interlocutor in the light of the probability that someone like that would (be able and willing to) to tell someone like him the truth about something like this in circumstances like these.
     From: Miranda Fricker (Epistemic Injustice [2007], 3.2)
     A reaction: That's a pretty good summary of the rational response to testimony. I can't think of any other factors.
Testimonial judgement is not logical, but produces reasons and motivations [Fricker,M]
     Full Idea: Moral/testimonial judgement is non-inferential, uncodifiable, intrinsically motivating, intrinsically reason-giving, and typically has an emotional aspect.
     From: Miranda Fricker (Epistemic Injustice [2007], 3.3)
     A reaction: Fricker's compressed summary of her findings about testimony. The first words indicate her belief that assessment of testimony is a moral affair.
Assessing credibility involves the impact of both the speaker's and the listener's social identity [Fricker,M]
     Full Idea: For a hearer to identify the impact of identity power in their credibility judgements they must be alert to the impact not only of the speaker's social identity, but also the impact of the own social identity on their credibility judgements.
     From: Miranda Fricker (Epistemic Injustice [2007], 4.1)
     A reaction: [why are all sentences in academic writing twice as long as they need to be? - that question is deeper than it looks!] This is a salutary warning. Not just 'what are my prejudices?', but also 'what is this person willing to tell a person like me?'.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience [Fricker,M]
     Full Idea: Our idea of testimonial sensibility is a spontaneous critical sensitivity permanently in training and adapting to experience. …This gives us a picture of how judgements can be rational yet unreflective, critical yet non-inferential.
     From: Miranda Fricker (Epistemic Injustice [2007], 3.4)
     A reaction: Love this. I want to connect human reasoning to good judgement by animals, and I offer the word 'sensible' to bridge the gap. Dogs and scientists can be sensible. Fricker spells out more fully what I have in mind, with reference to testimony.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
To judge agents in remote times and cultures we need a moral resentment weaker than blame [Fricker,M]
     Full Idea: I think that identifying forms of moral resentment that fall short of blame but which are agent-directed is the key to achieving appropriate moral response across historical and cultural distance.
     From: Miranda Fricker (Epistemic Injustice [2007], 4.2)
     A reaction: Very good. Simple blame for horrible actions performed in remote rather horrible societies is pointless. But switching off moral sensibilities when reading history and anthropology looks like a slippery slope, so 'moral resentment' is nice.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: According to me there is nothing simple except true monads, which have no parts and no extensions.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 5.24)
Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There are no two individuals indiscernible from one another - leaves, or drops of water, for example. This is an argument against atoms, which, like the void, are opposed to the principles of a true metaphysic.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.04)
Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The least corpuscle is actually subdivided ad infinitum and contains a world of new created things, which this universe would lack if this corpuscle were an atom.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.PS)
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Leibniz, by Papineau]
     Full Idea: In place of Descartes's conservation of 'quantity of motion', Leibniz upheld both the conservation of linear momentum and the conservation of kinetic energy.
     From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 5th paper) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness App 2
     A reaction: The point is that momentum involves velocity (which includes direction) rather than speed. Leibniz more or less invented the concept of 'energy' ('vis viva'). Papineau says these two leave no room for causation by mental substance.
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: To say that God could cause the universe to move forward in a straight line or otherwise without changing it in any other way is another fanciful supposition.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.14)
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
Space and time are purely relative [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I have more than once stated that I held space to be something purely relative, like time.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 3.4)
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: How could a thing exist, no part of which ever exists? In the case of time, nothing exists but instants, and an instant is not even a part of time.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 5.49)
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: To ask why God did not make everything a year sooner would be reasonable if time were something apart from temporal things, but time is just the succession of things, which remains the same if the universe is created a year sooner.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 3.6)
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
If time were absolute that would make God's existence dependent on it [Leibniz, by Bardon]
     Full Idea: Leibniz argues that if time is a thing in itself, and God is 'in' time, then God would be dependent for His existence on the existence of time.
     From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716]) by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 3 'Newton'
     A reaction: Hence Leibniz says time is merely relations between events. Not sure what he thinks an event is. What is God made of? Is there some divine matter upon which God's existence must depend?
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
The existence of God, and all metaphysics, follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: By this principle alone, that there must be a sufficient reason why things are thus rather than otherwise, I prove the existence of the Divinity, and all the rest of metaphysics or natural theology.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], §2)