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All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr)' and 'Convergence'

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37 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Unobservant thinkers tend to dogmatise using insufficient facts [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Those whom devotion to abstract discussions has rendered unobservant of the facts are too ready to dogmatise on the basis of a few observations.
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 316a09)
     A reaction: I totally approve of the idea that a good philosopher should be 'observant'. Prestige in modern analytic philosophy comes from logical ability. There should be some rival criterion for attentiveness to facts, with equal prestige.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
Infinity is only potential, never actual [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Nothing is actually infinite. A thing is infinite only potentially.
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 318a21)
     A reaction: Aristotle is the famous spokesman for this view, though it reappeared somewhat in early twentieth century discussions (e.g. Hilbert). I sympathise with this unfashionable view. Multiple infinites are good fun, but no one knows what they really are.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Existence is either potential or actual [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Some things are-potentially while others are-actually.
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 327b24)
     A reaction: I've read a lot of Aristotle, but am still not quite clear what this distinction means. I like the distinction between a thing's actual being and its 'modal profile', but the latter may extend well beyond what Aristotle means by potential being.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
     Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people."
     From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7
     A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
True change is in a thing's logos or its matter, not in its qualities [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: In that which underlies a change there is a factor corresponding to the definition [logon] and there is a material factor. When a change is in these constitutive factors there is coming to be or passing away, but in a thing's qualities it is alteration.
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 317a24)
     A reaction: This seems to be a key summary of Aristotle's account of change, in the context of his hylomorphism (form-plus-matter). The logos is the account of the thing, which seems to be the definition, which seems to give the form (principle or structure).
A change in qualities is mere alteration, not true change [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: When a change occurs in the qualities [pathesi] and is accidental [sumbebekos], there is alteration (rather than true change).
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 317a27)
     A reaction: [tr. partly Gill] Aristotle doesn't seem to have a notion of 'properties' in quite our sense. 'Pathe' seems to mean experienced qualities, rather than genuine causal powers. Gill says 'pathe' are always accidental.
If the substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; if it doesn't, it is 'coming-to-be' or 'passing-away' [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Since we must distinguish the substratum and the property whose nature is to be predicated of the substratum,..there is alteration when the substratum persists...but when nothing perceptible persists as a substratum, this is coming-to-be and passing-away.
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 319b08-16)
     A reaction: As usual, Aristotle clarifies the basis of the problem, by distinguishing two different types of change. Notice the empirical character of his approach, resting on whether or not the substratum is 'perceptible'.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
All comings-to-be are passings-away, and vice versa [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Every coming-to-be is a passing away of something else and every passing-away some other thing's coming-to-be.
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 319a07)
     A reaction: This seems to be the closest that Aristotle gets to sympathy with the Heraclitus view that all is flux. When a sparrow dies and disappears, I am not at all clear what comes to be, except some ex-sparrow material.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
Matter is the substratum, which supports both coming-to-be and alteration [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Matter, in the proper sense of the term, is to be identified with the substratum which is receptive of coming-to-be and passing-away; but the substratum of the remaining kinds of change is also matter, because these substrata receive contraries.
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 320a03)
     A reaction: This must be compared with his complex discussion of the role of matter in his Metaphysics, where he has introduced 'form' as the essence of things. I don't think the two texts are inconsistent, but it's tricky... See Idea 12133 on types of change.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Does the pure 'this' come to be, or the 'this-such', or 'so-great', or 'somewhere'? [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The question might be raised whether substance (i.e. the 'this') comes-to-be at all. Is it not rather the 'such', the 'so-great', or the 'somewhere', which comes-to-be?
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 317b21)
     A reaction: This is interesting because it pulls the 'tode ti', the 'this-such', apart, showing that he does have a concept of a pure 'this', which seems to constitute the basis of being ('ousia'). We can say 'this thing', or 'one of these things'.
Philosophers have worried about coming-to-be from nothing pre-existing [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: In addition, coming-to-be may proceed out of nothing pre-existing - a thesis which, more than any other, preoccupied and alarmed the earliest philosophers.
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 317b29)
     A reaction: This is the origin of the worry about 'ex nihilo' coming-to-be. Christians tended to say that only God could create in this way.
The substratum changing to a contrary is the material cause of coming-to-be [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The substratum [hupokeimenon?] is the material cause of the continuous occurrence of coming-to-be, because it is such as to change from contrary to contrary.
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 319a19)
     A reaction: Presumably Aristotle will also be seeking the 'formal' cause as well as the 'material' cause (not to mention the 'efficient' and 'final' causes).
If a perceptible substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; coming-to-be is a complete change [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: There is 'alteration' when the substratum is perceptible and persists, but changes in its own properties. ...But when nothing perceptible persists in its identity as a substratum, and the thing changes as a whole, it is coming-to-be of a substance.
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 319b11-17)
     A reaction: [compressed] Note that a substratum can be perceptible - it isn't just some hidden mystical I-know-not-what (as Locke calls it). This whole text is a wonderful source on the subject of physical change. Note too the reliance on what is perceptible.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Which of the contrary features of a body are basic to it? [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: What sorts of contrarities, and how many of them, are to be accounted 'originative sources' of body?
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 329b04)
     A reaction: Pasnau says these pages of Aristotle are the source of the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities. Essentially, hot, cold, wet and dry are his four primary qualities.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
There are 23 core brain functions, with known circuit, transmitters, genes and behaviour [Watson]
     Full Idea: In 2014 the National Institutes of Mental Health published a list of 23 core brain functions and their associated neural circuitry, neurotransmitters and genes, and the behaviour and emotions that go with them.
     From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 16 'Physics')
     A reaction: They were interested in the functions behind mental health, but I am interested in the functions behind our belief systems, which might produce a different focus. Sub-functions, perhaps.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Traditional ideas of the mind were weakened in the 1950s by mind-influencing drugs [Watson]
     Full Idea: One development in particular in the 1950s helped to discredit the traditional concept of the mind. This was medical drugs that influenced the workings of the brain.
     From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 16 'Intro')
     A reaction: This explains Ryle's 1949 book, and the Australian physicalists emerging in the late 1950s. Philosophers don't grasp how their subject is responsive to other areas of human knowledge. Of course, opium had always done this.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Humans have been hunter-gatherers for 99.5% of their existence [Watson]
     Full Idea: Anthropology shows that the hunter-gathering lifestyle has occupied 99.5 per cent of the time humans have been on earth.
     From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 13 'Emergence')
     A reaction: If you are trying to understand humanity, you ignore this fact at your peril. Even agriculture is only a tiny part of our history, and that only disappeared as a major human activity (in many nations) in the last hundred years.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Matter is the limit of points and lines, and must always have quality and form [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The matter is that of which points and lines are limits, and it is something that can never exist without quality and without form.
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 320b16)
     A reaction: There seems to be a contradiction here somewhere. Matter has to be substantial enough to have a form, and yet seems to be the collective 'limit' of the points and lines. I wonder what 'limit' is translating? Sounds a bit too modern.
The primary matter is the substratum for the contraries like hot and cold [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: We must reckon as an 'orginal source' and as 'primary' the matter which underlies, though it is inseparable from the contrary qualities: for 'the hot' is not matter for 'the cold' nor 'cold' for 'hot', but the substratum is matter for them both.
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 329a30)
     A reaction: A much discussed passage.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
There couldn't be just one element, which was both water and air at the same time [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: No one supposes a single 'element' to persist, as the basis of all, in such a way that it is Water as well as Air (or any other element) at the same time.
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 332a09)
     A reaction: Of course, we now think that oxygen is a key part of both water and of air, but Aristotle's basic argument still seems right. How could multiplicity be explained by a simply unity? The One is cool, but explains nothing.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
The Four Elements must change into one another, or else alteration is impossible [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: These bodies (Fire, Water and the like) change into one another (and are not immutable as Empedocles and other thinkers assert, since 'alteration' would then have been impossible).
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 329b1)
     A reaction: This is why Aristotle proposes that matter [hule] underlies the four elements. Gill argues that by matter Aristotle means the elements.
Fire is hot and dry; Air is hot and moist; Water is cold and moist; Earth is cold and dry [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The four couples of elementary qualities attach themselves to the apparently 'simple' bodies (Fire, Air, Earth, Water). Fire is hot and dry, whereas Air is hot and moist (being a sort of aqueous vapour); Water is cold and moist, and Earth is cold and dry.
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 330b02)
     A reaction: This is the traditional framework accepted throughout the middle ages, and which had a huge influence on medicine. It all looks rather implausible now. Aristotle was a genius, but not critical enough about evidence.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Bodies are endlessly divisible [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Bodies are divisible through and through.
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 326b27)
     A reaction: This is Aristotle's flat rejection of atomism, arrived at after several sustained discussions, in this text and elsewhere. I don't think we are in a position to say that Aristotle is wrong.
Wood is potentially divided through and through, so what is there in the wood besides the division? [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: If having divided a piece of wood I put it together, it is equal to what it was and is one. This is so whatever the point at which I cut the wood. The wood is therefore divided potentially through and through. So what is in the wood besides the division?
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 316b11)
     A reaction: Part of a very nice discussion of the implications of the thought experiment of cutting something 'through and through'. It seems to me that the arguments are still relevant, in the age of quarks, electrons and strings.
If a body is endlessly divided, is it reduced to nothing - then reassembled from nothing? [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Dividing a body at all points might actually occur, so the body will be both actually indivisible and potentially divided. Then nothing will remain and the body passes into what is incorporeal. So it might be reassembled out of points, or out of nothing.
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 316b24)
     A reaction: [a bit compressed] This sounds like an argument in favour of atomism, but Aristotle was opposed to that view. He is aware of the contradictions that seem to emerge with infinite division. Graham Priest is interesting on the topic.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
The Uncertainty Principle implies that cause and effect can't be measured [Watson]
     Full Idea: The Uncertainty Principle implied that in the subatomic world cause and effect could never be measured.
     From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 05 'Against')
     A reaction: The fact that it can't be measured does not, presumably, entail that it doesn't exist. Physicists seem to ignore causation, rather than denying it. Can causation be real if it only exists at the macro-level, as an emergent phenomenon?
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / a. Electrodynamics
The interference of light through two slits confirmed that it is waves [Watson]
     Full Idea: Thomas Young in 1803 confirmed the idea of Huyghens that light is waves, showing how light passing through two slits produces an interference pattern that resembles water waves sluicing through two slits.
     From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 04 'Conception')
     A reaction: The great puzzle emerges when it also turns out to be quantised particles.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons rotate in hyrogen atoms 10^13 times per second [Watson]
     Full Idea: In the hydrogen atom the electron rotates some 10,000 billion times per second.
     From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 18 'Evolutionary')
     A reaction: That's an awful lot. Is it at the speed of light?
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Quantum theory explains why nature is made up of units, such as elements [Watson]
     Full Idea: Planck's quantum idea explained so much, including the observation that the chemical world is made up of discrete units - the elements. Discrete elements implied fundamental units of matter that were themselves discrete (as Dalton had said).
     From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 4 'Intro')
     A reaction: The atomic theory was only finally confirmed by Einstein in 1905. This idea implies that the very lowest level of all must have distinct building blocks, but so far we have got down to 'fields', which seem to be a sort of 'foam'.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Only four particles are needed for matter: up and down quark, electron, electron-neutrino [Watson]
     Full Idea: We need twelve particles in the master equation of the standard model, but it is necessary to have only four to build a universe (up and down quarks, the electron and the electron neutrino (or lepton). The existence of the others is 'a bit of a mystery'.
     From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 11 'First Three')
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
There is no time without movement [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: There can be no time without movement.
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 337a24)
     A reaction: See Shoemaker's nice thought experiment as a challenge to this. Intuition seems to cry out that if movement stopped for a moment, that would not stop time, even though there was no way to measure its passing.
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
If each thing can cease to be, why hasn't absolutely everything ceased to be long ago? [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: If some one of the things 'which are' is constantly disappearing, why has not the whole of 'what is' been used up long ago and vanished away - assuming of course that the material of all the several comings-to-be was infinite?
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 318a17)
     A reaction: This thought is the basis of Aquinas's Third Way for proving the existence of God (as the force which prevents the vicissitudes of nature from sliding into oblivion).
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
The shape of molecules is important, as well as the atoms and their bonds [Watson]
     Full Idea: Pauling showed that the architecture - the shape of molecules was relevant (as well as the bonds). This meant that molecules were just as important as atoms in the understanding of matter. Molecules were not just the sum of their parts.
     From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 05 'Three')
     A reaction: If Aristotle struggled to understand matter, then so should modern philosophers. This involves thermodynamics and chemistry, as well as quantum theory.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
In 1828 the animal substance urea was manufactured from inorganic ingredients [Watson]
     Full Idea: In 1828 Wöhler, in an iconic experiment, had manufactured an organic substance, urea, hitherto the product solely of animals, out of inorganic materials, and without any interventions of vital force.
     From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 06 'Inorganic')
     A reaction: For reductionists like me, the gradual explanation of life in inorganic terms is the great role model of explanation. I take it for granted that the human mind will go the same way, despite partisan resistance from a lot of philosophers.
Information is physical, and living can be seen as replicating and preserving information [Watson]
     Full Idea: In passing information, physical changes take place, and information is thus physical. On this account, the act of living can be seen as replicating and preserving the information that a living body is comprised of.
     From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 17 'Dreams')
     A reaction: [He emphasises 'the act' of living, rather than a life]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Being is better than not-being [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Being is better than not-being.
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 336b29)
     A reaction: [see also Metaphysics 1017a07 ff, says the note] This peculiar assumption is at the heart of the ontological argument. Is the existence of the plague bacterium, or of Satan, or of mass-murderers, superior?
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
An Order controls all things [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: There is an Order controlling all things.
     From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 336b13)
     A reaction: Presumably the translator provides the capital letter. How do we get from 'there is an order in all things' to 'there is an order which controls all things'?