Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer')' and 'An essentialist approach to Truth-making'

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8 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation

18351	Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth [Lowe]
	Full Idea: If a proposition is 'made' true, it has to be true 'in virtue of' something, meaning a relationship of metaphysical explanation. Thus a true proposition must have truth conferred on it in some way that explains how it gets to be true.
	From: E.J. Lowe (An essentialist approach to Truth-making [2009], p.202)
	A reaction: It is good to ask what we mean by 'makes'. I like essentialist explanations, but this may be misplaced. Observing that y makes x true seems to be rather less than actually explaining how it does it. What would such explanations look like?

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing

21982	I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
	Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people."
	From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7
	A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork.

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes

18353	Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals [Lowe]
	Full Idea: Modes are real beings that stand in non-contingent formal ontological relations both to individual substances and to immanent universals.
	From: E.J. Lowe (An essentialist approach to Truth-making [2009], p.212)
	A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but I pass it on. 'Modes' seem to invite the Razor, if we already have substances and universals. I am no clear about 'instantiation' because I now have the word 'mode' to play with.

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes

18352	Tropes have existence independently of any entities [Lowe]
	Full Idea: Pure trope theorists must apparently hold that each trope has its identity underivatively, not that it depends for it on or owes it to other entities of any sort.
	From: E.J. Lowe (An essentialist approach to Truth-making [2009], p.207)
	A reaction: Lowe defends dependent 'modes' of things, against independent 'tropes'. Good, but he then has to say what the thing is (a modeless 'substance'?), because it can't just be a bundle of modes or tropes.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities

7401	Heat and colour don't exist, so cannot mislead about the external world [Galileo, by Tuck]
	Full Idea: Galileo argued that there is no such thing as heat (and hence also as colour) in the external world, so there is no reason to conclude from colour-blindness that we cannot know the truth about the world.
	From: report of Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.1
	A reaction: This key idea, taken up by Gassendi, Descartes and Locke, seems to me to be one of the most important (and, in retrospect, rather obvious) facts ever worked out by the human mind. Why does anyone still doubt it?

5454	Tastes, odours and colours only reside in consciousness, and would disappear with creatures [Galileo]
	Full Idea: I think tastes, odours, colours, and so on are mere names as far as the objects are concerned, and only reside in consciousness. Hence if the living creature were removed, all these qualities would be wiped away and annihilated.
	From: Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]), quoted by Brian Ellis - The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism Ch.3
	A reaction: A nice bold assertion of the primary/secondary distinction from the first great scientist. I agree, and to disagree (and hence side with Berkeley and Hume) is to head for metaphsical and epistemological confusion.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism

16560	Galileo introduced geometrico-mechanical explanation, based on Archimedes [Galileo, by Machamer/Darden/Craver]
	Full Idea: The modern idea of explaining with mechanisms became current in the 17th century when Galileo articulated a geometrico-mechanical form of explanation based on Archimedes' simple machines. This became the 'mechanical philosophy'.
	From: report of Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]) by Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C - Thinking About Mechanisms 5.2
	A reaction: So is Archimedes the source? I would say that mechanical explanation is just commonsense, and is predominant in all human thinking, even in tiny infants.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature

3645	To understand the universe mathematics is essential [Galileo]
	Full Idea: The great book of the universe cannot be understood unless one can understand the language in which it is written - the language of mathematics.
	From: Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623], VI.232)
	A reaction: Nice, though one might say that humans created the language of maths to help them discuss the patterns they perceived in nature. Maybe what is special is order, and all order can be described mathematically.