9 ideas
8508 | A 'trope' is an abstract particular, the occurrence of an essence [Williams,DC] |
Full Idea: I shall divert the word 'trope' to stand for the abstract particular which is, so to speak, the occurrence of an essence. | |
From: Donald C. Williams (On the Elements of Being: I [1953], p.115) | |
A reaction: Thus tropes entered philosophical discussion. Presumably the precedent for an 'abstract particular' would be a particular occurrence of the number 7. |
8509 | A world is completely constituted by its tropes and their connections [Williams,DC] |
Full Idea: Any possible world, and hence, of course, this one, is completely constituted by its tropes and connections of location and similarity. | |
From: Donald C. Williams (On the Elements of Being: I [1953], p.116) | |
A reaction: Note that Williams regularly referred to possible worlds in 1953. This is a full-blooded trope theory, which asserts that objects are bundles of tropes, so that both particulars and universals are ontologically taken care of. |
8510 | 'Socrates is wise' means a concurrence sum contains a member of a similarity set [Williams,DC] |
Full Idea: 'Socrates is wise' means that the concurrence sum (Socrates) includes a trope which is a member of the similarity set (Wisdom). | |
From: Donald C. Williams (On the Elements of Being: I [1953], p.119) | |
A reaction: Resemblance has to be taken as a basic (and presumably unanalysable) concept, which invites Russell's objection (Idea 4441). |
490 | Everything happens by reason and necessity [Leucippus] |
Full Idea: Nothing happens at random; everything happens out of reason and by necessity. | |
From: Leucippus (fragments/reports [c.435 BCE], B002), quoted by (who?) - where? |
9261 | The 'Ethics' is disappointing, because it fails to try to justify our duties [Prichard] |
Full Idea: Reading the 'Ethics' is so disappointing, because Aristotle does not try to convince us that we really ought to do what our non-reflective consciousness has hitherto believed we ought to do. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912]) | |
A reaction: Aristotle didn't speak the language of 'duty' (see Idea 2172), but he could work it into his account if Prichard asked nicely. I take the truly virtuous person to be, above all, a wonderful citizen. Duties are contractual; good deeds flow from virtue. |
9262 | The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard] |
Full Idea: Moral Philosophy rests on the mistake of supposing the possibility of proving what can only be apprehended directly by an act of moral thinking. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912]) | |
A reaction: This is a beginning of the rebellion against the Enlightenment Project in ethics, which is why Prichard has become popular. At bottom he is offering intuition ('direct moral thinking'), which is a frustratingly thin concept. |
9260 | Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard] |
Full Idea: It is untrue to urge that, since courage is a virtue, we ought to act courageously. We feel an obligation to act, but not from a certain desire. The action is done from obligation, so isn't an act of courage. ..In fact, virtue is no basis for morality. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912]) | |
A reaction: One of the few interesting and direct attacks on virtue theory, before its modern revival. Prichard urges a perception of what is valuable (or good) as the basis for obligation and right action. He is right that values come first, in virtue and elsewhere. |
9259 | We feel obligations to overcome our own failings, and these are not relations to other people [Prichard] |
Full Idea: The relation involved in an obligation need not be a relation to another at all. Thus we should admit that there is an obligation to overcome our natural timidity or greediness, and this involves no relations to others. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912]) | |
A reaction: An interesting un-Aristotelian and individualistic view of virtue. Why would we want to rid ourselves of timidity or greediness? Either it is self-interested, or we wish to be better citizens. See Richard Taylor on duty. |
9258 | If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves [Prichard] |
Full Idea: If the badness of pain were the reason why we ought not to inflict pain on another, it would equally be a reason why we ought not to inflict pain on ourselves; yet, though we would call such behaviour foolish, we wouldn't think it wrong. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912], n4) | |
A reaction: A very nice point. Note that it will equally well apply to 'benefit' or 'preferences', or any other ideal which utilitarians set out to maximise. It may not be bad to hurt yourself, but it might still be bad to harm yourself. |