Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'Possible Worlds' and 'The Fragmentation of Value'

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5 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan on Lewis]
     Full Idea: I suggest that Lewis's view in fact is just Meinong's view. ...Meinong distinguishes between 'existing' and merely 'subsisting', Lewis between 'being actual' and merely 'existing'.
     From: comment on David Lewis (Possible Worlds [1973]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 06
     A reaction: Lewis attempts to make actuality purely 'indexical' in character, like distinguishing the world 'here' from the world 'elsewhere', but Lycan seems right that he is committed to more than that.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
     Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people."
     From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7
     A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis]
     Full Idea: Lewis's knowledge of what possible worlds there are and of other general truths about worlds is posterior, not prior, to his knowledge of what things are possible and what things are impossible.
     From: comment on David Lewis (Possible Worlds [1973]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 07
     A reaction: This elementary objection seems to me to destroy any attempt to explain modality in terms of possible worlds. It is a semantics for modal statements, but that doesn't make it an ontology. To assess possibilities, study actuality.
What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis]
     Full Idea: Lewis must seek some ontological ground for the grouping of possibilia into disjoint worlds.
     From: comment on David Lewis (Possible Worlds [1973]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 07
     A reaction: I do love people like Lycan who ask the simple commonsense questions about these highly sophisticated systems that students of philosophy are required to study. If a proposition is a 'set of worlds', understanding a proposition is beyond me.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
There is no one theory of how to act (or what to believe) [Nagel]
     Full Idea: To look for a single general theory of how to decide the right thing to do is like looking for a single theory of how to decide what to believe.
     From: Thomas Nagel (The Fragmentation of Value [1977], p.135)
     A reaction: Depends on your level of generality. Values and virtues are general guides which should be brought to every action, with 'higher' values guiding choice of what is relevant.