Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'On the Ultimate Origination of Things' and 'Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow'

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9 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom

19336	Wisdom involves the desire to achieve perfection [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The wiser one is, the more one is determined to do that which is most perfect.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.151)
	A reaction: Debatable. 'Perfectionism' is a well-known vice in many areas of life. Life is short, and the demands on us are many. Skilled shortcuts and compromises are one hallmark of genius, and presumably also of wisdom.

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing

21982	I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
	Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people."
	From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7
	A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork.

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence

7696	Leibniz first asked 'why is there something rather than nothing?' [Leibniz, by Jacquette]
	Full Idea: The historical honour of having first raised the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" belongs to Leibniz.
	From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697]) by Dale Jacquette - Ontology Ch.3
	A reaction: I presume that people before Leibniz may well have had the thought, but not bothered to even articulate it, because there seemed nothing to say by way of answer, other than some reference to the inscrutable will of God.

19341	There must be a straining towards existence in the essence of all possible things [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Since something rather than nothing exists, there is a certain urge for existence, or (so to speak) a straining toward existence in possible things or in possibility or essence itself; in a word, essence in and of itself strives for existence.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.150)
	A reaction: Thus 'essence precedes existence'. Not sure I understand this, but at least it places an active power at the root of everything (though Leibniz probably sees that as divine). The Big Bang triggered by a 'quantum fluctuation'?

19428	Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: From the very fact that something exists rather than nothing, we recognise that there is in possible things, that is, in the very possibility or essence, a certain exigent need of existence, and, so to speak, some claim to existence.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.347)
	A reaction: I love the fact that Leibniz tried to explain why there is something rather than nothing. Bede Rundle and Dale Jacquette are similar heroes. As Leibniz tells us, contradictions have no claim to existence, but non-contradictions do.

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity

5047	The world is physically necessary, as its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Although the world is not metaphysically necessary, such that its contrary would imply a contradiction or logical absurdity, it is necessary physically, that is, determined in such a way that its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.139)
	A reaction: How does Leibniz know things like this? The distinction between 'metaphysical' necessity and 'natural' (what he calls 'physical') necessity is a key idea. But natural necessity is controversial. See 'Essentialism'.

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason

19343	We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: In practical affairs one always follows the decision rule in accordance with which one ought to seek the maximum or the minimum: namely, one prefers the maximum effect at the minimum cost, so to speak.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.150)
	A reaction: Animals probably do that too, and even water sort of obeys the rule when it runs downhill.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature

19429	The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: There is always in things a principle of determination which is based on consideration of maximum and minimum, such that the greatest effect is obtained with the least, so to speak, expenditure.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.347)
	A reaction: This is obvious in human endeavours. Leibniz applied it to physics, producing a principle that shortest paths are always employed. It has a different formal name in modern physics, I think. He says if you make an unrestricted triangle, it is equilateral.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation

8433	There are few traces of an event before it happens, but many afterwards [Lewis, by Horwich]
	Full Idea: Lewis claims that most events are over-determined by subsequent states of the world, but not by their history. That is, the future of every event contains many independent traces of its occurrence, with little prior indication that it would happen.
	From: report of David Lewis (Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow [1979]) by Paul Horwich - Lewis's Programme p.209
	A reaction: Lewis uses this asymmetry to deduce the direction of causation, and hence the direction of time. Most people (including me, I think) would prefer to use the axiomatic direction of time to deduce directions of causation. Lewis was very wicked.