Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance' and 'De Mundo (On the World)'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Only supernatural means could annihilate anything once it had being [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: A being cannot naturally go out of existence. For even if a ship or a plank ceases to be a ship or a plank, it never naturally ceases to be a being. For a being, unless it is annihilated, does not cease to be a being. To annihilate is a supernatural task.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (De Mundo (On the World) [1642], 12.5)
     A reaction: This idea was becoming an orthodoxy in Hobbes's time, and leads to the various conservation laws in physics.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
Everything happens by reason and necessity [Leucippus]
     Full Idea: Nothing happens at random; everything happens out of reason and by necessity.
     From: Leucippus (fragments/reports [c.435 BCE], B002), quoted by (who?) - where?
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames]
     Full Idea: There are two senses of 'semantic' - as theory of meaning or as truth-based theory of logical consequence, and they are very different.
     From: Scott Soames (Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance [2008], p.78)
     A reaction: This subtle point is significant in considering the role of logic in philosophy. The logicians' semantics (based on logical consequence) is in danger of ousting the broader and more elusive notion of meaning in natural language.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) [Soames]
     Full Idea: The semantic content of a sentence is not the set of circumstances supporting its truth. It is rather the semantic content of a structured proposition the constituents of which are the semantic contents of the constituents of the sentence.
     From: Scott Soames (Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance [2008], p.74)
     A reaction: I'm not sure I get this, but while I like the truth-conditions view, I am suspicious of any proposal that the semantic content of something is some actual physical ingredients of the world. Meanings aren't sticks and stones.