Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Holism: a Shopper's Guide' and 'Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism'

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4 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity

490	Everything happens by reason and necessity [Leucippus]
	Full Idea: Nothing happens at random; everything happens out of reason and by necessity.
	From: Leucippus (fragments/reports [c.435 BCE], B002), quoted by (who?) - where?

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism

19508	Contextualism needs a semantics for knowledge sentences that are partly indexical [Schiffer,S]
	Full Idea: Contextualist semantics must capture the 'indexical' nature of knowledge claims, the fact that different utterances of a knowledge sentence with no apparent indexical terms can express different propositions.
	From: Stephen Schiffer (Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism [1996], p.325), quoted by Keith DeRose - The Case for Contextualism 1.5
	A reaction: Schiffer tries to show that this is too difficult, and DeRose defends contextualism against the charge.

19509	The indexical aspect of contextual knowledge might be hidden, or it might be in what 'know' means [Schiffer,S]
	Full Idea: One might have a 'hidden-indexical' theory of knowledge sentences: they contain constituents that are not the semantic values of any terms; ...or 'to know' itself might be indexical, as in 'I know[easy] I have hands' or 'I know[tough] I have hands'.
	From: Stephen Schiffer (Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism [1996], p.326-7), quoted by Keith DeRose - The Case for Contextualism 1.5
	A reaction: [very compressed] Given the choice, I would have thought it was in 'know', since to say 'either you know p or you don't' sounds silly to me.

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism

9381	If some inferences are needed to fix meaning, but we don't know which, they are all relevant [Fodor/Lepore, by Boghossian]
	Full Idea: The Master Argument for linguistic holism is: Some of an expression's inferences are relevant to fixing its meaning; there is no way to distinguish the inferences that are constitutive (from Quine); so all inferences are relevant to fixing meaning.
	From: report of J Fodor / E Lepore (Holism: a Shopper's Guide [1993], §III) by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered
	A reaction: This would only be if you thought that the pattern of inferences is what fixes the meanings, but how can you derive inferences before you have meanings? The underlying language of thought generates the inferences? Meanings are involved!