Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'Epistemic Operators' and 'Ethical consistency'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
21982 I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
     Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people."
     From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7
     A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
6445 You have knowledge if you can rule out all the relevant alternatives to what you believe [Dretske, by DeRose]
     Full Idea: The 'Relevant Alternatives' theory of knowledge said the main ingredient that must be added to true belief to make knowledge is that one be in a position to rule out all the relevant alternatives to what one believes.
     From: report of Fred Dretske (Epistemic Operators [1970]) by Keith DeRose - Intro: Responding to Skepticism §6
     A reaction: Dretske and Nozick are associated with this strategy. There will obviously be a problem in defining 'relevant'. Otherwise it sounds quite close to Plato's suggestion that we need true belief with 'logos'.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
22455 Many ethical theories neglect the power of regretting the ought not acted upon [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: It is a fundamental criticism of many ethical theories that their accounts of moral conflict and its resolution do not do justice to the facts of regret...: basically because they eliminate from the scene the ought that is not acted upon.
     From: Bernard Williams (Ethical consistency [1965], p.175), quoted by Philippa Foot - Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma p.39
     A reaction: [p.175 in Problems of the Self] Williams seems to have initiated this idea. It doesn't matter much for Kantians and Utilitarians (any more than a wrong answer in maths), but it matters if character is the focus. The virtuous have regrets.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
22453 Moral conflicts have a different feeling and structure from belief conflicts [Williams,B, by Foot]
     Full Idea: Williams insisted that the feelings we have in situations of moral conflict show that the 'structure' of moral judgements is unlike that of assertions expressing beliefs.
     From: report of Bernard Williams (Ethical consistency [1965]) by Philippa Foot - Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma p.36
     A reaction: Foot presents this as a key reason for the non-cognitivist view of ethics, and her paper attacks it. I don't usually react to moral disagreement with the same vigour I have when I think a belief is untrue. It may just be uncertainty, though.