7 ideas
| 21226 | Husserl sees the ego as a monad, unifying presence, sense and intentional acts [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| Full Idea: Husserl's notion of monad expresses a complete inegration of every intentional presence into its sense, and every sense into the intentional acts, ....and finally every intentional act is integrated into the ego. | |
| From: report of Edmund Husserl (Cartesian Meditations [1931]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.6.2 | |
| A reaction: No, I don't understand that either, but it makes good sense to employ the concept of a 'monad' into the concept of the ego, if you think it embodies perfect unity. That was a main motivation for Leibniz to employ the word. |
| 490 | Everything happens by reason and necessity [Leucippus] |
| Full Idea: Nothing happens at random; everything happens out of reason and by necessity. | |
| From: Leucippus (fragments/reports [c.435 BCE], B002), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 21228 | Husserl's monads (egos) communicate, through acts of empathy. [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| Full Idea: For Husserl monads have windows because they communicate with each other. The windows of the monads are the acts of empathy. | |
| From: report of Edmund Husserl (Cartesian Meditations [1931]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.7.5 | |
| A reaction: Leibniz said his monads (which include minds) have 'no windows'. The mere existence of empathy (or mirror neurons, as we would say) is hardly sufficient to defeat solipsism. |
| 21225 | The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| Full Idea: Husserl distinguishes two sorts of egos or subjects of experience, the psychological ego and the pure ego. The psychological ego is a reality of the world, and the pure ego is a result of transcendental reduction. | |
| From: report of Edmund Husserl (Cartesian Meditations [1931]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.6.1 | |
| A reaction: The sounds like embracing both the Cartesian and the Kantian egos. This is obviously the source of Sartre's interesting early book on the self. 'Transcendental reduction' is his bracketing or epoché. |
| 4692 | It is not true that killing and allowing to die (or acts and omissions) are morally indistinguishable [Foot] |
| Full Idea: Many philosophers (e.g. Rachels) have argued that there is no morally relevant distinction between killing and allowing to die (or the related 'acts and omissions'),..as in not sending food, or sending poisoned food. I disagree. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Killing and Letting Die [1985], p.78) | |
| A reaction: It appears that some omissions are worse than acts. It is more honest to just shoot an injured person, than to walk away and leave them to die. A range of cases. |
| 4694 | Making a runaway tram kill one person instead of five is diverting a fatal sequence, not initiating one [Foot] |
| Full Idea: If a runaway tram is heading towards a track on which five people are standing, and there is someone who can switch the points, diverting it onto a track where there is one person,...this is diverting a fatal sequence, not starting a new one. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Killing and Letting Die [1985], p.85) | |
| A reaction: Suppose the one person was of immense community value, or someone you personally hated? Clearly she is interested in the agent's virtue, rather than the actual consequences. |
| 4693 | The right of non-interference (with a 'negative duty'), and the right to goods/services ('positive') [Foot] |
| Full Idea: There are rights to non-interference (and their corresponding "negative duties"), and the rights to goods and services (with corresponding "positive duties"). Interference usually needs more justification than withholding goods. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Killing and Letting Die [1985], p.82) | |
| A reaction: This invites the question of which is the stronger, and whether paternalism can overrule non-interference, or an expectation of self-sufficiency overrule the positive rights. |