Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'On the Essence of Human Freedom' and 'Truth'

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
10838 To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett]
     Full Idea: We cannot in general suppose that we give a proper account of a concept by describing those circumstance in which we do, and those in which we do not, make use of the relevant word. We explain the point of the concept, what we use the word for.
     From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.231)
     A reaction: Well said. I am beginning to develop a campaign to make sure that analytical philosophy focuses on understanding concepts (in a full 'logos' sort of way), and doesn't just settle for logical form or definition or rules of usage.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
10837 It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett]
     Full Idea: It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements.
     From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.231)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a rather contentious but very interesting claim. An even stronger claim might be that its value (its normative force) is ALL that the concept of truth contributes to speech, other aspects being analysed into something else.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
10840 We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett]
     Full Idea: For a particular bounded language, if it is free of ambiguity and inconsistency, it must be possible to characterize the true sentences of the language; somewhat as, for a given game, we can say which moves are winning moves.
     From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.237)
     A reaction: The background of this sounds rather like Tarski, with truth just being a baton passed from one part of the language to another, though Dummett adds the very un-Tarskian notion that truth has a value.
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19171 Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson]
     Full Idea: Tarski's definition of truth is like giving a definition of what it is to win in various games, without giving a hint as to what winning is (e.g. that it is what one tries to do when playing).
     From: report of Michael Dummett (Truth [1959]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 7
     A reaction: This led Dummett to his 'normative' account of truth. Formally, the fact that speakers usually aim at truth seems irrelevant, but in life you certainly wouldn't have grasped truth if you thought falsehood was just as satisfactory. The world is involved.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
21982 I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
     Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people."
     From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7
     A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
10839 You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett]
     Full Idea: One could train a dog to bark only when a bell rang and a light shone without presupposing that it possessed the concept of conjunction.
     From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.235)
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
20956 Ultimately, all being is willing. The nature of primal being is the same as the nature of willing [Schelling]
     Full Idea: In the last and highest instance there is no other being but willing. Willing is primal being, and all the predicates of primal being only fit willing: groundlessness, eternity, being independent of time, self-affirmation.
     From: Friedrich Schelling (On the Essence of Human Freedom [1809], I.7.350), quoted by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy 5 'Reason'
     A reaction: Insofar as this says that 'primal being' must be active in character, I love this idea. Not the rest of the idea though! Bowie says this essay clearly influenced Schopenhauer. It looks as if Nietzsche must be read it too.