19463
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Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer]
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Full Idea:
In all inductive reasoning we make the assumption that there is a measure of uniformity in nature; or, roughly speaking, that the future will, in the appropriate respects, resemble the past.
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From:
A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.viii)
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A reaction:
I would say that nature is 'stable'. Nature changes, so a global assumption of total uniformity is daft. Do we need some global uniformity assumptions, if the induction involved is local? I would say yes. Are all inductions conditional on this?
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9358
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There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI]
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Full Idea:
The fact is that there are several logics, markedly different, each self-consistent in its own terms and such that whoever, using it, avoids false premises, will never reach a false conclusion.
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From:
C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.366)
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A reaction:
As the man who invented modal logic in five different versions, he speaks with some authority. Logicians now debate which version is the best, so how could that be decided? You could avoid false conclusions by never reasoning at all.
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9357
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Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI]
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Full Idea:
The law of excluded middle formulates our decision that whatever is not designated by a certain term shall be designated by its negative. It declares our purpose to make a complete dichotomy of experience, ..which is only our penchant for simplicity.
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From:
C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.365)
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A reaction:
I find this view quite appealing. 'Look, it's either F or it isn't!' is a dogmatic attitude which irritates a lot of people, and appears to be dispensible. Intuitionists in mathematics dispense with the principle, and vagueness threatens it.
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21982
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I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
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Full Idea:
"I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people."
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From:
Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7
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A reaction:
[Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork.
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19459
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To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer]
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Full Idea:
To say 'I am not thinking' is self-stultifying since if it is said intelligently it must be false: but it is not self-contradictory. The proof that it is not self-contradictory is that it might have been false.
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From:
A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.iii)
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A reaction:
If it doesn't imply a contradiction, then it is not a necessary truth, which is what it is normally taken to be. Is 'This is a sentence' necessarily true? It might not have been one, if the rules of English syntax changed recently.
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19460
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'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer]
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Full Idea:
If there is no experience at all of finding out that one is not conscious, or that one does not exist, ..it is tempting to say that sentences like 'I exist', 'I am conscious', 'I know that I exist' do not express genuine propositions.
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From:
A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.iii)
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A reaction:
This is, of course, an application of the somewhat discredited verification principle, but the fact that strictly speaking the principle has been sort of refuted does not mean that we should not take it seriously, and be influenced by it.
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9365
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We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI]
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Full Idea:
The a priori contains principles which can be maintained in the face of all experience, representing the initiative of the mind. But they are subject to alteration on pragmatic grounds, if expanding experience shows their intellectual infelicity.
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From:
C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.373)
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A reaction:
[compressed] This simply IS Quine's famous 'web of belief' picture, showing how firmly Quine is in the pragmatist tradition. Lewis treats a priori principles as a pragmatic toolkit, which can be refined to be more effective. Not implausible...
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19462
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Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer]
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Full Idea:
Inductive reasoning covers all cases in which we pass from a particular statement of fact, or set of them, to a factual conclusion which they do not formally entail. The inference may be to a general law, or by analogy to another particular instance.
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From:
A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.viii)
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A reaction:
My preferred definition is 'learning from experience' - which I take to be the most rational behaviour you could possibly imagine. I don't think a definition should be couched in terms of 'objects' or 'particulars'.
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9363
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Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI]
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Full Idea:
The scientific search is for such classification as will make it possible to correlate appearance and behaviour, to discover law, to penetrate to the "essential nature" of things in order that behaviour may become predictable.
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From:
C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.368)
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A reaction:
Modern scientific essentialists no longer invoke scare quotes, and I think we should talk of the search for the 'mechanisms' which explain behaviour, but Lewis seems to have been sixty years ahead of his time.
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