Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom' and 'A World of Propensities'

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5 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers

11946	Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper]
	Full Idea: Propensities should not be regarded as inherent in an object, such as a die or a penny, but should be regarded as inherent in a situation (of which, of course, the object was part).
	From: Karl Popper (A World of Propensities [1993], p.14), quoted by George Molnar - Powers 6.2
	A reaction: Molnar argues against this claim, and I agree with him. We can see why Popper might prefer this relational view, given that powers often only become apparent in unusual relational situations.

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity

490	Everything happens by reason and necessity [Leucippus]
	Full Idea: Nothing happens at random; everything happens out of reason and by necessity.
	From: Leucippus (fragments/reports [c.435 BCE], B002), quoted by (who?) - where?

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death

6866	It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin]
	Full Idea: For the A-theorists called 'presentists' the past is as unreal as the future, and reality leaves us behind once we die, which is disturbing; but B-theorists, who see time as unreal, say we are just as real after our deaths as we were beforehand.
	From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174)
	A reaction: See Idea 6865 for A and B theories. I wonder if this problem is only superficially 'disturbing'. Becoming unreal may sound more drastic than becoming dead, but they both sound pretty terminal to me.

23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism

6867	Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world [Le Poidevin]
	Full Idea: I take existentialism to be the focus on the freedom and self-making of the human being, and his or her insertion into the world.
	From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.222)
	A reaction: I take 'self-making' to be the key here. If neuroscientists somehow 'proved' that there was no free will, I don't see that making any difference to existentialism. 'Insertion' seems odd, unless it refers to growing up.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series

6865	A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin]
	Full Idea: The A-theory regards our intuitive distinction of time into past, present and future as objective, and takes seriously the idea that time flows; the B-theory says this just reflects our perspective, like the spatial distinction between here and there.
	From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174)
	A reaction: The distinction comes from McTaggart. Physics seems to be built on an objective view of time, and yet Einstein makes time relative. What possible evidence could decide between the two theories?