Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'Possible Worlds' and 'Theses on Feuerbach'

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9 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophers have interpreted the world, but the point is to change it [Marx]
     Full Idea: The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.
     From: Karl Marx (Theses on Feuerbach [1846], §XI)
     A reaction: The 'point' of what? Personally I am more with Aristotle - that the aim is to create a society in which we can all aspire to contemplate like gods. As an interim statement of aim, though, one must respect Marx. But was he a philosopher?
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Whether human thinking can be 'true' must be decided in practice, not theory [Marx]
     Full Idea: The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question; man must prove the truth of his thinking in practice.
     From: Karl Marx (Theses on Feuerbach [1846], §II)
     A reaction: This would appear to be an assertion of the pragmatic view of truth well before Peirce. The obvious objections arise, such as whether falsehood (Plato's 'noble lie') might not have equal practical success, and whether truth might be disastrous.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan on Lewis]
     Full Idea: I suggest that Lewis's view in fact is just Meinong's view. ...Meinong distinguishes between 'existing' and merely 'subsisting', Lewis between 'being actual' and merely 'existing'.
     From: comment on David Lewis (Possible Worlds [1973]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 06
     A reaction: Lewis attempts to make actuality purely 'indexical' in character, like distinguishing the world 'here' from the world 'elsewhere', but Lycan seems right that he is committed to more than that.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
     Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people."
     From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7
     A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis]
     Full Idea: Lewis's knowledge of what possible worlds there are and of other general truths about worlds is posterior, not prior, to his knowledge of what things are possible and what things are impossible.
     From: comment on David Lewis (Possible Worlds [1973]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 07
     A reaction: This elementary objection seems to me to destroy any attempt to explain modality in terms of possible worlds. It is a semantics for modal statements, but that doesn't make it an ontology. To assess possibilities, study actuality.
What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis]
     Full Idea: Lewis must seek some ontological ground for the grouping of possibilia into disjoint worlds.
     From: comment on David Lewis (Possible Worlds [1973]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 07
     A reaction: I do love people like Lycan who ask the simple commonsense questions about these highly sophisticated systems that students of philosophy are required to study. If a proposition is a 'set of worlds', understanding a proposition is beyond me.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
The authentic self exists at the level of class, rather than the individual [Marx, by Dunt]
     Full Idea: Instead of focusing on the individual, Marxism suggested that the authentic self was at the social level in the form of class.
     From: report of Karl Marx (Theses on Feuerbach [1846]) by Ian Dunt - How to be a Liberal 6
     A reaction: [not sure of the best source in Marx] This idea is expressed here by a defender of liberal individualism. Dunt persuasively attacks any concept of the self as part of some group, rather than as being an individual.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
The human essence is not found in individuals but in social relations [Marx]
     Full Idea: The human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual; in its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.
     From: Karl Marx (Theses on Feuerbach [1846], §VI)
     A reaction: This is a key Marxist doctrine, and the central difference from Aristotle. Personally I am more with Aristotle, but the truth obviously lies somewhere in between. Man must be a 'social being', or there wouldn't be any social relations.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religious feeling is social in origin [Marx]
     Full Idea: The "religious sentiment" (discussed by Feuerbach) is itself a social product.
     From: Karl Marx (Theses on Feuerbach [1846], §VII)
     A reaction: Recent brain research has identified a part of the brain which is only active during religious thought and experience. It is easy to produce cynical political accounts of religion, but in its time it was also quite a good scientific account of nature.