Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'On the Pragmatics of Communications' and 'Notes on Comments by Fardella'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
To exist and be understood, a multitude must first be reduced to a unity [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: A plurality of things can neither be understood nor can exist unless one first understands the thing that is one, that to which the multitude necessarily reduces.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Notes on Comments by Fardella [1690], Prop 3)
     A reaction: Notice that it is our need to understand which imposes the unity on the multitude. It is not just some random fiction, or a meaningless mechanical act of thought.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Substances are everywhere in matter, like points in a line [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There are substances everywhere in matter, just as points are everywhere in a line.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Notes on Comments by Fardella [1690], Clarif)
     A reaction: Since Leibniz is unlikely to believe in the reality of the points, we must wonder whether he was really committed to this infinity of substances. The more traditional notion of substance is always called 'substantial form' by Leibniz.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
Everything happens by reason and necessity [Leucippus]
     Full Idea: Nothing happens at random; everything happens out of reason and by necessity.
     From: Leucippus (fragments/reports [c.435 BCE], B002), quoted by (who?) - where?
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
To understand language is to know how to use it to reach shared understandings [Habermas]
     Full Idea: One simply would not know what it is to understand the meaning of a linguistic expression if one did not know how one could make use of it in order to reach understanding with someone about something.
     From: Jürgen Habermas (On the Pragmatics of Communications [1998], p.228), quoted by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.3:34
     A reaction: Not offered as a 'theory of meaning', and certainly plausible. Compare a hammer, though: a proper understanding is that it is used to exert a sharp force, but you can take in its structure and nature before you spot its usage.