9 ideas
8679 | We perceive the objects of set theory, just as we perceive with our senses [Gödel] |
Full Idea: We have something like perception of the objects of set theory, shown by the axioms forcing themselves on us as being true. I don't see why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception (i.e. mathematical intuition) than in sense perception. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964], p.483), quoted by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 2.4 | |
A reaction: A famous strong expression of realism about the existence of sets. It is remarkable how the ingredients of mathematics spread themselves before the mind like a landscape, inviting journeys - but I think that just shows how minds cope with abstractions. |
9942 | Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L [Gödel, by Putnam] |
Full Idea: Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L (which implies the axiom of choice and the generalized continuum hypothesis). This established the full independence of the continuum hypothesis from the other axioms. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964]) by Hilary Putnam - Mathematics without Foundations | |
A reaction: Gödel initially wanted to make V = L an axiom, but the changed his mind. Maddy has lots to say on the subject. |
18062 | Set-theory paradoxes are no worse than sense deception in physics [Gödel] |
Full Idea: The set-theoretical paradoxes are hardly any more troublesome for mathematics than deceptions of the senses are for physics. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964], p.271), quoted by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 03.4 |
10868 | The Continuum Hypothesis is not inconsistent with the axioms of set theory [Gödel, by Clegg] |
Full Idea: Gödel proved that the Continuum Hypothesis was not inconsistent with the axioms of set theory. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964]) by Brian Clegg - Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable Ch.15 |
13517 | If set theory is consistent, we cannot refute or prove the Continuum Hypothesis [Gödel, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Gödel proved that (if set theory is consistent) we cannot refute the continuum hypothesis, and Cohen proved that (if set theory is consistent) we cannot prove it either. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 10 |
10271 | Basic mathematics is related to abstract elements of our empirical ideas [Gödel] |
Full Idea: Evidently the 'given' underlying mathematics is closely related to the abstract elements contained in our empirical ideas. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964], Suppl) | |
A reaction: Yes! The great modern mathematical platonist says something with which I can agree. He goes on to hint at a platonic view of the structure of the empirical world, but we'll let that pass. |
21982 | I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L] |
Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people." | |
From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7 | |
A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork. |
7861 | Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau] |
Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded. | |
From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4 | |
A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817). |
6660 | Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action. | |
From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9 | |
A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness. |