40 ideas
21021 | Keep premises as weak as possible, to avoid controversial difficulties [Nussbaum] |
Full Idea: One should always choose the weakest premises from which one's conclusion follows, rather than saddling the theory with thicker or more controversial premises. | |
From: Martha Nussbaum (Creating Capabilities [2011], 8) | |
A reaction: I like this because it connects the rather vague Ockham's Razor to the logical concept of Thinning. The key point is that a thinner set of premises that prove something will be more persuasive, because critics may reject premises instead of conclusion. |
18486 | We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride] |
Full Idea: We might define truth using the truth-maker relation, albeit in a roundabout way, according to the pattern of saying 'S is true' is equivalent to 'there is something which makes S true'. | |
From: Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 3.3) | |
A reaction: [MacBride gives it more algebraically, but I prefer English!] You would need to explain 'truth-making' without reference to truth. Horwich objects, reasonably, that ordinary people grasp 'truth' much more clearly than 'truth-making'. Bad idea, I think. |
18484 | Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride] |
Full Idea: For Martin the fatal error of phenomenalists was their inability to supply credible truth-makers for truths about unobserved objects; the same error afflicted Ryle's behaviourism, ...and Prior's Presentism (for past-tensed and future-tensed truths). | |
From: Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 3.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the original motivation for the modern rise of the truthmaker idea. Personally I find 'Napoleon won at Austerlitz' is a perfectly good past-tensed truthmaker which is compatible with presentism. Truth-making is an excellent challenge. |
18466 | If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride] |
Full Idea: If a truthmaker entails its truth, this threatens to over-generate truth-makers for necessary truths - at least if the entailment is classical. It's a feature of this notion that anything whatsoever entails a given necessary truth. | |
From: Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 1.1) | |
A reaction: This is a good reason to think that the truth-making relation does not consist of logical entailment. |
18473 | 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride] |
Full Idea: The principle of 'maximalism' is that for every truth, then there must be something in the world that makes it true. | |
From: Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 2.1) | |
A reaction: That seems to mean that no truths can be uttered about anything which is not in the world. If I say 'pigs might have flown', that isn't about the modal profile of actual pigs, it is about what might have resulted from that profile. |
18481 | Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride] |
Full Idea: If maximalism is intellectual heir to Russell's logical atomism, then 'optimalism' (the denial that universal and negative statements need truth-makers) is heir to Wittgenstein's version, where only atomic propositions represent states of affairs. | |
From: Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Wittgenstein's idea is that you can use the logical connectives to construct all the other universal and negative facts. 'Optimalism' restricts truthmaking to atomic statements. |
18483 | The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride] |
Full Idea: According the Lewis, the kernel of truth in truth-making is the idea that propositions have a subject matter. They are about things, so whether they are true or false depends on how those things stand. | |
From: Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 2.4.1) | |
A reaction: [Lewis 'Things Qua Truth-makers' 2003] That sounds like the first step in the story, rather than the 'kernel' of the truth-making approach. |
18477 | There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride] |
Full Idea: It's not obvious that there are enough positive states out there to underwrite all the negative truths. Even though it may be true that this liquid is odourless this needn't be because there's something further about it that excludes its being odourless. | |
From: Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 2.1.4.1) | |
A reaction: What is the ontological status of all these hypothetical truths? What is the truthmaker for 'a trillion trillion negative truths exist'? What is the status of 'this is not not-red'? |
18479 | There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride] |
Full Idea: We recognise that what makes it true that there is no oil in this engine is different from what makes it true that there are no dodos left. | |
From: Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 2.1.4.1) | |
A reaction: This looks like a local particular negation up against a universal negation. I'm not sure there is a big difference between 'my dodo's gone missing' (like my oil), and 'all the dodos have gone permanently missing'. |
18482 | Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride] |
Full Idea: Optimalists say that negative truths are 'true by default' (having the opposite truth value of p), and universal truths are too. Universal truths are equivalent to negative existential truths, which are true by default. | |
From: Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 2.2) | |
A reaction: The background idea is Wittgenstein's, that if p is false, then not-p is true by default, without anyone having to assert the negation. This strikes me as a very promising approach to truthmaking. See Simons 2008. |
18485 | Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride] |
Full Idea: Even an idealist could accept that there are truth-makers whilst thinking of them as mind-dependent entities. | |
From: Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 3.1) | |
A reaction: This undercuts anyone (me, perhaps?) who was hoping to prop up their robust realism with an angry demand to be shown the truthmakers. |
18474 | Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride] |
Full Idea: If the sentence 'This sentence has no truth-maker' has a truth-maker, then it must be true. But then what it says must be the case, so it has no truth-maker. Hence by reductio the sentence has no truth-maker. | |
From: Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 2.1.1) | |
A reaction: [Argument proposed by Peter Milne 2005] Rodriguez-Pereyra replies that the sentence is meaningless, so that it can't possibly be true. The Liar sentence is also said to be meaningless. The argument opposes Maximalism. |
18490 | Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride] |
Full Idea: Maybe the truth-maker panegyrists have misconstrued the logical form of 'makes true'. They have taken it to be a verb like 'x hits y', when really it is akin to the connective '→' or 'because'. | |
From: Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 3.7) | |
A reaction: [He cites Melia 2005] This isn't any sort of refutation of truth-making, but an offer of how to think of the phenomenon if you reject the big principle. I like truth-making, but resist the 'makes' that brings unthought propositions into existence. |
18493 | Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride] |
Full Idea: When supporters of truth-making talk of 'something' which makes a sentence true, they make the assumption that it is an objectual quantifier in name position. | |
From: Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 3.8) | |
A reaction: We might say, more concisely, that they are 'reifying' the something. This makes it sound as if Armstrong and Bigelow have made a mistake, but that are simply asserting that this particular quantification is indeed objectual. |
18489 | Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride] |
Full Idea: The 'connectives' are expressions that link sentences but without expressing a relation that holds between the states of affairs, facts or tropes that these sentences denote. | |
From: Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 3.7) | |
A reaction: MacBride notes that these contrast with ordinary verbs, which do express meaningful relations. |
18476 | 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride] |
Full Idea: Statements of the form 'a is F' aren't invariably positive ('a is dead'), and nor are statements of the form 'a isn't F' ('a isn't blind') always negative. | |
From: Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 2.1.4) | |
A reaction: The point is that the negation may be implicit in the predicate. There are many ways to affirm or deny something, other than by use of the standard syntax. |
21982 | I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L] |
Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people." | |
From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7 | |
A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork. |
18480 | Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride] |
Full Idea: 'To be is to be a truth-maker' has been proposed as a replacement the standard conception of ontological commitment, that to be is to be the value of a variable. | |
From: Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 2.1.4.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Ross Cameron 2008] Unconvincing. What does it mean to say that some remote unexperienced bit of the universe 'makes truths'? How many truths? Where do these truths reside when they aren't doing anything useful? |
18471 | Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride] |
Full Idea: The concept of 'grounding' appears to cry out for treatment as a family resemblance concept, a concept whose instances have no more in common than different games do. | |
From: Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 1.6) | |
A reaction: I like the word 'determinations', though MacBride's point my also apply to that. I take causation to be one species of determination, and truth-making to be another. They form a real family, with no adoptees. |
18472 | Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers define 'grounding' in terms of 'truth-making', rather than the other way around. | |
From: Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 1.6) | |
A reaction: [Cameron exemplifies the first, and Schaffer the second] I would have thought that grounding was in the world, but truth-making required the introduction of propositions about the world by minds, so grounding is prior. Schaffer is right. |
18475 | Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride] |
Full Idea: The logical atomism of Russell admitted some logically complex facts but not others - in contrast to Wittgenstein's version which admitted only atomic facts. | |
From: Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 2.1.3) | |
A reaction: For truthmakers, it looks as if the Wittgenstein version might do a better job (e.g. with negative truths). I quite like the Russell approach, where complex facts underwrite the logical connectives. Disjunctive, negative, conjunctive, hypothetical facts. |
18478 | Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride] |
Full Idea: It is almost universally acknowledged that Wittgenstein's plan to show all necessity is logical necessity ended in failure - indeed foundered upon the very problem of explaining colour incompatibilities. | |
From: Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 2.1.4.1) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure whether you can 'show' that colour incompatibility is some sort of necessity, though intuitively it seems so. I'm thinking that 'necessity' is a unitary concept, with a wide variety of sources generating it. |
21007 | Storytelling is never neutral; some features of the world must be emphasised [Nussbaum] |
Full Idea: Storytelling is never neutral; the narrator always directs attention to some features of the world rather than others. | |
From: Martha Nussbaum (Creating Capabilities [2011], 1) | |
A reaction: The audience would be a bit stupid if it insisted on neutrality. |
21025 | Particularism gives no guidance for the future [Nussbaum] |
Full Idea: Situation ethics offers no guidance for the future. | |
From: Martha Nussbaum (Creating Capabilities [2011], 8) | |
A reaction: Not sure if Situation Ethics is the same as Particularism. Jonathan Danby famously champions the latter. |
21026 | Compassion is unreliable, because it favours people close to us [Nussbaum] |
Full Idea: Daniel Batson's important research has shown us that compassion is not reliable on its own, because it can easily give priority to people close to the self. | |
From: Martha Nussbaum (Creating Capabilities [2011], 8) | |
A reaction: In Britain animal charities receive vastly more money than children's charities, presumably for this very reason. Kittens - you've got to hate them. |
21019 | Social contracts assume equal powers among the participants [Nussbaum] |
Full Idea: All contract theories, including Rawls's, assume a rough equality of physical and mental power among the participants. | |
From: Martha Nussbaum (Creating Capabilities [2011], 4) |
21011 | We shouldn't focus on actual preferences, which may be distorted by injustices [Nussbaum] |
Full Idea: When society puts things out of reach for people, they typically learn not to want those things. ..By defining the social goal in terms of satisfaction of actual preferences, utilitarian approaches often reinforce the status quo, which may be very unjust. | |
From: Martha Nussbaum (Creating Capabilities [2011], 3) | |
A reaction: Maximising happiness is potentially very paternalistic, whereas preference satisfaction is not, which aligns utilitarianism better with liberalism. It is notorious that slaves can be contented with their slavery, and battered wives can remain loyal. |
21008 | Liberalism does not need a comprehensive account of value [Nussbaum] |
Full Idea: The role of political liberalism in my theory requires me to prescind from offering any comprehensive account of value. | |
From: Martha Nussbaum (Creating Capabilities [2011], 2) | |
A reaction: Obviously liberalism has values, but they are the minimum ones of freedom and respect. Liberals have to tolerate some fairly ugly and miserable societies. Can liberals intervene in family life? |
21012 | Women are often treated like children, and not respected for their choices [Nussbaum] |
Full Idea: Women are often treated as passive dependents, creatures to be cared for (or not), rather than as independent human beings deserving respect for their choices. In other words they are often infantilized. | |
From: Martha Nussbaum (Creating Capabilities [2011], 3) | |
A reaction: Her prime example is from India, but you see the same thing in more subtle forms in the UK, especially among older people, and especially in art galleries. |
21015 | Negative liberty is incoherent; all liberties, to do and to be, require the prevention of interference [Nussbaum] |
Full Idea: The very idea of 'negative liberty' ...is an incoherent idea: all liberties are positive, meaning liberties to do or to be something, which all require the inhibition of interference by others. | |
From: Martha Nussbaum (Creating Capabilities [2011], 3) | |
A reaction: This rejects Isaiah Berlin's well-known claim that negative liberties are good, but positive liberties are far too dangerous. |
21017 | Political freedom is an incoherent project, because some freedoms limit other freedoms [Nussbaum] |
Full Idea: It is unclear whether the idea of promoting freedom is even a coherent political project. Some freedoms limit others. The freedom of rich people to make large donations to political campaigns can limit the equal worth of the right to vote. | |
From: Martha Nussbaum (Creating Capabilities [2011], 4) | |
A reaction: It is not just American right-wingers who over-emphasise 'freedom'. French philosophy seems to be riddled with the same thing. |
21016 | Political and civil rights are not separate from economic and social rights [Nussbaum] |
Full Idea: My approach rejects the distinction, common in the human rights movement, between 'first-generation rights' (political and civil) and 'second-generation rights' (economic and social). The second group are preconditions of the first group. | |
From: Martha Nussbaum (Creating Capabilities [2011], 3) | |
A reaction: [last sentence compressed] This sounds like the sort of point Marx argued for. Nowadays it is feminists who make this point most strongly. |
21009 | Capabilities: Life, Health, Safety, Mental life, Love, Planning, Joining in, Nature, Play, Control [Nussbaum, by PG] |
Full Idea: Ten Capabilities: Life (decent), Health (reproduction, shelter), Safety, Mental life (with education), Love (relationships), Planning (with free beliefs), Joining in (and non-discrimination), Nature (relations to), Play, Control (politics and property). | |
From: report of Martha Nussbaum (Creating Capabilities [2011], 2) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: She gives her crucial list in rather wordy form. To have impact it needs to be reduced to brief simple slogans. |
21010 | Justice requires that the ten main capabilities of people are reasonably enabled [Nussbaum] |
Full Idea: The basic claim of my account of social justice is this: respect for human dignity requires that citizens be placed above an ample (specified) threshold of capability in all ten of the areas. | |
From: Martha Nussbaum (Creating Capabilities [2011], 2) | |
A reaction: [The capabilities are given, briefly, in Idea 21009] The one word that bothers me here is 'dignity'. It is very vague, and can, I think, be reduced to much clearer and more obvious concepts. A person lacks dignity when they vomit, in ordinary usage. |
21013 | Capabilities are grounded in bare humanity and agency; qualifying as rational is not needed [Nussbaum] |
Full Idea: The capabilities approach grounds rights claims in bare human birth and minimal agency, not in rationality or any other specific property, something that permits it to recognise the equal human rights of people with cognitive disabilities. | |
From: Martha Nussbaum (Creating Capabilities [2011], 3) | |
A reaction: She says elsewhere that she also sees animals as included in the capabilities approach. This is a rejection of the Kantian grounds for rights (by a well-known Aristotelian). |
21014 | Rights are not just barriers against state interference; governments must affirm capabilities of citizens [Nussbaum] |
Full Idea: A prominent idea, common in the U.S., sees rights as barriers against interfering state action. ...The Capabilities Approach, by contrast, insists that all entitlements involve an affirmative task for government, to actively support capabilities. | |
From: Martha Nussbaum (Creating Capabilities [2011], 3) | |
A reaction: This makes her approach very left wing, by U.S. standards, because it needs higher taxation and a degree of government paternalism. Her approach strikes me as an excellent agenda for a fairly interventionist European liberal party. |
21020 | Any establishment belief system is incompatible with full respect for all citizens [Nussbaum] |
Full Idea: The idea of equal respect is difficult or impossible to render compatible with a religious establishment, even one that is benign and noncoercive. Any established church (or government secularism) denigrates nonbelievers, by stating they are an out-group. | |
From: Martha Nussbaum (Creating Capabilities [2011], 4) | |
A reaction: This sort of applies to membership of anything. She is sort of right, but there is no reason in principle why full respect should not be accorded to any out-group. |
21023 | We should respect animals in the way that we respect the animal nature in humans [Nussbaum] |
Full Idea: If we show respect to our own animal natures, it is simply inconsistent, and a kind of vicious self-promoting of a sort to which Kantians are especially opposed, to refuse the same respect to our fellow creatures. | |
From: Martha Nussbaum (Creating Capabilities [2011], 8) | |
A reaction: Nussbaum says Kant is hopeless on animals, but Christine Korsgaard offers this Kantian approach that demands genuine respect for animals, even though they are not considered rational. Nussbaum says animals are agents. Did Kant respect our animality? |
21024 | It may be no harm to kill an animal which cannot plan for its future [Nussbaum] |
Full Idea: The painless killing of an animal of a species that does not make plans extending into the future may not be a harm: this depends on how we think about the harm of death. | |
From: Martha Nussbaum (Creating Capabilities [2011], 8) | |
A reaction: Very old human beings may have no plans for the future. I, on the other hand, have got lots and lots of plans. Definitely. No one can specify the harm of death. How can it be distinguished from the harm of not being born? |
21022 | The Capabilities Approach sees animals as agents, not just as having feelings [Nussbaum] |
Full Idea: The Capabilities Approach sees animals as agents, not as receptacles of pleasure or pain. | |
From: Martha Nussbaum (Creating Capabilities [2011], 8) | |
A reaction: This is in opposition to the utilitarian view. The key consequence is that animals can be victims of injustice, as well as of cruelty. Nice. |