Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'Introduction to Virtue Ethics' and 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
6848 Humour is practically enacted philosophy [Critchley]
     Full Idea: Humour, for me, is practically enacted philosophy.
     From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.198)
     A reaction: This may be overstating it, as the funniest jokes may be the least philosophical, and remarks may be faintly amusing but very profound. Lear and his Fool make up a single worldview together.
6847 Humour can give a phenomenological account of existence, and point to change [Critchley]
     Full Idea: Humour provides an oblique phenomenology of ordinary life; it is a way of describing the situation of our existence, and, at its best, it indicates how we might change that situation.
     From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.198)
     A reaction: The trouble is that this leads us to relentlessly political standup comedians who aren't very funny. Critichley may have a problem with remarks which are very funny precisely because they are so politically incorrect. I sympathise, though.
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
6844 Scientism is the view that everything can be explained causally through scientific method [Critchley]
     Full Idea: Scientism is the belief that all phenomena can be explained through the methodology of the natural sciences, and the belief that, therefore, all phenomena are capable of a causal explanation.
     From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.196)
     A reaction: He links two ideas together, but I tend to subscribe fully to the second idea, but less fully to the first. Scientific method, if there is such a thing (Idea 6804), may not be the best way to lay bare the causal network of reality.
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
6835 German idealism aimed to find a unifying principle for Kant's various dualisms [Critchley]
     Full Idea: In his Third Critique Kant established a series of dualisms (pure/practical reason, nature/freedom, epistemology/ethics) but failed to provide a unifying principle; German idealism can be seen as an attempt to provide this principle.
     From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.187)
     A reaction: He cites 'subject', 'spirit', 'art', 'will to power', 'praxis' and 'being' as candidates. This is a helpful overview for someone struggling to get to grips with that tradition.
6837 Since Hegel, continental philosophy has been linked with social and historical enquiry. [Critchley]
     Full Idea: In continental philosophy from Hegel onwards, systematic philosophical questions have to be linked to socio-historical enquiry, and the distinctions between philosophy, history and society begin to fall apart.
     From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.188)
     A reaction: I have a strong sales resistance to this view of philosophy, just as I would if it was said about mathematics. It seems to imply a bogus view that history exhibits direction and purpose (the 'Whig' view). There are pure reasons among the prejudices.
6836 Continental philosophy fights the threatened nihilism in the critique of reason [Critchley]
     Full Idea: If reason must criticise itself (in Kant) how does one avoid total scepticism? In my view, the problem that has animated the continental tradition since Jacobi (early 19th cent) is the threat of nihilism.
     From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.188)
     A reaction: As an outsider to 'continental' philosophy, this is the most illuminating remark I have read about it. It is not only a plausible account of the movement, but also a very worth aim, which should be taken seriously by analytical philosophers.
6838 Continental philosophy is based on critique, praxis and emancipation [Critchley]
     Full Idea: The basic map of the continental tradition can be summarised in three terms: critique, praxis and emancipation.
     From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.189)
     A reaction: I wince at 'emancipation', which seems to take freedom as of unquestionably high value, instead of being one of the principles up for question in social philosophy. There are more presuppositions in Marxist than in analytical philosophy.
6845 Continental philosophy has a bad tendency to offer 'one big thing' to explain everything [Critchley]
     Full Idea: In continental philosophy there is a pernicious tendency to explain everything in terms of 'one big thing', such as the 'death drive' (Freud), 'being' (Heidegger), 'the real' (Lacan), 'power' (Foucault), 'the other' (Levinas), or 'différance' (Derrida).
     From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.197)
     A reaction: From a fan of this type of philosophy, this is a refreshing remark, because if pinpoints a very off-putting feature. Each of these 'big things' should be up for question, not offered as axiomatic assumptions that explain everything else.
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
6846 Phenomenology is a technique of redescription which clarifies our social world [Critchley]
     Full Idea: Phenomenology (as in the later Husserl) is for me a way of assembling reminders which clarify the social world in which we exist; it is a technique of redescription.
     From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.198)
     A reaction: I'm not sure if I can identify with this as a target for philosophy, but it is interesting and sound worthy of effort. Critchley offers this as the best strand in 'continental' philosophy, rather than the big explanatory ideas.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
21982 I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
     Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people."
     From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7
     A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
7096 We may still admire a person's character even if the traits are involuntary [Statman]
     Full Idea: If we focus on the evaluation of character traits, voluntariness becomes less important. We would not withdraw our admiration for a person only because we found out that his or her being such a person was not a result of voluntary choice.
     From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §3)
     A reaction: The need for voluntariness does not disappear. I would not admire the only generous deed you had ever performed if it was the result of hypnotism. I might admire the hypnotist. Nevertheless, I regard this idea as a crucial truth in moral theory.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
7098 There is a new sort of moral scepticism, about the possibility of moral theories [Statman]
     Full Idea: Since the 1980s, ethics has witnessed a new sort of moral scepticism, this time about the possibility of moral theories.
     From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §4)
     A reaction: He cites McDowell, Williams, Nussbaum and Baier as the culprits. 'Particularism' (every situation is different, so there can't be rules) seems an essential part of virtue theory, but total absence of principles sounds to me like moral drift.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
7099 With a broad concept of flourishing, it might be possible without the virtues [Statman]
     Full Idea: In a rich conception of human flourishing, both individuals and societies seem to be able to flourish without the virtues.
     From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §5)
     A reaction: I can see Aristotle clutching his head in despair at this thought. It might look like flourishing, but it couldn't be the real thing. It is Aristotle's fault, though, for including external goods. Money and pleasure offer a kind of flourishing.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
7100 Virtue theory isn't a genuine ethical theory, because it doesn't have universal application [Statman]
     Full Idea: It can be claimed that universality is a necessary property of any ethical theory and therefore virtue theory, which fails in this respect, is not a theory, and hence poses no alternative to genuine ethical theories.
     From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §5)
     A reaction: Replies: a) totally universal morality is an idle dream (part of the 'Enlightenment Project' to prove everything) and we must settle for something more relative; b) virtues aren't totally universal, but they are truths about humanity. I prefer b).
7102 Promises create moral duties that have nothing to do with character [Statman]
     Full Idea: That duties are created irrespective of facts about character is obvious from the case of promises, which bind their makers irrespective of their motives or personality.
     From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §5)
     A reaction: Just occasionally a promise can be broken, by a sensitive and wise person. I promise to give your son some money; I then discover he is a drug dealer. Promises arise out of character, and cannot be made by robots.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
7095 Moral education is better by concrete example than abstract principle [Statman]
     Full Idea: According to virtue theory, education through moral exemplars is more effective than education focused on principles and obligations, because it is far more concrete.
     From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §3)
     A reaction: Aristotle's view is that virtues must be developed from childhood, when principles don't mean much. The problem is that young people may witness highly virtuous behaviour in their exemplars, but totally fail to appreciate it without mention of principles.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
7094 Friends express friendship even when no utility is involved [Statman]
     Full Idea: Being a good friend means acting in ways that express the friendship even when those ways do not promote overall utility.
     From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §3)
     A reaction: This implies that friendship is a true virtue of character, rather than having friends just being an 'external' good. Having friends is good; being friends is a virtue. There are duties of friendship.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
7093 Behaviour may be disgusting or inhumane, but violate no duty [Statman]
     Full Idea: It is surely possible, and indeed often the case, that people who violate no duty nevertheless behave in an inhumane and a disgusting manner.
     From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §1)
     A reaction: This seems right, though it is easier to be disgusting than to be inhumane if no duty is to be violated. Social duties may not require a high degree of humanity, pure Kantian duties might.
7104 The ancients recognised imperfect duties, but we have added perfect duties like justice [Statman]
     Full Idea: The advantage of modern thinkers over the ancient virtue ethicists is that in addition to imperfect duties (i.e. virtues) they also recognise the existence of perfect duties, or duties of justice, which are essential for the existence of society.
     From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §7)
     A reaction: Even the Greeks had laws (e.g. Idea 422), so they understood that a society needs rules, but many laws don't seem to be moral rules (e.g. car parking), and the Greeks thought morality was about human excellence, not avoiding traffic jams.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
6843 Perceiving meaninglessness is an achievement, which can transform daily life [Critchley]
     Full Idea: If nihilism is the threat of the collapse of meaning, then my position is that one has to accept meaninglessness as an achievement, as an accomplishment that permits a transformed relation to everyday life.
     From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.193)
     A reaction: This sounds cheerfully upbeat and life-enhancing, but I don't quite see how it works. One could easily end up laughing at the most appalling tragedies, and that seems to me to be an inappropriate (Aristotelian word) way to respond to tragedy.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
7103 Abortion issues focus on the mother's right over her body, and the status of the foetus [Statman]
     Full Idea: Most of the debate on abortion focuses on two issues, the mother's assumed right over her body, and the status of the foetus.
     From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §6)
     A reaction: Personally I think society as a whole might have a say (if, perhaps, we are over- or under-populated, or we have a widely accepted state religion, or we are just very shocked). Mother's have virtues and duties as well as rights.