Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'Persons, Character and Morality' and 'Objections to 'Meditations' (Fifth)'

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5 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
21982 I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
     Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people."
     From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7
     A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
3400 Things must have parts to intermingle [Gassendi]
     Full Idea: If you are no larger than a point, how are you joined to the whole body, which is so large? …and there can be no intermingling between things unless the parts of them can be intermingled.
     From: Pierre Gassendi (Objections to 'Meditations' (Fifth) [1641]), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.131
     A reaction: As Descartes says that mind is distinct from body because it is non-spatial, it doesn't seem quite right to describe it as a 'point', but the second half is a real problem. Being non-spatial is a real impediment to intermingling with spatial objects.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
23279 It is important that a person can change their character, and not just be successive 'selves' [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: I want to emphasise the basic importance of the ordinary idea of a self or person which undergoes changes of character, as opposed to dissolving a changing person into a series of 'selves'.
     From: Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], II)
     A reaction: [compressed] He mentions Derek Parfit for the rival view. Williams has the Aristotelian view, that a person has an essential nature, which endures through change, and explains that change. But that needs some non-essential character traits.
23280 Kantians have an poor account of individuals, and insist on impartiality, because they ignore character [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: The Kantians' omission of character is a condition of their ultimate insistence on the demands of impartial morality, just as it is a reason to find inadequate their account of the individual.
     From: Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], II)
     A reaction: This is also why the Kantian account of virtue is inadequate, in comparison with the Aristotelian view.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
23278 For utilitarians states of affairs are what have value, not matter who produced them [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: The basic bearer of value for Utilitarianism is the state of affairs, and hence, when the relevant causal differences have been allowed for, it cannot make any further difference who produces a given state of affairs.
     From: Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], I)
     A reaction: Which is morally better, that I water your bed of flowers, or that it rains? Which is morally better, that I water them from love, or because you threaten me with a whip?